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COMMISSION DECISION 
of 16 july 2003 
relating to a proceeding under Article 82 of the EC Treaty 
(COMP/38.233 - Wanadoo Interactive) 
 
(Only the French version is authentic) 
 
In the published version of this decision, some information has been omitted pursuant to Articles 20(2) and 21(2) 
of Council Reulation (EC) No 17/62 (replaced by Articles 28(2) and 30(2) of Council Regulation (EC No 
1/2003) concerning non-disclosure of business secrets and other confidential information. The omissions are 
shown thus [...]*. Where possible the information omitted has been replaced by ranges of figures or a general 
description. 
THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, 
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, 
Having regard to Council Regulation No 17 of 6 February 1962, the first Regulation 
implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty,1 as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 
1216/1999,2 and in particular Articles 3 and 15(2) thereof, 
Having regard to the Commission decision of 27 July 1999 to initiate an investigation into the 
telecommunications sector, 
Having regard to the Commission decision of 19 December 2001 to initiate proceedings in 
this case, 
Having given the firms concerned the opportunity to make known their views on the 
objections raised by the Commission in accordance with Article 19(1) of Council Regulation 
No 17 and with Commission Regulation (EC) No 2842/98 of 22 December 1998 on the 
hearing of parties in certain proceedings under Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty,3 
Having consulted the Advisory Committee on Restrictive Practices and Dominant Positions, 
Having regard to the report of the Hearing Officer, 
Whereas: 
                                                
1  OJ 13, 21.2.1962, p. 204/62. 
2  OJ L 148, 15.6.1999, p. 5. 
3  OJ L 354, 30.12.1998, p. 18. 
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I. THE FACTS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
(1) High-speed Internet access is a key factor in the development of the information 
society in Europe. By making the Internet quicker, easier and more convenient to use, 
and by enlarging the range of applications and uses which it makes possible, high-
speed Internet access contributes to the development of e-commerce and the 
emergence of new electronic forms of distribution, which lends it a crucial economic 
and strategic dimension. The spread of high-speed Internet access in Europe depends 
to a significant extent on digital subscriber line, or DSL, services being made available 
on the local access networks run by telecom incumbents. These local access networks, 
which link end-users to the general telecom network, are known as local loops. 
Commercial DSL service provision really got started in Europe in 1999. 
(2) Against this background, the Commission decided, in July 1999, to launch an inquiry 
into the sector pursuant to the powers conferred on it by Article 12(1) of Regulation 
No 17, which focused in part on the provision of local loop access services and 
residential local loop services.4 The inquiry's main aim was to find evidence of anti-
competitive pricing for services using the local loop, of entry barriers and of predatory 
pricing. 
                                                
4  Decision C(99)2435 of 27 July 1999. 
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(3) Further to information obtained from France Télécom and its subsidiary Wanadoo 
Interactive and evidence submitted by several of Wanadoo Interactive's Internet 
service provider (ISP) competitors within the framework of this sector inquiry, the 
Commission decided to take a close look at the prices which Wanadoo Interactive 
charged its residential customers in France for high-speed Internet access and 
launched own-initiative proceedings in September 2001. In addition to these 
proceedings, it sent several requests for information to France Télécom, Wanadoo 
Interactive and its competitors and conducted an inspection on the company's premises 
in April 2002. The Commission also sent Wanadoo Interactive two successive 
statements of objections, dated 19 December 2001 and 9 August 2002 respectively, to 
which Wanadoo Interactive replied on 4 March and 23 October 2002 respectively. 
(4) The period covered by this Decision runs from January 2001 to October 2002 and 
coincides with a tremendous boom in the high-speed Internet access market in France. 
In less than two years, the number of subscribers to high-speed Internet access services 
increased fivefold from around 200 000 to more than one million. The main 
beneficiary of this growth was Wanadoo Interactive, a France Télécom subsidiary with 
a market share of more than [70- 80]* % at the end of the period. 
(5) The facts set out below concern Wanadoo Interactive's strategy of below-cost pricing 
as practised between January 2001 and October 2002 on the high-speed Internet access 
market. These practices concerned two of Wanadoo Interactive's high-speed products 
for residential customers, Wanadoo ADSL and eXtense, both of which are based on 
ADSL technology,5 which itself is a variation on DSL technology.6 The following 
paragraphs provide a detailed analysis of the revenue generated by these services and 
the related overheads and clarify the method chosen by the Commission to determine 
whether the prices charged could be regarded as constituting predatory pricing, in the 
light of the following legal analysis. They also set out evidence which was found when 
the on-site inspection was carried out and which sheds light on Wanadoo Interactive's 
in-house pricing deliberations and its high-speed access strategy. 
B. THE COMPANY 
(6) Wanadoo Interactive is part of the France Télécom group. 99.9% of its capital is held 
by Wanadoo SA. France Télécom's shareholding in Wanadoo SA fluctuated between 
70% and 72.2% during the period covered by this Decision. France Télécom is 56% 
state owned. Before the beginning of 2001, Wanadoo Interactive was known as France 
Télécom Interactive.7 The group formed by Wanadoo SA and its subsidiaries (“the 
Wanadoo group”) encompasses all France Télécom's Internet activities and its 
telephone directory business. The Wanadoo group’s activities therefore include 
Internet access, general or theme-based portals, e-commerce, printed, Minitel and 
                                                
5  Asymmetric Digital Subscriber Line. 
6  ADSL is technology enabling the terminal part of the telephony network to be digitised using high-
speed bandwidth over a single copper pair. The basic telephony service occupies a bandwidth of a few 
kilohertz. By setting up a modem and specific ADSL filter at each end of the copper pair, bandwidths 
ranging from 20 kHz to more than 1 megahertz can be used. The enriched line can process bi-
directional data traffic ranging from a few hundred kilobit/s to several megabit/s while also enabling 
simultaneous telephone use. 
7  For the sake of simplicity it will be referred to in what follows as “Wanadoo Interactive” irrespective of 
the period in question. 
 EN    EN 
Internet directories and Internet services for business and industry. Within the group, 
Wanadoo Interactive covers operational and technical aspects of Internet access 
services in France, including the ADSL services discussed in this Decision. 
(7) Basically, the Wanadoo group's activities consist of two major segments: access, 
portals and e-commerce on the one hand and directories and services for business 
users on the other. Between 2000 and 2002, the first segment's performance was 
particularly impressive. Two factors acted as a motor for growth: a substantial increase 
in the number of active subscribers and rising revenue from individual subscriptions as 
a result of the development of high-speed Internet access services. 
(8) In 2000 the Wanadoo group recorded consolidated pro forma turnover of €1 111 
million, EBITDA8 of - €66.4 million and a net consolidated result of - €102 million.9 
Turnover on directories and services for business users amounted to more than €741 
million in that year, i.e. more than two-thirds of the consolidated turnover of Wanadoo 
SA and its subsidiaries.10 Income from the access, portals and e-commerce segment 
totalled €370 million. Turnover from Internet access accounted for 22% of total 
consolidated turnover.11 While the access, portals and e-commerce segment recorded 
negative EBITDA of €285 million, directories and services for business users 
generated positive EBITDA of more than €225 million. 
(9) The Wanadoo group realised an operating result (EBITDA) of - €63.534 million in 
2001 and of + €28.5 million in the first half of 2002. The net consolidated result for 
the two periods amounted to - €193.2 million and - €38.5 million respectively. The 
contribution of the group's two main segments can be summarised as follows. 
Turnover on the group's Internet activities was €715 million and €516 million 
respectively (i.e. 45% of the group total) in 2001 and the first half of 2002; the 
segment's operating result for those two periods was - €359 million and - €112 million 
respectively. Directories and services for business users generated turnover of €848 
million (54% of the group total) in 2001 and €401 million (43% of the group total) in 
the first half of 2002. The segment's operating result in these two periods amounted to 
€218 million and €125 million respectively. 
(10) Wanadoo's consolidated accounts therefore showed significant losses in 2000 and 
2001; the profits generated by the second segment did not completely offset the major 
losses recorded by the first. Better operating conditions for Internet access activities 
enabled the group to break even in the first half of 2002. 
(11) The Wanadoo Interactive subsidiary, to which this Decision is addressed and which 
specialises in Internet access activities in France, recorded turnover of €402 million, 
an operating result of - €92 million (i.e. - 23% of turnover) and a net result of - €89 
million in 2001. In the first half of 2002 it recorded turnover of €305 million, an 
operating result of €31 million and a net result of €26 million. 
(12) At 30 June 2001 Wanadoo Interactive had 2.33 million active Internet subscribers in 
France. The Wanadoo group's UK subsidiary, Freeserve, which had been acquired at 
                                                
8  Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortisation. 
9  Information for that year is taken from Wanadoo's 2000 annual report. 
10  “Paper” advertising alone generated revenue of more than €558 million, i.e. half total turnover. 
11  With revenue of almost €250 million. 
 EN    EN 
the start of the year, had 2.03 million subscribers in the United Kingdom. At 1 January 
2002 Wanadoo had more than six million customers in Europe; by September 2002 it 
had more than seven million. 
C. THE SERVICES 
1. Introduction: Internet access in France 
(13) Internet access services consist in an Internet service provider (ISP) offering Internet 
access via a terminal and a wide range of services such as navigation, email, 
downloading of files and applications, hosting of personal pages, user networking, etc. 
In the vast majority of cases Internet subscribers are connected to their ISP either via a 
telephone line,12 by cable (in areas served by cable networks) or via a dedicated link. 
During the period covered by this Decision and at the time of its publication, Internet 
access via mobile terminals13 accounted for only a very marginal share of the market. 
(14) In the first half of 2001 the number of Internet subscriptions in France was estimated 
at more than 6.1 million. By 31 March 2002 this number was estimated at 7.72 
million, 29% up on the previous year. By 30 September of that year there were more 
than 8.46 million active Internet subscribers in France.14 
2. The services: high-speed Internet access for residential customers 
(15) High-speed Internet access is a specific Internet access service for which access modes 
enabling high-speed traffic are required. The respective characteristics of low-speed 
and high-speed access are clearly identified by service providers and consumers alike. 
(16) The main advantage of high-speed access over dial-up access is that it makes the 
Internet much more convenient to use by virtue of: 
– upload and download speeds which are significantly higher than those offered 
by low-speed Internet access, 
– the possibility of an always-on connection and being able to use the same 
access line for telephone calls or other communications (such as fax messages) 
while still linked up to the Internet.15 
(17) From a practical viewpoint, residential users can currently obtain a high-speed Internet 
connection in two ways involving relatively minor differences in performance but 
different technical constraints:16 
                                                
12  There are no systematic data on this subject. However, on the basis of the figures published by the 
Association des Fournisseurs d'Accès or the Autorité de régulation des télécommunications (ART), 
Internet access via a fixed telephone line was still thought to account for more than 95% of total 
residential customer logons at the end of the first quarter of 2001. 
13  WAP services on mobile telephony networks. 
14  Source: Association des fournisseurs d'accès à Internet, data as at 30 June 2001, 31 March 2002 and 30 
September 2002. 
15  Low-speed Internet access entails making a specific connection every time the user logs on, which 
means he cannot make or receive telephone calls simultaneously on the same line. 
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– either via a telephone line adapted to the needs of ADSL technology, with 
equipment (modem, filters) which separates voice traffic frequencies from data 
traffic frequencies, thus enabling the telephone and Internet to be used 
simultaneously. The shorter the distance between the subscriber's terminal and 
the distributor in which the operator's multiplexer is located, the better the 
performance;17 
– or via cable with a modem linked to the cable operator's network. However, 
precisely because of the “cascade” structure of cable networks, saturation 
problems may arise where large numbers of subscribers in the same area access 
the network at the same time. 
In both cases, the options offered by service providers reflect the risks inherent in the 
access mode in question in terms of the undertakings given on speed of access and 
service availability.18 Although watertight speed guarantees are not always 
forthcoming, service providers generally undertook to deliver a download 
performance of 512 kbit/s (network to subscriber) and an upload performance of 128 
kbit/s (subscriber to network) during the period covered by this Decision. 
(18) To benefit from high-speed Internet access, residential users must have a telephone 
line or high-speed access cable and an ISP subscription enabling them to access the 
web. Consumers can opt to buy high-speed access separately from a provider such as 
France Télécom or a cable operator and to take out an Internet subscription from a 
specialist provider. Buying the service from two separate providers means they can 
cancel their subscription to one of the two components of unlimited access. 
Alternatively, consumers may prefer a single transaction in which they purchase a 
package comprising high-speed access and Internet service. 
(19) As the operator of the local telephone access network known as a local loop, France 
Télécom occupies a special position on the market. The telecom incumbent offers the 
high-speed access line component only, leaving Wanadoo Interactive to market 
Internet access subscriptions, portals and contents. Since end-1999 France Télécom 
has offered an ADSL service targeted on residential customers known as Netissimo 1. 
France Télécom customers who have taken out a subscription to Netissimo 1 can buy 
Internet access from the ISP of their choice if they so wish. 
(20) The main high-speed ISPs using ADSL technology during the period covered by this 
Decision were Wanadoo Interactive, Club Internet (T-Online France), Nerim, Easynet, 
Mangoosta,19 Infonie,20 Tiscali-Liberty Surf and 9Online. These companies started 
marketing ADSL right at the end of 1999. 
                                                                                                                                                   
16  Optic fibres and leased lines are two further options for business users. At present, rapid penetration of 
the mass customer base appears to be beyond the capacity of wireless local loops and satellite for 
technical reasons. 
17  Saturation problems may also occur in view of the fact that customers share some traffic merger 
infrastructure, […]* . 
18  High-speed Internet services via cable modem are slightly less attractive than ADSL, at least for very 
heavy users, because a supplementary charge is usually made once users exceed a certain monthly 
traffic threshold (or a certain number of hours online each month). 
19  Company taken over by Nerim in August 2001. 
20  Infonie's ISP activities were taken over by Liberty Surf on 23 November 2001. 
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(21) The main cable operators involved in providing high-speed Internet access are Est 
Vidéocommunication, France Télécom Câble, a France Télécom subsidiary which 
provides technical back-up for Câble Wanadoo, NC Numéricâble, Noos and UPC 
France. All these operators link sales of Internet access per se to sales of high-speed 
access. Noos subscribers also buy Noos's Internet service, UPC subscribers use 
Chello's, NC Numéricâble customers subscribe to AOL's and France Télécom Câble 
customers buy Wanadoo Interactive's. Internet access via cable modem was first made 
available at the end of 1997. 
D. WANADOO INTERACTIVE'S “GENERAL PUBLIC” ADSL PRODUCTS AND 
CORRESPONDING REVENUE 
(22) Wanadoo Interactive sells ADSL-based high-speed Internet access services and cable-
based access services. The latter, which are marketed under the Wanadoo Câble 
trademark, are not covered by this Decision, which is solely concerned with Wanadoo 
ADSL and eXtense services. 
1. Wanadoo ADSL et eXtense 
(23) Wanadoo Interactive started providing high-speed Internet access under its own 
trademark at the end of 1999. Until January 2001 the company simply offered, under 
the “Wanadoo ADSL” brand name, its own high-speed Internet access service 
complementing France Télécom's Netissimo 1 service (i.e. provision of an ADSL 
line). Under these arrangements, Wanadoo ADSL customers pay a monthly 
subscription to France Télécom for the service,21 the rental of the ADSL modem from 
France Télécom, as well as a subscription to Wanadoo Interactive as the ISP (i.e. FRF 
(French francs) 135 or €20.58 per month inclusive). 
(24) In addition to this initial offering, since 8 January 2001 Wanadoo Interactive has 
offered a package targeted on the same customers. Since that date it has sold France 
Télécom's Netissimo 1 service and unlimited flat-rate Internet access as a package 
known as “eXtense” or “kit eXtense”22 for a monthly subscription of FRF 298 or 
€45.42, taxes included. Subscribers who opt for this solution do not need to maintain a 
specific contractual relationship with France Télécom for the ADSL service per se 
because they simply buy a modem at a cost of FRF 990 or €150 (taxes included) 
instead of renting one from France Télécom.23 
(25) The launch of eXtense boosted the development of the ADSL services marketed by 
Wanadoo Interactive. It will be seen from Table 1 that since the launch Wanadoo 
ADSL's customer base has expanded at a relatively slow rate in comparison with the 
rapid growth recorded by the eXtense package. However, in the second quarter of 
                                                
21  The retail price of the service provided by France Télécom to final users varied from €30.18 inclusive at 
the beginning of 2001 to €25 inclusive as of October 2002. 
22  This offering was referred to as Xtense during the first few months of 2001. It was then renamed 
eXtense, the name which will be used hereinafter. 
23  The starter pack sold by Wanadoo Interactive comprises a USB plug and play modem, a configuration 
CD Rom, a modem installation CD Rom, three distributed filters, an RJ 11 connection cable, an 
installation manual and user guide and a 30-minute helpline card. 
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2002 […]*as a result of the French Competition Council's decision to take action 
against France Télécom for marketing the package in its shops.24 
  Table 1: Wanadoo Interactive' ADSL subscriber base (512 kbit/s) 
 Wanadoo ADSL eXtense Total 
Dec-00  […]* […]* […]* 
Mar-01 […]* […]* […]* 
June-01 […]* […]* […]* 
Sept-01 […]* […]* […]* 
Dec-01 […]* […]* […]* 
Mar-02 […]* […]* […]* 
June-02 […]* […]* […]* 
Aug-02 […]* […]* […]* 
 
2. Total and unit revenue from Wanadoo ADSL and eXtense products 
1. Total revenue from services (2001) 
(26) Wanadoo Interactive claims that in 2001 eXtense generated revenue from 
subscriptions of around € […]*, against € […]* for Wanadoo ADSL.25 In the first half 
of 2002 eXtense generated € […]*; the corresponding figure for Wanadoo ADSL was 
€ […]*. 
2. Theoretical unit revenue from subscriptions26 
(27) In the case of Wanadoo ADSL, the monthly unit charge invoiced to each customer 
during the period under consideration amounted to FRF 113 or €17.20 (taxes 
excluded). eXtense produces a theoretical monthly unit revenue of FRF 249 or €37.98 
(taxes excluded). In both cases, this is recurrent revenue. In addition, customers who 
do not have a modem buy the starter pack when they take out a subscription. The sales 
price of the starter pack is not treated as proceeds in the following analysis, but losses 
on cost-price will be treated as non-recurrent net acquisition costs. Special deals on 
subscriptions or starter pack purchase prices during the period in question have been 
treated by the Commission as non-recurrent acquisition costs and not as losses on 
recurrent revenue. 
                                                
24  Decision No 02-MC-03 of 27 February 2002 on the referral and application for interim measures lodged 
by T-Online France. 
25  […]*. 
26  Real average revenue differs from nominal revenue as explained in points 28 to 34 below. 
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3. Actual average unit revenue from subscriptions 
(28) The month-on-month figures for actual unit revenue from Wanadoo Interactive's 
ADSL subscriptions differ from the monthly nominal subscription charge figures 
referred to in paragraph 27 for at least two reasons. 
(29) First, average net monthly revenue from subscriptions is mechanically lower than 
theoretical nominal revenue because of the time-lag between registering customers as 
subscribers and the point at which their subscription starts functioning on the one hand 
and the entry in the accounts of the first corresponding subscription payments on the 
other. The time-lag between registering new subscribers and receipt of the first 
payments amounts to […]*on average. As such, a new subscriber registered in any 
given month generates on average […]* % of the theoretical revenue from an existing 
subscriber over the whole month.27 The impact of this time-lag - which Wanadoo 
Interactive refers to as a "side effect"- is all the more significant where the subscriber 
base is growing rapidly, as Wanadoo Interactive's has been since the beginning of 
2001. 
(30) Second, […]*in 2001,[…]*.28 The resulting losses were evaluated in July 2001 at 
approximately FRF […]*for the first six months of 2001,29 i.e. the equivalent of FRF 
[…]* (€ […]*) per month on average per Wanadoo ADSL or eXtense subscriber. At 
end-October 2001 these losses were evaluated at FRF […]* for the first ten months of 
the year,30 i.e. on average FRF […]* (€ […]*) per month and per ADSL subscriber. At 
the time Wanadoo Interactive estimated that, on average, […]* % of subscribers had 
been affected [...]* since the beginning of the year. 
(31) Wanadoo Interactive contested the accounting value of the aforementioned amounts 
with the Commission but was unable to provide a detailed evaluation of […]*during 
the period in question.31 Nor was it able, on a more general note, to explain the 
discrepancies between theoretical average turnover and average turnover as per the 
accounts, which would leave the so-called side effects unexplained. However, for the 
last five months of 2001 and the first six months of 2002 it is possible to approximate 
these unexplained discrepancies by comparing the average actual turnover which an 
ADSL subscriber represents against theoretical turnover corrected by the mechanical 
effects of growth in the subscriber base. 
                                                
27  In point 7 of its reply dated 24 April 2002, Wanadoo Interactive provides a detailed explanation of the 
reasons for this time-lag between registering customers in the subscriber base and incorporating 
subscriptions in turnover (file, p. 4714 et seq.). According to Wanadoo Interactive, this analysis is also 
valid for 2002 (file, p. 6096). 
28  Article 5 of the general conditions of sale of the eXtense package service provides for customers to be 
paid compensation equivalent to one month's subscription if Wanadoo Interactive is unable to resume 
service during the business day following the day on which the interruption is notified. Over and above 
this legal obligation, dissatisfied customers are offered free subscriptions lasting several months with 
the aim of retaining them. 
29  […]* (file, p. 4657 et seq.). 
30  […]* (file, p. 4915 et seq.). 
31  Lastly, in its reply of 4 March 2003 (paragraph 77), Wanadoo Interactive disputed ever having[…]*, 
but this is directly contradicted as regards 2001 by the in-house documents referred to in footnotes 29 
and 30 to this Decision and as regards 2002 by Wanadoo Interactive's reply of 13 December 2002 to a 
request for information from the Commission (file, p. 6097). 
 EN    EN 
(32) These discrepancies are only partially explained by the purely mechanical phenomena 
underlying the difference in turnover described in paragraph 29. A comparison 
between actual average turnover and theoretical turnover32 reveals an unexplained 
differential of approximately € […]* per month for the eXtense package for the period 
from 1 August to 15 October 2001, of € […]*for the period from 15 October 2001 to 
15 February 2002 and € […]* for the period from February to June 2002. Any ex post 
assessment of the services in question must take those losses into account. 
(33) From January 2001 to October 2002 the actual average revenue (taxes excluded) from 
subscriptions to Wanadoo ADSL and eXtense was therefore significantly lower than 
the average monthly theoretical revenue, mainly because of the two phenomena 
referred to in paragraphs 29 and 30. After agreeing on a method for calculating the 
unexplained differentials in turnover with the Commission,33 Wanadoo Interactive 
eventually challenged the idea of taking these differentials into account on the basis 
that it was impossible to predict them.34 However, the Commission has pointed out 
that Wanadoo Interactive takes account of this average monthly revenue as per the 
accounts in its own management indicators, as shown by several of the company's 
budget presentations.35 A company document dated December 2001 indicates growth 
in average monthly turnover per subscriber from FRF […]* (i.e. € […]*) in January 
2001 to FRF […]* (i.e. € […]*) in October 2001.36 A document dated January 2002 
refers to an average turnover in 2001 of €[…]*per eXtense subscriber, i.e. […]* % 
less than theoretical average turnover per subscriber.37 A document from November 
2001 indicates average turnover per subscriber of € […]*in 2001 and € […]* in 2002 
for eXtense customers, i.e. still about […]* % below the theoretical average 
turnover.38 Hence Wanadoo Interactive cannot argue with any degree of justification 
that it was not aware of this type of differential or that its financial analyses did not 
contain any evidence thereof. 
(34) Below we examine average theoretical revenue corrected to reflect losses in turnover 
unexplained by side effects and corresponding in part to compensation for dissatisfied 
customers. However, apparent losses relating to the time-lag between the registration 
of new subscribers and the entry in the accounts of the corresponding subscription 
payments will not be investigated further because they are solely attributable to rapid 
growth in the subscriber base. 
4. Content-related revenue 
(35) In addition to generating revenue from subscriptions and, where appropriate, starter 
pack purchases, ADSL customers represent a less direct source of revenue in the form 
of online advertising, e-commerce and audience fees. Although these products relate 
                                                
32  See Annex 16. For 2002, the discrepancies calculated in this annex do not take account of subscriptions 
of several months offered free of charge to customers when they sign up, which are regarded in the 
Commission's analysis as costs relating to special offers. No special offers in the form of free monthly 
subscriptions for new customers were made available in 2001. 
33  […]* (file, pp. 4994-4995). 
34  Reply of 4 March 2003, paragraph 78. 
35  These documents and the Wanadoo Interactive in-house documents referred to below were obtained in 
the course of the inspection carried out on the company's premises on 4 and 5 April 2002. 
36  […]* (file, p. 2745.) 
37  […]* (file, p. 2766), […]*. 
38  […]* (file, p. 2870). 
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to activities distinct from Internet access, they are inseparable from it, and accordingly 
the Commission has incorporated the resulting revenue into its analysis. The 
corresponding figure for 2001 was estimated on an ex ante basis at € […]* (taxes 
excluded) per subscriber per month. Actual market trends produced a much lower 
result that year; around € […]*per subscriber per month. These rather disappointing 
results were confirmed before the start of 2002.39 The more modest forecast for 2002 
was between € […]*and € […]*per month and per subscriber.40 The result for the first 
half of 2002 was approximately € […]*per month per subscriber.41 
E. COSTS INCURRED BY WANADOO INTERACTIVE 
1. Costs included in the analysis 
(36) Traditionally, a distinction is drawn between variable (or operational) costs and fixed 
(or structural) costs. The 1982 French General Accounting Plan defines variable costs 
as those costs which fluctuate according to company output alone, it being understood 
that cost fluctuations are not necessarily directly proportionate to fluctuations in 
output. This definition is in line with that accepted by the Court of Justice of the 
European Communities, which defines these costs as varying “according to the 
quantities produced.”42 It should be noted that this definition does not require the 
charge to be made strictly at the same time as the good or service is produced. 
(37) In addition to this first distinction, a second is made between direct and indirect costs. 
The 1982 French General Accounting Plan defines the direct costs of a good or service 
as the costs directly attributable to it (these are usually variable or operational costs) 
and the variable or fixed costs which may be unambiguously associated with those 
costs even if they transit into the cost accounts via analysis centres corresponding to 
company activities which are not exclusively dedicated to producing the good or 
service in question. Direct costs are frequently confused with variable costs but may 
also include fixed or structural costs, like the costs associated with fixed assets 
specifically dedicated to producing the good or service in question. Indirect costs, on 
the other hand, are costs which are not directly attributable to a given product, but 
which must be broken down according to formulas determined for the various 
products and which reflect, as closely as possible, the indirect causal relationships. 
Direct costs plus indirect costs equal full costs. However, full costs generally exclude 
non-attributable costs, such as general financial costs and extraordinary costs which 
are not linked to production of the good or service in question. 
(38) Lastly, a distinction must be made, in cost analysis, between recurrent and non-
recurrent costs. With the framework of a service like a high-speed Internet 
subscription, recurrent costs are costs which arise on a periodic basis. In activities of 
this type, non-recurrent costs are costs which arise just once (or on a very occasional 
or accidental basis) per subscriber, for instance customer acquisition costs. 
                                                
39  In any event, Wanadoo Interactive learnt of these worse-than-anticipated results before  […]* file, p. 
2768). 
40  Letter from Wanadoo Interactive of 27 September 2002, point 2. 
41  Letter from Wanadoo Interactive of 28 November 2002, point 4. 
42  Case C-62/86 Akzo Chemie v Commission [1991] ECR I-3359, paragraph 71. 
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(39) Broadly speaking, Wanadoo Interactive identifies the following costs for its ADSL 
products: 
– network costs; 
– customer acquisition costs; 
– other production costs. 
(40) In 2001 those three categories accounted for […]* %,[…]* % and […]* % 
respectively of the costs of the two services combined. Acquisition costs account for 
[…]* % of the total costs of the eXtense service. 
(41) Paragraphs 42 to 69 look at the three cost types and their characteristics in the light of 
the various cost categories referred to in paragraphs 36, 37 and 38. 
2. Network costs 
(42) For residential customers to have an end-to-end high-speed Internet access service, 
Internet traffic must be kept under control on three levels. Wanadoo Interactive 
therefore uses three different services supplied by France Télécom and based on the 
requisite network architecture to ensure Internet connectivity. 
(a) First, Wanadoo Interactive uses a service known as IP/ADSL (ADSL access 
service), which is the wholesale equivalent of France Télécom's Netissimo 1 
retail service. This service ensures the ADSL link between subscribers to 
France Télécom's telephone network and a broadband access server (BAS) 
which is generally located at regional level. This section covers the public 
switched telephone network's local access segment, i.e. the telephone line, 
local link distributor fitted with an Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM) 
multiplexer and an ATM backbone regional segment linking the multiplexer to 
a BAS. Wanadoo Interactive concluded the first IP/ADSL 1 access service 
contract on […]*, just before launching its eXtense package.43 
(b) The service marketed as the IP/ADSL routing service (“routing service” or “IP 
routing service”) enables traffic to be routed and conveyed from BASs to a 
central site which acts as a service platform for Internet access subscribers. 
France Télécom connects the provider's platform to its network via a very 
high-speed connection at the end of which it has installed a router. 
(c) Lastly, beyond its service provision point, Wanadoo Interactive must be able, 
as a matter of course, to link subscribers to all worldwide Internet networks, 
and for that purpose it has taken out an international connectivity contract with 
France Télécom. 
(43) A distinction must be drawn between the Wanadoo ADSL product on the one hand 
and the eXtense service on the other. In the first case, users are directly linked to 
                                                
43  Contract No 00000031 between France Télécom Interactive and France Télécom for the provision of 
IP/ADSL 1 and IP/ADSL 2 services enclosed with the letter from France Télécom dated 20 February 
2001 in reply to the Commission's request for information dated 29 January. 
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France Télécom, which provides them with the ADSL line (via its Netissimo 1 
service), i.e. the first segment of the service referred to in paragraph 42. In this 
instance, Wanadoo Interactive covers the second and third services only, i.e. IP routing 
and international connectivity. In the second case, however, Wanadoo Interactive 
provides a continuum of services to its customer and uses France Télécom's wholesale 
services to cover the three segments referred to in paragraph 42. In this case, Wanadoo 
Interactive resells the technical service provided by France Télécom. 
(44) Wanadoo Interactive has purchased IP routing and international connectivity from 
France Télécom since […]*, and ADSL access since […]*. In addition, Wanadoo 
Interactive has been linked to France Télécom by an international Internet connectivity 
contract since […]*. 
1. Access costs 
(45) France Télécom invoices the ADSL access service by multiplying the number of 
ADSL subscribers by the basic charge calculated per subscriber line. Each individual 
subscriber generates a recurring subscription cost for this service (recurring direct 
variable costs). 
(46) Three periods must be distinguished in this connection: 
– between November 1999 and July 2001 the IP/ADSL access service was 
invoiced […]*; the cost for Wanadoo Interactive was FRF […]* (€ […]*); 
– between 1 August 2001 and 15 October 2002 the IP/ADSL access service was 
invoiced uniformly per customer, irrespective of the number of customer 
connections. The cost was lower than in the previous period (FRF 140 or 
€21.34 per subscriber); 
– as of 15 October 2002, the charge for the service was reduced again to FRF 
101.67 or €15.50 per subscriber on the basis of the same invoicing principles as 
in the previous period. 
2. Routing costs 
(47) Each customer of Wanadoo Interactive's ADSL services has an impact on the volume 
of traffic processed by France Télécom as part of the IP routing service, partly because 
of engineering rules and the statistical connection between the number of subscribers 
and the speed used, and partly because of the invoicing rules applied by France 
Télécom. 
(48) Since early 2001 the service has been invoiced in several different ways. Initially, until 
August 2001, the charge was calculated […]*. This […]*, it being assumed that each 
subscriber used approximately […]*per busy hour. During the second period, from 
August 2001 to March 2002, the service was invoiced as […]* of […]*per online 
subscriber. Lastly, during the third period, routing service invoices were drawn up on 
the basis of […]*. In all cases, over the whole of the period covered by this Decision, 
invoiced traffic is very largely determined by the number of subscribers to ADSL 
services and represents a direct variable cost. 
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(49) The invoiced service is made up of several elements: a “connection” component, with 
installation charges and a monthly licence fee44 and an IP bandwidth component for 
which a monthly fee is charged, corresponding to traffic between the ISP platform and 
final users. Until October 2002 there were two routing service variants linked to two 
separate pricing structures. The provider could subscribe to the regional routing 
service to supply customers located in the same region as its service provision 
platform. At the same time, it could subscribe to the national routing service for 
customers based outside the region. In the second case, a higher charge was made. 
Since October 2002 the price for the two types of routing has been the same. 
(50) For the period from August 2001 to March 2002, the invoicing rules for bandwidth use 
were applied […]*45. For end-2001, […]*. Various items of evidence discovered at 
Wanadoo Interactive in the course of the inspection suggest that from […]*2001 
bandwidth use per online subscriber was approximately […]*, rather than […]*.46 
Information from competitors and France Télécom itself show an underlying, regular 
growth in traffic in the first few months of 2002 to levels in excess of 40 kbits/s. […]* 
measures taken by France Télécom since March 2002 report speeds of between […]*  
and  […]* for Wanadoo Interactive between April and June 2002.47 
(51) The invoices issued to Wanadoo Interactive by France Télécom for the routing service 
at the end of 2001 were drawn up […]*48. Connection rates were below Wanadoo 
Interactive’s forecasts to autumn 2001, and average speeds per subscriber per busy 
hour invoiced by France Télécom were also below forecasts, varying between […]* 
and […]* kbit/s between August and September 2001 and between […]* kbit/s and 
[…]* kbit/s between February and June 2002.49 Actual costs as invoiced by France 
Télécom to Wanadoo Interactive for its routing service for the last five months of 2001 
and early 2002 were therefore significantly below forecasts. 
(52) The trend in routing service charges in 2002 was less favourable than anticipated. In 
October 2001 Wanadoo Interactive expected these charges to fall to € […]* per Mbit/s 
on average as from the start of 2002, […]* % down on the then price. By April 2002 it 
had already revised this estimate in its target profit and loss accounts for eXtense and 
Wanadoo ADSL products up to € […]* per Mbit/s on average from the date on which 
the new charges came into force. Lastly, the new routing charges applicable to 
Wanadoo Interactive for its traffic in France were set in July 2002 at €448 per Mbit/s 
as from 15 October 2002. 
                                                
44  However, it should be noted that the bespoke routing facility made available to Wanadoo Interactive, 
which remained valid until 1 August 2001, did not provide for any monthly subscription for the 
connection component. 
45  Point 1 of the letter from France Télécom dated 24 April 2002 in reply to the request for information 
from the Commission dated 12 April 2002. 
46  […]*file, p. 4645 et seq.). […]* (file, p. 4503 et seq.) […]* (file, p. 3545 et seq.). 
47  Letter from France Télécom dated 20 December 2002 (file, p. 6107). Measures taken between July and 
September 2002 (letter from France Télécom dated 5 February 2003) point to[…]*. 
48  Annexes 1 and 2 to the letter from France Télécom dated 24 April 2002 (file, p. 4722 et seq.). 
49  Source: tables provided by France Télécom on 3 and 29 May 2002 in reply to the Commission's request 
for information dated 14 March 2002; letter to the Commission from Mr Parfait, the CEO of Wanadoo 
Interactive, dated 7 May 2002, p. 3 (file, p. 4897 et seq.);[…]*. 
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(53) Since March 2002 France Télécom has invoiced Wanadoo Interactive [...]*50 [...]*51. 
France Télécom's decision to switch invoicing methods resulted in supplementary 
invoicing for [...]*. However, France Télécom invoiced Netissimo 1 and Netissimo 2 
type traffic [...]*. For that reason, it is difficult to identify the exact proportion of the 
supplementary invoice accounted for by Netissimo 1 and the Commission has 
discounted the slight increase in costs per subscriber which appears to have resulted 
which, incidentally, is minor in scale.52 
(54) The impact of the routing service costs associated with the connections described in 
paragraph 49 (setting-up of connection and monthly subscription) appears relatively 
marginal in comparison with other costs. These recurring connection rental costs will 
be excluded from the analysis of variable and full costs. 
(55) The cost per ADSL subscriber of the routing service can be estimated at € […]* (FRF 
[…]*) for the period from January to July 2001, at € […]* (FRF […]*) for the period 
from August to mid-October 2001, at € […]* (FRF […]*) for the period from mid-
October 2001 to February 2002 and at € […]*for the period from February to October 
2002.53 
3. The costs of international connectivity 
(56) The purpose of the international connectivity service is to convey all traffic generated 
by Wanadoo Interactive subscribers when navigating outside Wanadoo Interactive's 
platform. Although, in contrast to the other two services already described, this service 
is not specific to the provision of high-speed Internet access, there is no denying that 
each subscriber to Wanadoo ADSL and the eXtense package generates a certain 
volume of traffic and that this traffic is added to the total download requested by 
Wanadoo Interactive. In its in-house forecasts, the company includes these costs in the 
network costs of its ADSL services.54 The fee paid by Wanadoo Interactive to France 
Télécom is a variable cost because it depends on the number of Wanadoo Interactive 
subscribers. 
(57) The costs associated with international connectivity, which were stable in 2000 and 
2001, fell at the beginning of 2002 following […]*. As such, it can be estimated that 
the cost of international connectivity per ADSL subscriber has declined from € […]*to 
€ […]* on average since February 2002.55 
(58) However, it should be noted that the cost assessment of international connectivity at 
end-2001/beginning-2002 referred to in paragraph 57 is based on assumptions which 
are favourable to Wanadoo Interactive. It is assumed that international connectivity 
traffic per subscriber is equal to […]* of invoiced traffic per subscriber for the routing 
service.[…]*, France Télécom's international connectivity service is invoiced on the 
basis of the download actually measured and observed at point of presence (POP 
                                                
50  […]* (file, p. 5904). 
51  […]* (file, p. 6807 et seq.). 
52  […]* (File, p. 5904),[…]*. 
53  See Annex 17 to this Decision. 
54  Point 6 of France Télécom's reply (dated 6 December 2001) to the Commission's request for 
information dated 23 November 2001. 
55  See Annex 18 to this Decision. 
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level),. […]*56 […]*Accordingly, applying a coefficient of […]* % of theoretical 
bandwidth invoiced for the routing service in order to estimate international 
connectivity traffic results in actual traffic being underestimated. However, subject to 
that reservation, the Commission accepts the estimate provided by Wanadoo 
Interactive for the period up to April 2002 pending more accurate information on 
actual traffic. 
(59) For the period after April 2002, the Commission based its cost assessment of 
international connectivity on a coefficient of […]* % of bandwidth noted by France 
Télécom in April, May and June 2002.57 
4. Refunds […] 
(60) […]*. These sums should be deducted from the network costs actually incurred by 
Wanadoo Interactive in 2001 in the ex post analysis of costs. 
3. Customer acquisition costs 
(61) ISPs refer to costs incurred for activities designed to attract potential customers to 
services or to encourage them to take out subscriptions and costs associated with 
setting up subscriptions and services as acquisition costs (or customer conquest costs 
to use Wanadoo Interactive's terminology). These are one-off costs for each new 
subscriber, incurred at the point in time when the contractual relationship is entered 
into with the provider. Wanadoo Interactive identifies several items constituting 
customer acquisition costs: advertising, sales network fees, access costs, special offers 
and similar activities, the cost of the eXtense starter pack and other structural costs. 
1. Advertising, marketing activities and special offers 
(62) Advertising has a direct impact on the number of new subscriptions. In this instance, 
only advertising and marketing specific to Wanadoo Interactive's ADSL services were 
taken into account, to the exclusion of generic advertising on high-speed access or 
general advertising for Wanadoo or its services. 
(63) Wanadoo Interactive does not accept that advertising should be regarded as a variable 
cost. In particular, it has invoked Commission merger decisions in which advertising 
costs are presented as sunk costs.58 
(64) First, the fact that advertising costs are regarded as constituting sunk costs in the 
Commission decisions to which Wanadoo Interactive refers does not mean that they 
                                                
56  Explanations provided by France Télécom in point 4 of its letter to the Commission dated 13 November 
2002. 
57  Letter from France Télécom dated 20 December 2002 (file, p. 6108). 
58  Commission Decision IV/M.2817- Barilla/BPL/Kamps of 25 June 2002 (OJ C 198, 21.8.2002, p.4) and 
Commission Decision IV/M.430 - Procter and Gamble/VP Schickedanz of 21 June 1994 (OJ L 354, 
31.12.1994, p. 32), referred to in paragraphs 260 and 261 of Wanadoo Interactive’s reply of 23 October 
2002 to the statement of objections dated 9 August 2002. The 1994 Decision clearly states that a 
campaign in a particular magazine or media channel has a fixed cost irrespective of turnover, but it does 
not draw the conclusion that all advertising and promotional campaigns in general consist wholly of 
fixed costs. 
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cannot be treated as variable costs. Not all sunk costs are necessarily fixed costs.59 In 
addition, the advertising costs associated with a given product are generally regarded 
as direct variable costs for cost accounting purposes.60 Even if advertising costs may 
be regarded as fixed costs in the very short term because they do not have an 
absolutely immediate effect on sales, they do have a clear impact in the short term - in 
any event less than a few weeks. This is particularly true in an expanding market 
characterised by information campaigns focusing on new products or on seasonal 
special offers. It might be different for general communication expenditure merely 
designed to publicise the company and its trade mark in general, as opposed to a 
specific product. In the case in point, the advertising costs are quite specific and 
correspond to successive campaigns which focus strongly on sales promotion. There is 
accordingly a strong correlation between information campaigns and trends in 
Wanadoo Interactive's sales, with a correlation coefficient of [>0,53]*.61 The fact that, 
in chronological terms, advertising is the event which generates sales rather than a cost 
resulting from each sale taken individually does not alter this conclusion62 any more 
than the fact that the cost of advertising campaigns is not necessarily directly 
proportionate to each product unit.63 In this case the scale of the advertising and 
information campaigns was geared to the desired result, and as such the relevant costs 
were determined by a customer acquisition target. 
(65) In practice, in addition to questioning the nature of the advertising costs, Wanadoo 
Interactive disputes their inclusion in a predatory pricing test. The Commission takes 
the view that this objection is irrelevant in the case in point. This is because, in so far 
                                                
59  William J. Baumol and Robert D. Willig, ‘Fixed Costs, Sunk Costs, Entry Barriers and Sustainability of 
Monopoly’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, August 1981, e.g. p. 407. 
60  See A. Mikol, J.C. de Guardia and H. Stolowy, Comptabilité analytique et contrôle de gestion, Dunod, 
1991, p. 100. 
61  See Annex 21. The linear correlation coefficient is calculated according to the usual mathematical 
formula, as is the correlation between covariance and the square root of total variance. Correlation rates 
always range between –1 (inverse correlation) and +1 (complete correlation), with values around 0 
indicating zero correlation. Wanadoo Interactive claims in its reply of 4 March 2003 (paragraph 60) that 
a coefficient of [>0,53]* is not significant, but contradicts itself by providing, in support of its 
comments, an annex setting out elements of statistical theory which identifies precisely that figure 
([>0,53]*) as the boundary between “average correlation” and a “strong correlation”. In addition, in 
view of the range of available data pairs ([…]* variable pairs), a coefficient of [>0,53]* must be 
regarded as a particularly significant indicator of a statistical correlation between the two series of data 
(advertising expenditure on the one hand and growth in the subscriber base on the other), with a very 
low risk of error. It can be demonstrated mathematically that, for a range of variable pairs of this type, 
these pairs must be regarded as significantly correlated with a risk of error of less than 1% where the 
correlation coefficient exceeds 0.53. That condition is met in this instance. 
62  In paragraph 60 of its reply of 4 March 2003 (file, p.6871), Wanadoo Interactive claimed that a 
correlation link did not necessarily indicate a relationship of cause and effect because of what 
statisticians refer to as a “confounding factor”. The examples quoted by Wanadoo Interactive (a strong 
correlation between UK tax revenue and crime in Japan, or between wheat prices and the rodent 
population) are not relevant here. Above all, the company is unable to identify a potential “confounding 
factor” in the case in point. 
63  Wanadoo Interactive stated that, in its analysis, advertising cannot be regarded as a variable cost 
because it does not maintain a constant proportional relationship with growth in the subscriber base 
(paragraphs 63 to 65 of the reply of 4 March 2003, file, pp. 6873-6875). In the case in point, the 
Commission takes the view that growth in the subscriber base is not strictly proportional to advertising 
expenditure (which would suggest a function of the type y=a.x), but considers that it is linked to that 
expenditure by a linear relationship of the type y=a.x + b (see values of a and b as calculated in Annex 
21). In practical terms, as simple common sense would suggest, that means that growth in the subscriber 
base is partly proportional to advertising expenditure and partly generated by exogenous factors. 
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as these costs determine the development of the relevant company's subscriber base in 
a growing market and, as such, the market power it acquires or reinforces, they 
represent an essential variable of the analysis. 
(66) Special offers are motivated by the same customer acquisition logic as advertising 
campaigns. The related costs should be regarded as variable costs, particularly since 
by their very nature they are directly linked to the purchase of each new product unit 
sold (discounts, refund offers, etc.). 
2. Payments to the sales network 
(67) Payments to the sales network are also strictly proportionate to the number of new 
units sold. A commission for each new subscription is paid to the sales outlet (sales 
outlets forming part of the France Télécom network or other distribution points). 
[…]*. The average variable cost of paying sales outlets is therefore determined by 
[…]*. 
3. Service access costs 
(68) Service access costs are invoiced by France Télécom to Wanadoo Interactive for each 
new subscription to the eXtense service. For the period as a whole, these costs 
amounted to €53.40. However, between 15 October 2001 and 15 February 2002 and 
after September 2002, France Télécom exempted all ISPs from these access costs. 
4. Other production costs. 
(69) The other production costs identified by Wanadoo Interactive are: platform costs; 
customer service costs, the bulk of which are direct costs associated with the hot line 
service; customer administration costs, relating inter alia to invoicing and debt 
recovery; and customer loyalty costs. The Commission's analysis incorporates all the 
explanations provided by Wanadoo Interactive on the structure, breakdown and 
evolution of these costs and their classification as variable and fixed costs 
respectively. 
F. THE EXTENT TO WHICH COSTS WERE COVERED BY REVENUE 
(70) In this section the Commission explains and comments on various approaches that a 
test of predation might adopt, and the results arrived at when those approaches are 
applied to the revenues and costs considered in sections I.D and I.E: 
– recovery of the full instantaneous costs as recorded in the undertaking's 
accounts; 
– recovery of the full costs and of the variable unit costs as recorded in the 
accounts after they have been adjusted by spreading certain costs over several 
years; 
– recovery of the variable costs for the different generations of subscribers 
separately; 
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– recovery of the costs which the undertaking would have foreseen ex ante, 
excluding any incidental or fortuitous components that may have affected 
initial forecasts. 
(71) For each of these approaches the Commission begins its analysis in March 2001.64 
Although Wanadoo Interactive's ADSL services were launched commercially at the 
end of 1999, and made significant losses in 2000, the Commission takes the view that 
at that time the high-speed market had not yet developed sufficiently for a test of 
predation to be significant. 
(72) The merits and conceptual limits of the different approaches are outlined below. At the 
end of the analysis the Commission finds that only the adjusted costs approach allows 
any valid conclusions to be drawn; the others can help to throw further light on the 
matter, but no more. 
1. Recovery of full instantaneous costs 
(73) The instantaneous costs and revenues considered in this approach are the costs and 
revenues arising over time as they are entered month by month in the undertaking's 
cost accounts. Over the period considered, the total revenue from and the full costs 
incurred in respect of Wanadoo Interactive's two ADSL services were at 
approximately the levels shown in Table 2. 
Table 2: Revenue and full costs of ADSL and Wanadoo Interactive services 
(€ million) 
 Revenue Costs Revenue less 
costs 
Rate of recovery of 
full costs 
January-July 2001 […]* […]* […]* […]* 
August-December 
2001 
[…]* […]* […]* […]* 
January-June 2002 […]* […]* […]* […]* 
*Provisional estimate 
(74) It will be seen that the rates of recovery of full instantaneous costs were low, at 
[…]*% and […]*% in the two halves of 2001. In the first half of 2002 the rate was 
better.65 
                                                
64  The period covered by this Decision begins on 1 March 2001, but the figures given in Tables 2 and 3 
include the months of January and February 2001. This is because even though the figures specifically 
for January and February 2001 were not relevant to the analysis, the information available was not 
differentiated finely enough to make it possible to separate and disregard them. The fact that those 
figures are included in Tables 2 and 3 does not affect the assessment of the duration of the infringement. 
65  At the time of this Decision it is not possible to establish the real costs for the first half of 2002 with any 
precision. In the data assembled from the figures supplied by Wanadoo Interactive, which come directly 
from the company's cost accounts (Wanadoo Interactive's letter of 13 December 2002, p. 6 (file, p. 
6099)), there are certain cost components which are not included. The real rate of recovery of costs was 
probably appreciably lower. 
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(75) There is an important limitation on the method of analysing the recovery of 
instantaneous costs which makes it impossible to draw conclusions on this basis. In an 
expanding market, where the costs of acquiring customers form a substantial 
proportion of expenditure, a firm operating normally cannot set out to recover its full 
costs immediately. Thus the rates of recovery shown in Table 2 do not by themselves 
prove that prices were predatory, and are given here only for information. 
2. Recovery of adjusted costs 
(76) This approach is based on the consideration that it is not the firm's objective to 
produce an instantaneous profit. Rather the firm will seek to achieve a level of 
recovery of recurrent costs (network costs and production costs) which is sufficient to 
ensure that the margin between revenue and recurrent costs will, within a reasonable 
time, also cover the non-recurrent variable costs invested in the commercial 
development of the particular product, on items such as advertising, promotion, 
marketing etc. The non-recurrent variable costs are accordingly adjusted and spread 
over a certain period in line with the principle of the depreciation of assets.66 This 
method supposes that the firm seeks to secure a return on its investment within a 
reasonable time, rather than to recover all its costs at once. It may be that its prices 
will not fully cover its costs in the first few years of business, without driving off the 
market competitors with less financial stamina who are likewise investing with a view 
to reasonable profitability. 
(77) To assess the economic equilibrium of Wanadoo Interactive's ADSL services, the 
Commission has spread the costs of acquiring customers over 48 months. A 
subscription to the eXtense service ties the customer for a year at least. But to spread 
the acquisition costs over just one year would not reflect ordinary market conditions, 
since on average subscribers stay with the same service provider for longer than that. 
(78) Wanadoo Interactive has accepted this approach, though in its reply of October 2002 it 
says that in its view the average customer life is now something more like […]*.67 In 
its letter of 4 March 2003, Wanadoo Interactive maintains that four years is a “[…]*”, 
and that a duration of “[…]* would not be unreasonable”,68 basing itself on customer 
turnover between August 2001 and June 2002.69 For the reasons set out in its 
statement of objections of 19 December 2001, the Commission takes the view that the 
turnover rates observed over a period in which the clientele has been growing 
vigorously cannot be considered representative: the only such rates that would be 
useful in calculating the average customer life would be rates observed among a 
stabilised clientele. 
                                                
66  It should be pointed out, however, that Wanadoo Interactive does not carry out any depreciation of this 
kind in its own accounts, where the expenditure in question is entered at the time it arises, in the same 
way as ordinary current expenditure. 
67  See paragraphs 321 and 322 of Wanadoo Interactive's reply of 23 October 2002 (file, p. 6314). 
68  Wanadoo Interactive reply of 4 March 2003, paragraph 29 (file, p. 6866). 
69  Wanadoo Interactive arrives at an annual turnover rate of […]* % for eXtense and […]* % for 
Wanadoo ADSL. In the case of Wanadoo ADSL, however, the firm has mistakenly taken account only 
of cancellations, without also including customer migration to other products offered by the same firm. 
Wanadoo ADSL's real rate of customer turnover in annual equivalent ((out-migration + cancellations) ÷ 
average clientele) is […]* %, which according to Wanadoo Interactive would be the equivalent of an 
average customer life of […]* years. 
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(79) In their business plans Wanadoo Interactive's competitors likewise spread non-
recurrent variable costs over time, but the periods chosen are shorter than those used 
by the Commission in this case.70 In its simulations of margin squeezes the French 
regulator, the Autorité de régulation des télécommunications (ART), also uses a 
duration lower than the four years applied here.71 It should be pointed out, lastly, that 
in the period considered in this Decision the length of the period over which the non-
recurrent costs are to be spread is immaterial to the finding that the full costs are not 
covered, because the full costs are not covered even if depreciation takes place over an 
infinitely long time.72 
(80) In this Decision the “adjusted unit costs” means the sum of the recurrent unit costs, 
recorded on a monthly basis, and the (non-recurrent) acquisition costs divided by 48. 
(81) In paragraphs 82 and 83 the Commission considers the recovery of adjusted variable 
unit costs, and in paragraphs 84 to 86 the recovery of adjusted full unit costs. The 
Court of Justice has accepted two tests of cost recovery, depending on whether the 
actions of the dominant firm formed part of a plan to eliminate competitors.73 In the 
present case the Commission takes the view that Wanadoo Interactive's intentions are 
beyond doubt,74 and that the results obtained by both tests ought to be considered. 
1. Recovery of variable unit costs 
(82) Under the method of adjusting acquisition costs used by the Commission, the rates of 
recovery of variable unit costs are as shown in Table 3.75 The table also shows an 
average for the two services together,76 weighted in line with their respective shares of 
turnover in the period in question.77 
                                                
70  Oreka writes down its spending on acquisition over an average period of 18 months (file, p. 6113), 
while Tiscali and T-Online France spread the net costs of their special offers on ADSL modems over 
twelve months and two years respectively (file, pp. 5365 and 5378). 
71  The ART depreciates the €53 charged by France Télécom for access to the service over a period of 
three years. See ART opinion No 02/346 of 30 April 2002 on tariff decision No 2002033 relating to the 
development of the IP/ADSL routing offering and tariff proposals for IP/ADSL offerings announced by 
France Télécom, paragraph III.1. 
72  See paragraph 86. 
73  Akzo, paragraph 71. 
74  See section I.G. 
75  The detailed calculations are set out in Annexes 1 to 8. 
76  See Annex 15 to this Decision. 
77  In its reply of 4 March 2003, paragraphs 14-20 (file, pp. 6861-6863), Wanadoo Interactive contests this 
method of weighting, arguing that the Commission earlier weighted the figures by reference to the 
customer bases of the two services. But the Commission considers that in order to calculate an overall 
rate of cost recovery (the total revenue of the two services divided by the costs of the two services 
together), the rates of recovery observed for the two products should be weighted by reference either to 
the total revenue or to the total cost of each of them. The Commission does not possess information on 
the total cost over the entire period, and has accordingly taken the total revenue as the weighting factor 
here. To choose the customer base as the weighting factor would be arithmetically wrong: it would 
seriously overestimate the weight to be given to the Wanadoo ADSL product, treating it as if its costs 
and revenues were the same as those of the eXtense service, whereas in fact its costs and revenues per 
subscriber are only half those of eXtense. The Commission takes the view that it cannot be bound by an 
error of calculation made at an earlier stage in the proceedings, provided that in order to enable the 
undertaking to defend itself it has given it the opportunity to submit its observations on the rectification 
of the mistake, as it did in this case in its letter of 16 January 2003. 
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Table 3: Recovery of adjusted variable costs 
 eXtense Wanadoo 
ADSL 
Together 
1 January - 31 July 2001 […]*% […]*% […]*% 
1 August - 15 October 2001 […]*% […]*% […]*% 
15 October 2001 - 15 February 
2002 
[…]*% […]*% […]*% 
15 February - 15 October 2002 […]*% […]*% […]*% 
(83) For the period ending August 2001, recurring revenue was not sufficient even to cover 
recurring expenditure, irrespective of non-recurring variable costs: recovery of 
recurring costs was […]*% for the eXtense service, and […]*% for the Wanadoo 
ADSL service.78 
2. Recovery of variable unit costs 
(84) An analysis of full costs is necessary in the light of the Community case-law on 
predation. It is all the more justified in the present case because. […]*79 The use of full 
costs was particularly necessary in that Wanadoo Interactive showed a net loss from 
1999 to 2001. It could hardly avoid seeking to ensure that each product in the range 
covered its full cost, because during these years there was no product that showed a 
profit sufficient to free the other lines of business in the portfolio from the need to 
meet this objective.80 
(85) In the first seven months of 2001 there is no doubt that full costs were not covered, 
given the level of recovery of variable costs. In the period after 1 January 2001 the 
rates of recovery of full costs were as follows.81 
Table 4: Recovery of full unit costs 
 eXtense Wanadoo 
ADSL 
Together 
1 August 2001 - 31 December 2001 […]*% […]*% […]*% 
1 January 2002 – 15 October 2002 […]*% […]*% […]*% 
                                                
78  Annexes 1 and 2. 
79  This fact is evidenced in all of Wanadoo Interactive's in-house documents relating to profit-and-loss 
forecasts, product budgets and the financial results of the various offerings. An exhaustive list of the 
documents gathered at Wanadoo Interactive would be long, and the Commission will here confine itself 
to citing, by way of example, […]* (file, pp. 2869 and 2870), […]* (file, p. 2770). […]* (file, p. 2982)). 
80  The need for a gross margin that makes a sufficient contribution to the recovery of the company's full 
costs is pointed out in […]* (File, p. 2885)). 
81  For the rate of recovery shown for the two together, the individual figures are weighted in line with the 
respective share of turnover, as explained in paragraph 82 (see Annexes 13.2, 14.3 and 15.1 to this 
Decision). 
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(86) In the period January 2001 to October 2002, then, the adjusted full unit costs were 
never recovered. It should be pointed out that the choice of the length of time over 
which the non-recurrent costs are to be written off has no effect on the finding that the 
company was unable to cover its full costs in this period. In the case of eXtense, the 
margin over total production costs was always negative throughout the period, so that 
there could never be a contribution to the recovery of non-recurrent acquisition costs 
even if they were to be spread over an infinite time.82 In the case of Wanadoo ADSL, 
the margin over total production costs was likewise negative until December 2001; 
from January 2002 onward it became slightly positive, but would cover acquisition 
costs only over a period of more than 96 months. 
3. Analysis by successive generations of new subscribers 
(87) In its reply of 23 October 2002, Wanadoo Interactive criticises the Commission's 
method of adjusting acquisition costs by spreading them over 48 months.83 In order to 
analyse cost recovery, Wanadoo argues that the Commission should have calculated 
not in terms of the entire duration of the line of business but in terms of the successive 
generations of new subscribers. Wanadoo Interactive suggests two methods: first, to 
analyse the recovery of variable costs and full costs looking only at the new 
generations of subscribers in each period, and second, to carry out a discounted cash 
flow analysis for each new generation of subscribers. 
1. Analysis of adjusted costs for new generations of subscribers 
(88) For each new generation of subscribers, the method suggested by Wanadoo Interactive 
ignores the costs of acquiring previous generations.84 This method of assessing the 
equilibrium of a particular activity minimises the role played by the losses borne 
during the initial development phase. For example, Wanadoo Interactive's theory 
means that the assessment of the economic equilibrium of the ADSL business at the 
end of 2001 should not take account of the acquisition costs associated with the new 
subscribers recruited in the period January to July 2001, because a fresh generation of 
new subscribers has arrived in the meantime. Wanadoo Interactive is here calling into 
question the very principle of a spreading of acquisition costs. But despite this 
objection of principle, its theory does deserve study, as part of an analysis aimed at 
determining the period during which Wanadoo Interactive's pricing practices 
constituted a barrier to entry and to the expansion of competitors on the relevant 
market. 
(89) In a supplementary analysis, therefore, the Commission has considered the costs really 
borne by each new generation of subscribers. There is no reason to look once again at 
the period from January to August 2001: here it is not disputed that the variable costs 
were not covered. For the three succeeding periods the results are actually very close 
                                                
82  For example, if acquisition costs are spread over ten years, the rate of recovery of the full costs of 
eXtense is […]*% from August to December 2001 and […]*% from January 2002. In the case of 
Wanadoo ADSL, with costs spread over the same period, the rate of recovery is […]*% for the period 
August to December 2001 and […]*% thereafter. 
83  Wanadoo Interactive's reply of 23 October 2002, paragraph 289 and Appendix D, Annex 9. 
84  Reply of 23 October 2002, paragraphs 282 and 286. 
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to those for the subscriber population as a whole which are set out in Table 3 (within 
1.5%).85 If the recovery rates calculated for the two services are weighted in line with 
their respective shares in the progression of turnover, the result is actually less 
favourable than that obtained using the previous method in the period August to 
October 2001 and again in the period February to September 2002. 
2. A cash flow analysis would be invalid in this case 
(90) In its reply of October 2002 Wanadoo Interactive suggests that it should be considered 
whether in each new generation of subscribers the cash flow per customer, 
cumulatively over the average life of that subscriber, is positive.86 The method 
Wanadoo Interactive outlines involves a number of difficulties of principle, in the light 
of which it should be rejected. 
(91) First, this analysis does not allow any conclusion to be drawn regarding predation. In 
the most common configurations a firm pursuing a predatory policy hopes that it will 
be able to recover its initial losses in some form in the medium or long term. The 
initial loss intended to eliminate weaker competitors has to be offset by positive 
margins later. This means that there might very well be predation even though, despite 
heavy losses to the company at the beginning, the subscriber does generate a positive 
discounted cash flow over the duration of the subscription. 
(92) Second, an analysis by population of subscribers artificially segments the successive 
waves of customers, whose economic and financial significance will ultimately be 
apparent only when they are looked at together. Even if one were to accept the method 
suggested by Wanadoo Interactive with respect to the generations of subscribers 
acquired in the past, one cannot overlook the impact of future generations of 
subscribers. To assess whether Wanadoo Interactive is acting reasonably in acquiring 
new subscribers, it is not enough to look at the discounted cash flows of a group of 
subscribers recruited in a stated period: one also has to consider the prospects of 
growth in later periods. A firm's strategy is not based exclusively on the pricing of a 
particular product, but incorporates other factors such as the rate of growth and the 
commercial objectives that reflect it. The method suggested by Wanadoo Interactive 
ignores this dimension. 
(93) Let us suppose, for example, that the subscribers recruited in month t of year N allow 
the company to envisage a positive cash flow within a time frame compatible with the 
average life of a subscription. On the face of it it might be concluded that the 
recruitment of subscribers in month t of year N is profitable. But even if these 
subscribers individually may generate a positive cash flow in time, the growth of sales 
in the succeeding months (t+1), (t+2) etc. entails acquisition costs that reduce the 
profitability of the business as a whole. A segmented analysis of new recruitment 
overlooks the overall equilibrium of the business, which for the company is the vital 
question. The dynamics of sales and acquisition costs are such that the acquisition of 
new subscribers who may apparently be profitable individually in the medium term 
actually worsens the net cumulative position of the business as a whole in the short 
                                                
85  Annexes 3.2, 4.2, 5.2, 6.2, 7.2, 8.2 and 15.2. 
86  Wanadoo Interactive's reply of 23 October 2002, paragraphs 333 and 341 (file, pp. 6316 and 6317), and 
reply of 4 March 2003, paragraphs 23-25 (file, p. 6865). 
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term. This aspect deserves special attention here, because Wanadoo Interactive's 
ADSL services are growing rapidly, and the company intends this growth to continue 
at least until 2004. Even though an individual subscriber might be expected to generate 
a positive discounted cash flow over three years, therefore, Wanadoo Interactive's 
ADSL business might nevertheless continue to be in overall deficit for many years 
more. 
(94) In the short term, the recruitment of apparently profitable new subscribers will 
improve the net overall position of the activity in question only if the following 
inequality is satisfied: 
(Xt-1 + xt).m > a.xt 
where “Xt-1” is the cumulative total number of subscribers in month (t-1), “xt” is the 
number of new subscribers in month t, “m” is the margin per subscriber, and “a” is 
the acquisition cost per new subscriber. The condition can be restated (Xt-1 + xt).m - 
a.xt > 0. To put it another way, the recruitment of new subscribers will have a 
positive effect on the firm's net position only if the rate of growth of the business is 
less than m/(a-m). It is interesting to note that in the period from January 2001 to 
June 2002 the condition was never satisfied for the eXtense product.87 Thus 
regardless of the medium-term value of the successive subscribers taken individually, 
the recruitment of new subscribers constantly worsened the net position of the 
business over that period. 
(95) The Commission takes the view, therefore, that an analysis of discounted cash flows 
cannot take the place of an analysis of the overall position of the activity, because it 
gives an artificially optimistic picture of the terms of entry and expansion on the 
relevant market. 
(96) The third difficulty in the approach suggested by Wanadoo Interactive is the absence 
of the information that would be needed to reconstruct the margins anticipated by the 
company. Here and there in the company’s internal papers one can find assessments of 
trends in costs, but scattered information of this kind is not sufficient to allow a precise 
ex post reconstruction of the future revenue flows anticipated by Wanadoo Interactive 
at the time when it decided its commercial development strategy. Not even the prices 
of Wanadoo Interactive's offerings in the years 2003 and 2004 were plotted out with 
any certainty in advance. For example, several of the company's documents refer to a 
target price below FRF […]*, taxes included, for the eXtense package in 2004,88 but 
the development over time of the margin anticipated by the company was not clear. 
4. Recovery of the adjusted costs foreseeable ex ante 
(97) In order to analyse Wanadoo Interactive's tariff policy one has to reconstruct the 
recovery of variable and full costs at the end of 2001 and the first few months of 2002 
as it could reasonably have been estimated on the basis of the assumptions used at the 
time by Wanadoo Interactive for new generations of subscribers.89 As explained in 
                                                
87  See Annex 20 to this Decision. 
88  […]* (File, pp. 2901 and 2907). 
89  The short-term predation test advocated by Areeda and Turner is likewise based on the concept of 
pricing below the costs than can be “reasonably anticipated”. 
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paragraph 99, numerous incidental factors arose which affected the real outturn for the 
end of 2001 and the beginning of 2002. In the summer of 2001 it would not have been 
possible to anticipate with certainty the factors that actually affected the end of the 
year. And the factors that affected the year 2002 could not reasonably have been 
anticipated before the beginning of that year. 
(98) Wanadoo Interactive has not contested the principle of such an examination of 
foreseeable costs, which was put forward in the supplementary statement of objections 
of 9 August 2002. It has merely said that some drops in price were not incidental but 
desired, although they were not referred to in budgetary assessments and accounting 
targets.90 It quotes just one example, that of the costs of […]*, which were the subject 
of commercial negotiation in […]*. The Commission considers that these negotiations 
concluded too late […]* for Wanadoo International to have been able to allow for 
them at the time it decided its commercial development strategy for the second half of 
2001.91 
(99) It is safe to assume that in the analyses of profitability it made in summer 2001, 
Wanadoo International could not have taken account of the following incidental 
factors: 
– the fall in the costs […]*; 
– the refunds […]*,92 and the revenue foregone as a result of […]*; 
– the billing for bandwidth consumption at a level substantially lower than […]*; 
– the real distribution of subscribers between Île-de-France and the rest of the 
country […]*.93 
(100) On the other hand, Wanadoo Interactive expected that access to the service would be 
free in […]*, whereas in fact it became so only in on 15 October 2001. As regards 
advertising revenue, Wanadoo International anticipated a recovery in the market in on-
line advertising in the autumn, and it can be supposed that it envisaged advertising and 
audience revenue in line with its initial budgetary forecasts. 
(101) On the basis of the assumptions used by Wanadoo Interactive at the time, therefore, if 
the company had been using a method of adjusting acquisition costs similar to that 
used by the Commission, the rates of recovery of adjusted variable costs that it could 
have anticipated in the second half of 2001 would have been as follows: 
Table 5: Recovery of foreseeable variable costs at the end of 2001 
eXtense package Wanadoo ADSL Together 
                                                
90  Reply of 23 October 2002, footnote 101 (file, p. 6272). 
91  […]* (Letter from Wanadoo International to the Commission, 7 May 2002, note 2 (file, p. 4904)). 
92  […]* annexed to the reply of 7 May 2002 to a Commission request for information (file, p. 4913)). 
93  It will be remembered that up to the autumn of 2002 the distribution of subscribers between the Paris 
region and the rest of the country had an appreciable effect on costs, because France Télécom's routing 
charges were [...]* higher in the provinces. 
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[…]* % […]* % […]* % 
 
(102) Turning now to the foreseeable full costs for the end of 2001, the target business plan 
for the two services for the end of 2001, referred to in the statement of objections of 19 
December 2001,94 showed levels of cost recovery of […]*% before acquisition costs, 
as envisaged at the time by Wanadoo Interactive following its own methods.95 These 
levels confirm that in the middle of October 2001 Wanadoo Interactive was still 
unable to anticipate recovery of the adjusted full cost in the last weeks of 2001, either 
for eXtense or for Wanadoo ADSL. 
(103) To reconstruct the costs that could have been anticipated by the company at the end of 
2001 for the year 2002 is a more delicate exercise. The company had put forward very 
favourable hypotheses for the development of certain costs, but it knew that these 
drops in costs would not take place at once at the beginning of the year. It knew that 
the year would be divided into two periods, before and after the lowering of France 
Télécom's access and routing tariffs. 
(104) At the beginning of 2002, therefore, before France Télécom's new wholesale tariffs 
entered into force, Wanadoo Interactive could reasonably anticipate only a 
continuation of the tendencies in operation at the end of 2001, corrected to take 
account of a number of important factors: 
– access to the service would be free to Wanadoo Interactive, either because 
these expenses would be billed to the customer or as a result of periodic France 
Télécom promotion campaigns; - the costs of the hot line would fall; 
– the costs of  […]*; this was known […]*; 
– the net cost of the modem to Wanadoo Interactive would be reduced to […]*;  
– the costs of international connectivity would be reduced, though the bandwidth 
consumption assumed would be the same as in 2001.96 
(105) On the basis of these hypotheses it can be presumed that at the beginning of 2002, 
before the new routing tariffs entered into force, Wanadoo Interactive could work on 
the assumption that the profitability of new subscribers, calculated according to the 
adjusted costs method used by the Commission, would be as shown in Table 6. As 
                                                
94  Paragraphs 49 and 56 of the statement of objections of 19 December 2001. 
95  These costs are unadjusted, unlike those used under the Commission’s method. But the difference does 
not affect the comparison of the results, because Wanadoo Interactive’s evaluation does not include 
acquisition costs, and the effect of acquisition costs is greatly minimised when they are spread over four 
years in accordance with the Commission’s method. The figures in the Commission’s estimates and in 
the target profit-and-loss account are consequently fairly similar. 
96  At the very beginning of 2002 Wanadoo Interactive was not in a position to know that the bandwidth 
per subscriber would ultimately be evaluated on a […]* basis[…]*. Indeed this point is not even 
referred to in Wanadoo Interactive's reply of 4 March 2002 to the statement of objections of 19 
December 2001. 
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eXtense accounted for the bulk of the 2002 sales objectives,97 Wanadoo Interactive 
could not expect fully to cover its variable costs. 
Table 6: Recovery of foreseeable variable costs at the beginning of 2002 
eXtense package Wanadoo ADSL Together 
[…]*% […]*% […]*% 
 
(106) In the second period in 2002, after the point when the sharp fall in prices that 
Wanadoo Interactive anticipated had taken place, Wanadoo Interactive could on the 
basis of its forecasts envisage the recovery of about 100% of the full costs as adjusted 
by the Commission's method. 
5. Conclusion on recovery of costs 
(107) It will be seen that for the whole of the period from January 2001 to October 2002 
Wanadoo Interactive never covered the variable costs or the full costs relating to its 
ADSL services as they appeared in its own accounts. Even in 2002, when profitability 
improved, every additional month, bringing its cohort of new subscribers, worsened 
the net position of the ADSL business. This straightforward finding is repeated here 
only for the sake of clarity. 
(108) The Commission has applied a method designed to assess whether Wanadoo 
Interactive's ADSL services had a production margin sufficient to cover the costs of 
acquiring new subscribers if the acquisition costs are depreciated over 48 months. To 
supplement this analysis, given that fortuitous circumstances arose at the end of 2001, 
the Commission has also evaluated the extent to which Wanadoo Interactive could 
have made a positive forecast of the profitability of its ADSL services in the second 
half of 2001 and at the beginning of 2002 on the basis of the working hypotheses 
available in the company at that time. 
(109) The Commission has concluded from this method and the supplementary assessments 
referred to in this section that: 
– from 1 January 31 July 2001 Wanadoo Interactive did not cover the variable 
costs of its ADSL services; 
– from 1 August 2001 to 15 October 2002 Wanadoo Interactive never covered its 
full costs, but barely or almost covered its adjusted variable costs, though until 
March 2002 it could not have foreseen this; 
– after 15 October 2002 Wanadoo Interactive covered its costs as adjusted in 
accordance with the method used by the Commission. 
                                                
97  In the first two months of 2002, eXtense accounted for […]*% of Wanadoo Interactive's sales of ADSL 
products on the residential market, as compared with […]*% in the third quarter of 2001. […]* only in 
February 2002, when the Competition Council banned the marketing of eXtense packages in France 
Télécom shops. This […]* was not foreseeable. 
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G. INTERNAL COMPANY PAPERS CONCERNING A STRATEGY OF PREEMPTION OF THE HIGH-
SPEED MARKET 
1. The intention to preempt the high-speed market was formulated 
(110) Several documents found on Wanadoo Interactive's premises attest the existence of a 
strategy of preemption of the high-speed market or “ADSL market”. In particular: 
– a document dating from July 200098[…]*99  […]* 
–  […]*;100 
– ; […]*101 
–  […]*; 
– […]*speaking of the period from 2001 to 2003, […]*102 
(111) This objective of preempting the high-speed market is a reflection at Internet service 
provider level of the objective set for France Télécom as a whole by its chairman with 
respect to ADSL, namely “to preempt the market by stealing a march on our 
competitors”.103 
(112) A translation of this concept of preemption into market share terms can be seen in 
several documents, which state that Wanadoo Interactive is trying not just to be the 
market “leader” but to take and hold very large market shares. 
(113)  […]*.104 
(114) […]*: 
– […]*;105 
– […]*106 […]*. 
(115) […]*107[…]*.108  […]*109 
(116) […]*.110  […]*111  […]* 
 
                                                
98  […]* (file, p. 3827). 
99  This expression refers to the product that was later called eXtense. 
100  […]*  (file, p. 3124). 
101  […]*  (file, p. 3764). 
102  […]*  (file, p. 4261). 
103  Quoted in the judgment of the Paris Appeal Court in France Télécom v T-Online, 9 April 2002, p. 4. 
104  […]* (file, p. 3764). 
105  […]*  (file, p. 3276). 
106  Wanadoo Interactive's assessment of its market share here is well below its real share at that time. 
107  […]*  (file, p. 4155). 
108  […]*  (file, p. 4157). 
109  […]* (file, p. 3095). 
110   […]* 
111  […]* (file, p. 2708 et seq.). 
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(117) […]*.112  […]* 
(118) The strategy pursued on the high-speed market formed part of a broader effort to 
increase market shares for all forms of Internet access.  […]*113  […]* 
(119) Wanadoo Interactive has contested the significance of the papers cited here and of the 
word “preemption” they use, and the relevance of the ambitions expressed in terms of 
market share. The words quoted by the Commission, it says, merely reflect the 
dialectic of the decision-making process in a big organisation; they represent the views 
of their authors, and not of the company as a legal person. And they are informal and 
impromptu manners of speaking, or in some cases off-the-cuff messages not 
thoroughly thought through.114 
(120) As a matter of strict fact the Commission feels it ought to refute this contention. 
(121) First, the words quoted regarding the objective of preemption were for the most part 
not uttered in the course of “aimless conversations”, as Wanadoo Interactive has 
claimed.115 Three of the five passages referring to preemption which have been quoted 
here are taken from formal presentations to management meetings. The document 
from which the fourth passage is taken is […]* not a document prepared by Wanadoo 
Interactive's sales management as a means of motivating its sales staff on the ground, 
as the company has maintained.116 
(122) Some documents, […]*, could indeed be described as informal, but this makes it all 
the more instructive to observe the way the objective of preempting the market 
permeated the company, appearing in papers of very different kinds. Looking beyond 
the diversity of the documents, therefore, one can see practical evidence of the 
company's unity of purpose. Contrary to what Wanadoo Interactive claims, the authors 
of these papers never do actually discuss the objective of preempting the market: it is 
quite clearly the initial assumption they all make. 
(123) Nor are the quotations given here from the words of junior employees in the company: 
they are all from senior managers, and indeed […]*. It is hardly likely, therefore, that 
they should be off-the-cuff messages not thoroughly thought through.117 
(124) Wanadoo Interactive has rightly pointed out that the market share targets announced 
are not absolutely identical: the estimates of Wanadoo Interactive's share of the high-
speed market range from […]*% to […]*%, with the exception of one document 
giving a figure of […]*%. The company has complained that the Commission has not 
tried to rank these evaluations in the order of their importance.118 Let us therefore 
consider the document with the greatest authority, […]*. It was this presentation that 
announced market share targets of […]*% for dissociated ADSL offerings, like 
Wanadoo ADSL, and […]*% for packaged ADSL offerings, like eXtense. A 
                                                
112  File, p. 3316. 
113  […]*  (file, p. 2897). 
114  Reply of 23 October 2002, paragraph 181 (file, p. 6289). 
115  Reply of 23 October 2002, paragraph 182 (ibid.). 
116  Reply of 23 October 2002 to the statement of objections of 9 August 2002, paragraphs 162 and 175. 
117  It should be noted, too, that their tone is measured and quite unlike the examples of belligerent language 
and rousing rhetoric cited by Wanadoo Interactive (reply of 23 October 2002, footnote 141). 
118  Reply of 4 November 2002, footnote 150. 
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document immediately subsequent to that presentation confirms the objective of taking 
[…]*% of the dissociated ADSL offerings segment by 2004.119 
2. Internal thinking on the price level and Wanadoo Interactive's knowledge of 
the economic and financial impact of the development of its ADSL services 
(125) In the course of its investigations the Commission has been able to take stock of the 
internal process of reflection on the setting of prices for the services in question and 
the economic and financial effects of the tariffs decided. The material gathered on the 
company's premises is outlined below. 
(126) A large number of company documents, […]*confirm that the company was aware of 
the dangers associated with its pricing of ADSL services from a very early stage. 
These documents clearly show that Wanadoo Interactive knowingly weighed a short-
term profitability objective against an objective of vigorous penetration of the market, 
and that it deliberately sacrificed the first to the second.  […]* 
(127) […]*the price of the Wanadoo ADSL service was set at FRF 135 (or €20.58), taxes 
included.120 […]*.121 […]*. It was originally a promotional offer,122 but became a 
permanent price. 
(128) From January 2001 the price of the eXtense package subscription was set at FRF 298 
per month, taxes included. That price and the price of the “pack” containing the 
modem had been the subject of different hypotheses for more than a year. 
(129) Much earlier, […]*, a price target of FRF[…]*, taxes included, for a subscription to 
the projected product, then called […]*, had been mentioned[…]*.123 
(130) In spring 2000, when prospects for the launch of a packaged offering by Wanadoo 
Interactive were hardening, there was mention of a subscription price of FRF[…]*, 
taxes included.124 […]*. [...]*125 But that scenario lost ground in summer 2000, 
after[…]*. 
(131) From summer 2000 onward, several alternative scenarios for combining the price of 
the pack and the monthly subscription were under discussion.126 Under the hypotheses 
being studied, subscription prices for 2000 and 2001 ranged from FRF […]* to 
FRF […]*, taxes included, and the price of the pack from FRF […]* to FRF […]*, 
taxes included.127 One of these scenarios was known as the “central scenario”. Here 
the monthly subscription would be FRF […]* , taxes included, and the pack 
FRF […]*. The combination of prices that was ultimately adopted was not considered 
in the course of that exercise;128 but on the hypotheses that Wanadoo Interactive was 
                                                
119  […]* (file, p. 3316): […]*. 
120  […]* (file, p. 3155). […]* (file, p. 3367), […]* (file, p. 3345). 
121  […]* (file, p. 2790). 
122   […]* 
123  […]*  (file, p. 3362). 
124   […]*  (file, p. 2598); […]* (file, p. 2600). 
125  […]*  (file, p. 3134). 
126  These scenarios are presented in simplified form in Annex 10. 
127  File, pp. 2606-2651. 
128   […]*  (file, pp. 3133-3134). 
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using at the time, it can be calculated that the prices actually set in January 2001 
would have generated very heavy deficits and a net value which updated to 2003 
would have been negative by FRF […]* .129 
(132) In […]* the discussion of the level of prices considered new forecasts of the costs of 
the service, in particular involving more favourable assumptions for network costs. A 
presentation made on […]* as part of the budgetary discussions speaks of a 
subscription price of FRF […]*130 for the whole of 2001; this was the price then 
entered in Wanadoo Interactive's draft budget. The price of the subscription was 
finally adjusted slightly in the course of the autumn, and the price charged in January 
2001 was FRF 298, taxes included, with the price of the pack set at FRF 990, taxes 
included. 
(133) Thus discussion of the level of prices for the eXtense package was hesitant for a fairly 
long period in 2000. But it should be noted that all the scenarios envisaged expected 
heavy losses in 2001, even supposing that favourable tariffs were to be applied for 
routing and for Netissimo immediately on 1 January 2001. 
(134) […]* 131 […]* 132 […]* 133 
(135) The choice of a subscription price for the eXtense package slightly below FRF[…]*, 
taxes included, reflects an intention to penetrate the market rapidly, regardless of the 
short-term financial disadvantages. […]* 134 
(136) The version of the 2001 budget dated […]* provided for a gross margin over the 
production costs of the eXtense package and Wanadoo ADSL together equal to FRF 
[…]*, and a net margin, after taking account of acquisition costs, of FRF […]*.135 The 
version of the 2001 budget dated[…]*,136 after pointing out that ADSL would have a 
gross margin of FRF […]* in 2000, provided for a gross margin per unit of  FRF […]*  
per month in 2001, equal to a total gross margin of FRF […]* and a net margin of FRF 
[…]*.137 The version of the 2001 budget dated […]* provided for a production margin 
of FRF […]* on the same products, and a net margin of FRF […]* when account was 
taken of acquisition costs.  […]* 138 
(137) At the end of 2000 and the beginning of 2001, it was clear that in Wanadoo 
Interactive's portfolio of products ADSL services stood out on account of the extent to 
which they were in deficit. This is particularly instructive with reference to the way in 
                                                
129  See Annex 19 to this Decision. 
130  […]*  (file, p. 3055). 
131  […]*  (file, p. 2642). 
132  In these estimates the total cost of acquiring a customer is allocated in its entirety to the year in which 
the expenditure arose. 
133  […]*  (file, p. 2626). 
134   […]*  (file, p. 2652 et seq.). 
135  […]*  (file, p. 2974). 
136  […]*  (file, p. 3323). 
137  This version was based in particular on the following assumptions: cost of Netissimo access FRF[…]*, 
cost of conveyance of IP traffic FRF […]*, and cost of international connectivity FRF […]*  per month. 
The last component proved to be an overestimate. But the first two components proved to be 
underestimates, as compared even with the average costs actually noted after July 2001. These 
assumptions were reproduced in the definitive 2001 budget at the beginning of 2001. 
138  […]*  (file, p. 3275). 
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which Wanadoo Interactive weighed considerations of market penetration against 
respect for the short-term economic fundamentals. The definitive version of the 2001 
budget provided for a margin over production cost of  FRF […]* per ADSL subscriber 
per month; […]*.139 
(138) For part of the first half of 2001 these figures gave rise to discussion within the 
company regarding the pricing of the eXtense package. The expected fall in the tariffs 
for traffic routing and Netissimo had failed to materialise, and the cost assumptions 
made in the budget were proving overoptimistic. […]* 140 […]* 141 Between March 
and May 2001 possible monthly subscription prices of € […]* (FRF […]*)142 or FRF 
[…]*, taxes included, were spoken of within the company, as was an increase in the 
price of the pack.143  […]* 144 […]*. 
(139) The changes in the tariffs for IP/ADSL traffic routing and Netissimo access which 
were made in August 2001 produced some improvement in the situation. But internal 
papers show that serious concern nevertheless persisted within the company regarding 
the viability of ADSL at the end of 2001 and even at the beginning of 2002. […]* 
(140) […]*.145 […]*.146 […]*.147 
(141) […]* 148 […]* 149 […]* 150 […]* 151 […]* 152 The wording reflects an extremely 
reserved assessment of the financial logic of Wanadoo Interactive or its competitors 
developing their high-speed business to any significant extent in 2002. 
3. Wanadoo Interactive was aware that there were legal dangers 
(142) The internal papers gathered on the company's premises show that Wanadoo 
Interactive was made aware in advance of the legal dangers associated with pricing its 
retail services below cost.[…]* 153[…]* 154 […]* 155 […]*.156 
(143) In its reply of October 2002 Wanadoo Interactive argues that the documents cited were 
valueless because they did not originate in its legal department. In the Commission's 
view the situation is quite the reverse: it is instructive that concern over the legitimacy 
of the practices was widespread in the company, and was not confined to legal 
                                                
139  […]*  (file, p. 4351). 
140   […]*  (file, p. 3020). […]* 
141   […]* (file, p. 2803). 
142  […]* (file, pp. 3233 and 3234). 
143  […]*  (file, p. 3211). 
144  […]*  (file, p. 3106). […]* (, p. 2754).  
145  […]*  (file, p. 2921 et seq.). […]* (file, p. 3110 et seq.). 
146  […]*  (file, p. 3110 et seq.). 
147  […]*  (file, p. 3511). 
148   […]*  (file, p. 2978). 
149  […]*  (file, p. 2870). 
150   […]* (file, p. 2880).  […]* 
151  […]*  (file, p. 3097). 
152   […]* 
153   […]* (file, p. 2826 et seq.). 
154  This expression referred to the ADSL access service IP ADSL, also known as Netissimo 1. 
155  This refers to the IP routing service for ADSL traffic. 
156   […]* (file, p. 3080 et seq.). 
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specialists. […]* Wanadoo Interactive has observed157 […]*.158 But this observation is 
of no value here, because the words in question did not in any way refer to the gap 
between the retail prices of Wanadoo Interactive's products and the underlying costs, 
but rather to the relationship between France Télécom's wholesale offering ADSL 
Connect ATM, which was intended for alternative telecommunications operators, and 
wholesale prices for the resale of services to Internet service providers. 
(144) The Commission takes the view that without necessarily knowing that its price might 
constitute predation,159 Wanadoo Interactive was well aware of the problem of a 
squeeze between the wholesale and retail prices of the provision of ADSL services to 
end users. As early as the summer of 2000 Wanadoo Interactive had identified the 
legal risk […]* This awareness should have encouraged it to observe a measure of 
discipline in its pricing policy, and to price its services at a level above its costs. 
4. The context provides evidence of a strategy designed to contain and drive off 
competitors 
(145) The setting of prices below cost is not the only method used by Wanadoo Interactive 
and its main shareholder to hold back the development of competitors and to divert the 
growth in the high-speed market to its own advantage. Other means also seem to have 
been used. Although these actions can be imputed to Wanadoo Interactive itself only 
in part, and although they are not the subject of objections made against Wanadoo 
Interactive, they are very important for an understanding of the context of the case. 
This is because they show how Wanadoo Interactive’s policy of selling below cost in 
order to preempt the market formed part of an overall strategy. 
(146) First, Wanadoo Interactive was given privileged access to information regarding the 
suitability of telephone lines for ADSL technology, and generally regarding the 
operational implementation of ADSL connections. Its competitors in the ADSL 
segment were asked to go through a long procedure that was difficult to reconcile with 
mass marketing, especially via large retailers. Internal company documents attest that 
Wanadoo Interactive was well aware of the discriminatory advantage conferred on it 
by the immediate verification of the suitability of lines, because it was informed of an 
instruction given to France Télécom shops not to mention this.160 The situation was 
referred to the French Competition Council by T-Online France in an application for 
interim measures. By decision of 27 February 2002 the Competition Council held that 
there was a danger of structural discrimination in favour of Wanadoo Interactive in the 
operation of the IP/ADSL contract which would be a serious handicap to mass 
                                                
157  Reply of 23 October 2002, paragraph 101. 
158  […]* (file, p. 3294 et seq.). 
159  It should be pointed out, however, that in June 2001 the ART, in a public opinion on Wanadoo 
Interactive's ADSL services, referred quite directly to the possibility of a predatory policy: “the terms of 
the offer made [by France Télécom] to Wanadoo are such that Wanadoo has to bear substantial losses, 
given the level of prices charged on the residential market since packages have been marketed. The 
situation might be evidence of predatory behaviour on the part of France Télécom and its subsidiary 
Wanadoo on the market in ADSL services for the general public” (ART opinion No 01-548 of 19 June 
2001 on tariff decisions Nos 2001482 on the development of Netissimo 1 and Netissimo 2 services and 
2001480 on the development of the supply of IP/ADSL access provision and IP/ADSL routing 
provision). 
160  […]* (file, p. 3632). 
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marketing, and asked France Télécom to put an end to it.161 That decision was upheld 
by the Paris Court of Appeal on 9 April 2002. 
(147) On this point Wanadoo Interactive does not deny the facts adduced by the 
Commission,, and confines itself to observing that in July 2002 the Competition 
Council decided that its injunction of February 2002, which led to the suspension of 
the sale of eXtense packs, was being complied with, and that the ban could be lifted.162 
The facts adduced by the Commission therefore remain true of the period before 
summer 2002, and Wanadoo Interactive has not contested them with respect to that 
period. 
(148) Second, the supply of ADSL modems was probably used jointly by France Télécom 
and Wanadoo Interactive to slow the development of competitors in the start-up phase 
at least in the first few months of 2001. France Télécom had authority to approve 
ADSL modems for use on its network. This power seems to have been used to 
postpone any widening of the range of potential modem suppliers, and to consolidate 
the shortage that obtained on the market at the beginning of 2001. On the one hand, 
France Télécom delayed the approval of modems manufactured by ECI, which it 
finally granted on 19 March 2001, and waited for a decision of the ART on a dispute 
proceeding before allowing Internet service providers to install modems not approved 
by that date; the regulator's decision came in November 2001.163 On the other hand, 
orders for modems placed jointly by France Télécom and Wanadoo Interactive had the 
effect of taking up almost all of the production capacity of the only supplier authorised 
at the time, Alcatel, and this made it difficult for competitors to obtain supplies.164 
[…]*,165 […]*.166 […]*.167 The “closing off” of the modems market in the first few 
months of 2001 had a strong inhibiting effect on the initial development of 
competitors. By way of example, in December 2000 Wanadoo Interactive already had 
at least [...]* modems in stock at France Télécom shops, while in January 2001 T-
Online had succeeded in obtaining only one-tenth of that figure. 
(149) Wanadoo Interactive has not commented on the facts adduced or the quotations used 
by the Commission. It has merely referred the Commission to a decision taken by the 
French Competition Council in June 2002, dismissing an application for interim 
measures lodged by Olitec.168 Olitec, a manufacturer of terminal equipment, 
complained of an absence of transparency in the procedure for the approval of 
modems and the tenders organised by France Télécom. The Competition Council took 
the view that since the decision of the ART in November 2001, which had been 
followed by the amendment of France Télécom's IP/ADSL contract in March 2002, 
                                                
161  Decision No 02-MC-03 of 27 February 2002 regarding a reference and an application for interim 
measures submitted by T-Online France (file, pp. 1557 to 1569.) 
162  Competition Council decision No 02-D-46 of 19 July 2002 regarding the application of Article 3 of 
decision No 02-MC03 of 27 February 2002, cited in paragraph 247 of the reply of 23 October 2002 
(file, p. 6300). 
163  […]* (file, pp. 1673 to 1688). 
164   […]* (file, p. 5023). 
165  […]* (file, p. 2792). 
166  […]* (file, p. 5096)). 
167  […]* (file, p. 3109). […]* (file, p. 3214)).  […]* 
168  Decision No 02-D-40 of 25 June 2002 regarding a reference and an application for interim measures 
lodged by Olitec, referred to in paragraph 249 of Wanadoo Interactive's reply of 23 October 2002 (file, 
p. 6300). 
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the difficulties in the approval procedure were now surmountable. As regards the time 
before that the Council considered that Olitec had not been able to produce sufficiently 
convincing evidence to show that the methods of approving modems reflected 
discriminatory practices. On this point the Commission would observe that when it 
took its decision the Competition Council had no knowledge of the existence of the 
documents referred to in paragraph 148, which seem to indicate that the approval of 
modems was based not solely on technical criteria but also on considerations of 
advantage. 
(150) Lastly, in autumn 2001 France Télécom put a “partnership offer” to Internet service 
providers, which was to apply with effect from December 2001;169 the offer brought 
with it a serious danger of restriction of competition. At that time the relative 
improvement in the tariffs for IP/ADSL access services and routing made it less 
unrealistic economically for competitors to come forward with ADSL offerings, and 
several Internet service providers were trying to arrive at a policy for marketing via 
large retailers. The principle of the partnership offer was that France Télécom, in 
association with providers, would market ADSL access in packaged form at a fixed 
price (FRF [...], taxes included, to be paid on purchase, and FRF [...], taxes included, 
to be paid as a monthly subscription, including FRF [...], taxes included, as a monthly 
subscription to the service provider). This would give Internet service providers the 
benefit of France Télécom's brand image and distribution network. In return the retail 
prices were to be fixed, as was the payment to be made to the sales outlet, which was 
FRF [...] per subscription activated. The object of this operation was doubtless to 
discourage competing telecommunications operators from offering services similar to 
Netissimo, 170 and thus to reduce the possibility that service providers might offer 
products technically different from those of Wanadoo Interactive. By circumscribing 
retail prices and the commissions to be paid to distributors, the arrangement would 
also have the effect of depriving service providers of much of their freedom of 
manoeuvre in their commercial policy. This partnership offer, although the 
responsibility for it lay not with Wanadoo Interactive but with Wanadoo Interactive's 
majority shareholder, is witness to an objective of control of the development of the 
market171 and a desire to dissuade competitors from differentiating their offerings from 
those of the company in question.. 
(151) On this point Wanadoo Interactive does not contest the existence of the partnership 
offer, and confines itself to observing that the partnership offer was never put into 
effect.172 The Commission would point out that the offer was not put into effect 
because of the negative reaction of the firms to which it was made, and because of the 
action taken by the Competition Council.173 The absence of implementation was not in 
any way due to a unilateral withdrawal of its commercial proposal by France Télécom. 
                                                
169  File, pp. 1580 to 1590. 
170   […]*  (file, p. 3036). 
171   In opinion 02-35 of 9 January 2002 to the Competition Council on an application from T-Online 
France, paragraph 3.4, the ART states that by this partnership offer “France Télécom would very 
strictly circumscribe the Internet service providers' prices (selling prices to end users) and the ISPs' 
commercial policy by fixing the price to be paid to the distribution network” (file, p. 1553). 
172  Paragraph 250 of the reply of 23 October 2002 (file, p. 6300). 
173  In Article 4 of its decision No 02-D-46, already referred to, the Competition Council prohibits the 
implementation of the partnership offer in the following terms: “France Télécom is required to suspend 
any multi-ISP offer intended to be marketed in large-scale retailing which associates the provision of its 
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H. PROCEDURE 
1. History  
(152) By letter of 18 September 2001 the Commission informed France Télécom and 
Wanadoo Interactive that the information gathered in the course of the sector inquiry 
into the unbundling of the local loop, from those two undertakings and from their 
competitors, gave grounds for the initiation of an investigation specifically into the 
pricing of the ADSL products marketed by Wanadoo. The Commission then sent 
various requests for information in order to complete its information. 
(153) This stage of the investigation culminated on 19 December 2001, when the 
Commission sent Wanadoo Interactive a statement of objections. Wanadoo Interactive 
submitted its observations on the statement of objections in a reply dated 4 March 
2002, and at a hearing held on 18 March 2002. Several competitors - AOL France, 
Mangoosta (in liquidation under court supervision), Tiscali France, Easynet and Noos 
- were recognised as interested third parties, and were allowed to attend the hearing. 
(154) At a meeting held on Commission premises on 19 March 2002, representatives of 
France Télécom,174 while denying any infringement, nevertheless put forward a plan 
to remedy the failure to cover costs by thoroughly recasting France Télécom’s 
IP/ADSL access and routing charges.175 
(155) On 4 and 5 April 2002 Commission officials visited the company's premises under 
Article 14(2) of Regulation No 17. On this occasion Wanadoo Interactive presented 
them with its estimates of revenue and costs for the business in question in 2001 and 
2002. The Commission officials took copies of numerous company papers. 
(156) On 9 August 2002 the Commission sent Wanadoo Interactive a supplementary 
statement of objections. This completed a number of points of fact and law in the 
analysis set out in the statement of objections of 19 December 2001, in particular by 
incorporating the information that the Commission had obtained since the beginning 
of 2002 in reply to requests for information made to Wanadoo Interactive and its main 
competitors, and the conclusions the Commission had drawn from its visit on 4 and 5 
April 2002. 
(157) Wanadoo Interactive submitted its observations on this supplementary statement of 
objections in a reply of 23 October 2002, and did not request an oral hearing. 
(158) On 16 January 2003 the Commission sent Wanadoo Interactive a letter setting out 
facts which had not been mentioned in the statements of objections and of which 
account might be taken in a Decision (hereinafter the “letter on the facts”). Most of 
this material consisted of updatings of tables that had been sent to Wanadoo 
Interactive with the supplementary statement of objections. The letter on the facts 
explicitly stated that the information it contained was not such as to extend the 
                                                                                                                                                   
ADSL Netissimo service with an Internet service provision offering with the same characteristics as 
those described in Annex 10 to [T-Online's] reference” (file, p. 1569). 
174  Lawyers representing Wanadoo Interactive were also present at this meeting. 
175  France Télécom's proposed charges for IP/ADSL access and routing were made public on 11 April 
2002 (file, p. 2564 et seq.). 
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duration of the suspected infringement or in any way to alter the Commission's 
assessment of the degree of gravity of the abuse. 
(159) In a letter to the Hearing Officer dated 31 January 2003, Wanadoo Interactive asked 
for an extension of the time allowed for a reply, which had initially been set at four 
weeks. The Hearing Officer did not accept the grounds the company put forward in 
support of its request, but allowed Wanadoo Interactive a further ten days to enable it 
to seek any clarification of the letter on the facts that might be necessary from the 
Commission departments. On 26 February 2003 the representatives of Wanadoo 
Interactive did ask the Commission for clarification of a number of aspects of the letter 
on the facts. The Commission replied by letter of 28 February 2003. By letter of 4 
March 2003 Wanadoo Interactive replied on the substance of the letter on the facts of 
16 January 
2. Access to the file 
(160) In the course of the proceedings Wanadoo Interactive exercised its right of access to 
the file on several occasions: on 7 and 23 February, after the first statement of 
objections was sent; on 20 and 21 August 2002, after the supplementary statement of 
objections was sent; and on 23 and 27 January 2003, after the sending of the letter on 
the facts. By letter of 6 June 2003, lastly, the Commission sent Wanadoo Interactive 
numbered copies of the papers not covered by business secrecy that had been included 
in the file since the preceding January.176 
(161) In several letters Wanadoo Interactive has argued that it has not been given proper 
access to the file.177 First, it says that the Commission has not given it access to the 
sector inquiry into local loop unbundling; it takes the view that the contributions made 
by competing firms might provide information that would be useful to its 
argumentation. The Commission, it says, has selected some documents from the sector 
inquiry and has deliberately ignored others. Second, Wanadoo Interactive disputes the 
inaccessibility of papers provided by some of its competitors, and criticises the 
Commission for failing to give any indication of the content of those documents. 
Third, Wanadoo Interactive argues that it has not had full access to the whole of the 
Commission's file on this investigation, because some papers are not entered on the 
numbered list of documents that was supplied to it. 
(162) On the first question, it is true that the sector inquiry was in a sense a catalyst for the 
investigations that led to proceedings being initiated specifically against Wanadoo 
Interactive; this is part of the function of any inquiry into a sector of the economy. But 
the sector inquiry was looking at the question of local access in general, and especially 
offers of fully unbundled or shared access and offers of indirect access aimed at 
operators. Thus it covered an area much wider than the subjects investigated in the 
present proceeding. In the interests of sound administration the Commission opened 
two separate files, with some documents from the sector inquiry being copied and 
included in the new file on Wanadoo Interactive. The company has accused the 
                                                
176  This information was accompanied by an exhaustive list of all the documents in the Commission file, 
updated since January 2003. Wanadoo Interactive submitted observations on some of these new papers 
in a letter of 18 June 2003. 
177  Letters from Wanadoo Interactive's lawyers dated 14 January 2002, 22 January 2002, 8 February 2002, 
10 September 2002 and 30 September 2002 (file, respectively pp. 847, 871, 5546, and 5854 et seq.). 
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Commission of discrimination in the selection of the papers included in the Wanadoo 
Interactive file. On 18 February 2002, to enable Wanadoo Interactive to form an 
opinion of the objectivity the Commission had exercised in selecting the papers to be 
included in the new file, the Commission sent Wanadoo Interactive an exhaustive 
numbered list of the documents in the sector inquiry in France. Wanadoo Interactive 
has not considered it necessary to ask to see specific documents on the list sent to it. 
The Commission would also point out that in March 2002 it published a report on the 
question of the unbundling of the local loop, with a detailed annex on France, setting 
out all the conclusions to be drawn from the inquiry.178 
(163) On the question of accessibility of documents, the Commission feels it has to observe 
a fair balance between the rights of the defence and the protection of the interests of 
the firms which have supplied it, at its request, with information constituting business 
secrets. The Commission notice on the internal rules of procedure for processing 
requests for access to the file in cases pursuant to Article 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty, 
Article 65 and 66 of the ECSC Treaty and Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89,179 
and especially paragraph II.D.2 thereof, lays down a line of conduct to be followed by 
the Commission which is intended to preserve this balance, more especially in cases of 
abuse of a dominant position. The notice points out that in cases of abuse of a 
dominant position competitors face a special danger of retaliatory measures, because 
of the considerable commercial pressure that the dominant firm is able to exercise on 
them; this calls for special precautions. In general, therefore, the Commission has 
treated information sent by competitors as confidential wherever they so requested. At 
the same time, by giving Wanadoo Interactive systematic access to the content of the 
requests for information which the Commission sent to the firms, whether as part of 
the sector inquiry or in the course of the investigation of the present case, it has 
enabled the company to assess the object and scope of the information provided by its 
competitors. When in their replies these firms added information going beyond the 
scope of the questions asked, a brief indication of the nature of those comments was 
entered on the list of the documents in the file that was supplied to Wanadoo 
Interactive. When Wanadoo Interactive so requested, giving its reasons, the 
Commission obtained non-confidential versions of their replies from the competitors, 
and sent them to Wanadoo Interactive.180 
(164) The unnumbered documents not included in the enumerative list are all entirely public 
documents, such as press articles and the published reports of international 
institutions. None of them is used as evidence or incriminating matter in this case. 
These documents are freely accessible to the public. And although it did not number 
them, the Commission did give Wanadoo Interactive access to all these documents; 
the company’s legal representatives made complete copies in January 2002, 
August 2002 and January 2003. 
                                                
178  The report can be consulted freely on the Internet site of the Directorate-General for Competition 
(http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/antitrust/others/sector_inquiries/local_loop/local_loop_unbundl
ing_inquiry.pdf). The Commission's letter of 17 January 2002 informed Wanadoo Interactive that the 
report and its annexes would be published on the site (file, p. 858). 
179  OJ C 23, 23.1.1997, p. 3. 
180  Commission letters to Wanadoo Interactive's lawyers, 11 and 15 October 2002 (file, pp. 5888 and 
5893). 
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(165) The Commission believes that on these various points it has followed an approach that 
respects the legitimate interests of competitors and allows Wanadoo Interactive fully 
to exercise its right to defend itself. The Commission has explained this approach to 
the company repeatedly, both in conversation and in various letters.181 
3. Wanadoo Interactive's objection to the letter on the facts 
(166) Wanadoo Interactive drew attention to what it saw as a difficulty of procedure, namely 
the significance and scope of the letter on the facts which the Commission sent on 16 
January 2003. In a letter to the Hearing Officer dated 31 January 2003, Wanadoo 
Interactive contested the very principle of the letter on the facts, contending that its 
nature and content required that a third statement of objections be sent in order to 
enable it to defend itself properly. 
(167) In his reply of 18 February 2003 the Hearing Officer observed that the letter from the 
Commission departments did not in any way add to the scope of the two earlier 
statements of objections, or modify the Commission's assessment in a manner 
unfavourable to Wanadoo Interactive; an assurance to that effect was given in several 
places in the letter in question, and in those paragraphs where it was not explicit it 
could be deduced sufficiently clearly from the context and nature of the comments 
made. The Hearing Officer concluded that it was not necessary that the Commission 
send Wanadoo Interactive a further supplementary statement of objections. 
II - LEGAL ASSESSMENT 
A. ARTICLE 82 OF THE TREATY 
(168) Article 82 of the Treaty prohibits as incompatible with the common market any abuse 
by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the common market or in a 
substantial part of it insofar as it may affect trade between Member States. Such abuse 
may, in particular, consist in directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling 
prices. 
B. THE RELEVANT MARKET 
1. The service market 
1. Introduction 
(169) In its statement of objections of 19 December 2001, the Commission defined the 
relevant market as that for high-speed Internet access for residential customers. On 
that market, Internet service providers offer customers, consisting mainly of 
households, Internet access for a single terminal, with download speeds up to 512 
                                                
181  Letters to Wanadoo Interactive's lawyers from Commission departments, 17 and 28 January 2002, 18 
February 2002, and 20 September 2002, conversation of 23 January 2002, and letter to the same 
lawyers from the Hearing Officer, 4 March and 15 October 2002 (file, pp. 852, 870, 909, 927 bis, 5561 
and 5897). 
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kbit/s182 and upload speeds of 128 kbit/s during the period covered by this Decision. A 
flat-rate amount is charge for these services. They offer unlimited use and allow 
simultaneous use of the telephone line to make and receive calls. These Internet access 
services allow hosting of a website and the provision of email facilities, including a 
number of email addresses. The offerings available on the market comprise very 
comparable functionalities. Prices are very similar. The service providers' marketing 
information is based on two key messages: download speed and the convenience of 
simultaneous telephone and Internet use. 
(170) This market definition includes both offerings based on ADSL technology and 
offerings based on cable modem technology. Although the geographic penetration 
potential of the two technologies is very different, with ADSL offering much wider 
scope, and although the technical performances are not wholly comparable, because of 
the greater risk of congestion on cable networks, it was apparent that, on the demand 
side, substitutability between these different offerings was sufficient to justify their 
inclusion within the same service market here. It should be emphasised, however, that 
the options offered by the cable operators have since early 2001 consistently had a 
much lower growth potential than the options based on ADSL technology. On 1 
January 2001, the cable television networks served around 8 million French 
households, whereas on the same date the ADSL technology deployed on the fixed 
telephone network allowed some 11 million telephone lines to be covered. In addition, 
of the 8.4 million marketable cable sockets, only half had undergone the necessary 
adjustments to be able to take high-speed Internet connection. Lastly, the cable 
operators operate on the basis of municipal or local franchises and their presence 
throughout the country is fragmentary, whereas service providers using ADSL 
technology are subject only to the constraints imposed by the roll-out of ADSL 
technology by France Télécom. The service providers' penetration capacity was thus a 
priori greater with ADSL as from the end of 2000. 
(171) The Commission has also taken the view that high-speed Internet access for residential 
customers must be distinguished from high-speed Internet access for business 
customers. There are at least three differences: very different price ranges; generally 
much superior operating capacities for business customers; and a wider range of 
technical options for access. In the first place, prices are frequently three to five times 
higher than those charged to residential customers. These higher charges obviously 
reflect more advanced functionalities. The products designed for business customers 
offer download speeds at least twice as great as those described above for residential 
customers, greater web-page hosting capacities and the possibility of multi-terminal 
use and networking operation. Their technical specifications and charges are 
sometimes tailored to the customer, which is impossible on the mass market. Lastly, 
from a technical point of view, high-speed Internet access for business customers can 
be achieved through a greater variety of solutions than in the case of residential 
customers. Leased lines, wireless local loop or satellite transmission are not realistic 
options at present in the case of residential customers, given the costs involved, but 
they are viable in the case of business customers. 
                                                
182  The download speed up to 768 kbit/s made available by Freesurf on 23 October 2001 was, until the 
autumn of 2002, the only one which differed from all the other, hitherto relatively similar, download 
speeds on offer. As from the autumn of 2002, at the end of the period covered by this Decision, a 
greater variety of download speeds became available on the market. 
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(172) The inclusion in the service market of offerings provided by cable operators and the 
exclusion of offerings intended for business customers were not contested by 
Wanadoo Interactive. 
(173) However, Wanadoo Interactive did object to the Commission's distinction between 
high-speed Internet access and low-speed Internet access. Wanadoo Interactive 
identifies only one market for Internet access as a whole. In its view, Internet access is 
growing steadily, albeit a growing proportion of consumers is being attracted, in the 
period 2000 to 2010, by high-speed Internet access offerings, at the expense of low-
speed Internet access offerings. High-speed and low-speed, in its view, thus simply 
constitute two segments of one and the same market. Following the migration process, 
the low-speed segment, it argues, is now of only residual importance. In Wanadoo 
Interactive's view, what we are witnessing therefore is simply a gradual move 
upmarket, with the old version of the service (low-speed) tending to be replaced by the 
new version (high-speed), this being a basic market trend.183 Wanadoo Interactive's 
argument is based on the fact that, since the specific content of high-speed Internet 
access had not matured, high-speed Internet access uses available in 2001 and 2002 
were in fact similar to low-speed uses. Wanadoo Interactive emphasises in particular 
the similarity, in its view, between the flat-rate offerings for low-speed access beyond 
20 hours, which it considers are comparable to unlimited packages, which it claims are 
offered by numerous competing providers, though it cites only two examples relating 
to AOL.184 In fact, it argues, it is not the speed which high-speed users are seeking, but 
rather the flat-rate charge and unlimited use available in such offerings. For the 
reasons set out in paragraphs 174 to 202, the Commission takes the view that the 
relevant service market is restricted here to high-speed Internet access alone, 
excluding the low-speed market. 
2. Differences in use 
(174) Wanadoo Interactive argues that no distinction can be made between "high-speed" and 
"low-speed" because the uses made of them are not radically different and because 
most users use the same type of Internet access applications and functions irrespective 
of the mode of access. 
(175) Clearly, high-speed and low-speed Internet access offer one and the same basic range 
of common uses: email, information searches, navigation, chatting, downloading of 
files, etc. However, it is important to note that some of the high-speed uses are 
possible with low-speed Internet access only under extremely dissuasive conditions of 
loss of quality and convenience, while some applications available with high-speed 
access are simply not feasible with low-speed access. For example, the downloading 
of very voluminous video files or interactive network games are very difficult or 
indeed impossible to perform with low-speed Internet access. Moreover, Wanadoo 
Interactive acknowledges, in its reply of 4 March 2002 to the statement of objections, 
that “[…]* % of audiovisual/multimedia activities are specific to ADSL”.185 Wanadoo's 
chief executive officer confirmed in the autumn of 2002 that, for network games, a 
download speed of 128 kbit/s was insufficient and that consequently such applications 
                                                
183  Reply of 4 March 2002, p. 22 et seq. (file, p. 1727 et seq.). 
184  Reply of 4 March 2002, p. 20 (file, p. 1725). 
185  Reply of 4 March 2002, p. 18 (file, p. 1723). 
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were possible only with higher download speeds.186 It may be noted that the fact that 
some applications are not feasible with low-speed Internet access is one of the 
elements taken into account by other competition and regulatory authorities187 in 
identifying two separate markets.188 
(176) The ease of use provided by high-speed Internet access explains why subscribers have 
quite distinct user profiles. Almost 58% of high-speed users in France are reported to 
use audio-video applications, as against less than 25% of Internet users as a whole; 
more than 45% of high-speed users in France are reported to use the Internet for file 
transfer, as against less than 21% of Internet users as a whole.189 Wanadoo Interactive 
estimated in October 2001 that […]* % of eXtense subscribers downloaded audio files. 
Internet users with high-speed Internet access are generally ranked as large 
consumers.190 
(177) High-speed Internet access subscribers are connected much more frequently than low-
speed Internet users. One of the advantages of high-speed offerings is the elimination 
of connection time, which can take 45 seconds in the case of low-speed access. This 
feature encourages one-off and frequent Internet consultations, for example to look up 
a particular item of information. According to Wanadoo Interactive, […]* % of ADSL 
users use the Internet several times a day, as against […]* % of its customers in all 
categories taken as a whole.191 
(178) Another particular feature is that the high-speed subscriber is connected for a much 
longer time on average than the low-speed user. Wanadoo Interactive's figures confirm 
that the duration and frequency of Internet use increased considerably once the switch 
is made from low-speed to high-speed access. According to an internal company 
document dated October 2001, the monthly duration of declared actual use rises from 
[…]* hours to […]* hours,192 whereas […]* % used the Internet several times a day as 
against […]* % of those who had not yet subscribed to eXtense. Another document 
dated 13 July 2001 shows that in April 2001 Wanadoo Interactive's ADSL subscribers 
used the Internet on average [150-250]* hours a month, as against an average of [0-
100]* hours in the case of customers who had subscribed to the low-speed package 
"Intégrales 100 heures".193 
                                                
186  Reuters article transmitted on 11 October 2002 at 11.23, "Wanadoo launches an ADSL facility at 30 
euros a month". 
187  See, for example: Federal Communications Commission, Applications for consent to the transfer of 
control and licences and section 214 authorizations by Time Warner Inc. and America Online Inc., 
Transferors, to AOL Time Warner Inc., transferee, CS Docket No 00-30, FCC, 11.1.2001, points 69 and 
71 in particular. 
188  This view is also supported in the academic world. See Jerry A. Hausman, J. Gregory Sidak and Hal J. 
Singer, ‘Cable Modems and DSL: Broadband Internet Access for Residential Customers’, American 
Economic Association Papers and Proceedings, Vol. 91, 2001; Robert W. Crandall, J. Gregory Sidak, 
Hal J. Singer, ‘The Empirical Case against Asymmetric Regulation of Broadband Internet Access’, 
March 2002. 
189  These figures are taken from a study drawn up by NetValue in October 2001, cited in Le Journal du 
Net. 
190  Wanadoo Interactive's chief executive officer quoted on 20 August 2001 in Le Journal du Net. 
191  […]*. Document found during the inspection. 
192  […]* study carried out by […]* (file, p. 4147). 
193  File, p. 4586. 
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(179) According to Wanadoo Interactive, high-speed Internet access subscribers are not 
seeking speed or convenience of use so much as unlimited access. The company cites 
as evidence the frequent reference to the unlimited access facility which users identify 
as their reason for choosing high-speed access.194 In point of fact, this feature simply 
reflects the fact that, up to August 2002, the conditions did not really exist for the 
development of unlimited low-speed access facilities under acceptable cost conditions 
and at attractive price levels for the final customer, which prompted low-speed users 
attracted by the prospect of unlimited access to turn to high-speed access facilities.195 
(180) Lastly, another aspect of the particular profile of high-speed users is the bandwidth 
used by this type of service. Wanadoo Interactive's ADSL competitors point out that 
the real subscriber bitrates observed at the beginning of 2002 were on average greater 
than 20 kbit/s per connected subscriber, as against 1 kbit/s approximately on average 
in the case of low-speed users.196 There is thus a ratio of 1 to 15 at least between the 
bandwidth consumed per high-speed user and a low-speed user. This gap reflects the 
very wide differences in use, which is much heavier in the case of high-speed Internet 
access. 
3. Technical features and performances 
(181) An important technical feature of high-speed Internet access is the specific nature of 
the modems used. A high-speed Internet access modem cannot be used for low-speed 
Internet access and vice versa. 
(182) In its reply of 4 March 2002, Wanadoo Interactive argued that a market definition 
could not be based on performance differences identified between products, since uses 
are relatively convergent and similar. On the contrary, any such differences in 
performances would simply be symptomatic of a process of moving upmarket in a 
market which was constantly developing. Higher-performance products gradually 
superseded earlier generations of less sophisticated products. To back up its 
arguments, Wanadoo Interactive drew an analogy in the Internet access sector with the 
personal computer and server sectors. It cited three Commission Decisions in merger 
                                                
194  Paragraph 37 of the reply of 23 October 2002 (file, p. 6255). 
195  AOL had launched an unlimited low-speed access package in 2000, but had to double the prices 
charged for it in July 2001 because of costs. It was only as from August 2002, thanks to changes in 
interconnection charges, that Tiscali and AOL were able to introduce unlimited low-speed access 
facilities that were more attractive and economically more profitable. Wanadoo Interactive's low-speed 
facility known as "Intégrale 100 heures" is not strictly speaking an unlimited access facility, since it 
provides for a maximum amount of use that is less than the average period of use of high-speed users. 
Indeed, this package met with a fairly limited take-up, with […]* subscribers on 31 March 2002, which 
is […]* less than Wanadoo Interactive's ADSL subscribers on that date. Moreover, this facility was 
replaced at the end of 2002 in the catalogue by "Intégrales 60 heures". In Annex 20 to its reply of 23 
October 2002, Wanadoo Interactive provides […]* witness document 27 attached to the reply of 23 
October 2002 quoting the following remarks by the president of Club Internet: "Unlimited packages 
make sense only in high-speed access, for two reasons: it is in this type of intensive Internet use that the 
convenience and speed of high-speed access are fully justified and, in addition, only this type of use 
allows the telephone line to be left free, which is crucial if one wants to be able to continue to use the 
telephone". 
196  Statement made by the representative of Easynet France at the hearing held on 18 March 2002. 
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cases concerning these sectors.197 According to Wanadoo Interactive, in these various 
Decisions, the Commission decided not to distinguish different markets for products 
that involved developing technology.198 
(183) Even assuming the analogy with the IT equipment sector is relevant, it should be noted 
firstly that, in actual fact, in the Decisions cited by the company, the Commission did 
not reach any conclusion on market definitions. The extract quoted by Wanadoo 
Interactive from the Fujitsu/Siemens Decision199 merely reports the opinion stated by a 
number of third parties during the investigations, and the Commission went on in the 
very next sentence of its Decision to state that, for the purpose of the case in point, it 
was not necessary to reach any conclusion on the question of the relevant product 
market. The HP/Compaq Decision recognises that three separate server markets 
should be distinguished on the basis of different functionalities, reflected more or less 
in the price bands.200 It may also be noted that, in a very different sector, that of 
passenger cars, though it also left the market definition open, the Commission 
recognised that it was possible to identify several separate markets on the basis of a 
number of objective criteria such as engine size,201 even though the ultimate purpose 
of owning a car, namely the individual transport of passengers on public roads, is 
always the same. Accordingly, technical differences in performance, though not 
necessarily the sole basis of the market definition, may be a factor in it.202 It is 
therefore useful to examine in greater detail the performance differences between 
high-speed and low-speed Internet access. 
(184) There is no absolute technical definition of the dividing line between “low-speed” and 
“high-speed” access. However, there is a general consensus that “high-speed” refers to 
services that allow download speeds appreciably greater than those made possible by 
ISDN technology.203 The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) considers high-speed access to mean any access facility that allows a 
download speed of more than 256 kbit/s.204 The Federal Communications Commission 
(FCC) defines high-speed access as download speeds in excess of 200 kbit/s, i.e. well 
in excess of the performance allowed by “primary ISDN” technology. The UK 
regulator Oftel has defined high-speed Internet access as downstream capacity in 
excess of 128 kbit/s.205 In the case of the French market being examined here, it 
                                                
197  Decision of 26 May 1997 in Case IV/M.920 - Samsung/AST (OJ C 203, 3.7.1997, p. 3); Decision of 
30 September 1999 in Case IV/JV.22 - Fujitsu/Siemens (OJ C 318, 5.11.1999, p. 15); Decision of 
31 January 2002 in Case IV/M.2609 - HP/Compaq (OJ C 39, 13.2.2002, p. 23). 
198  Reply of 4 March 2002, paragraphs 80 to 84. 
199  The quotation used by Wanadoo Interactive (paragraph 82 of the reply of 4 March 2002) is: "a 
distinction between the different categories of personal computers is not justified" (file, p. 1729). 
200  HP/Compaq Decision, paragraphs 20 to 22. 
201  Decision of 12 May 1999 in Case IV/M.1519 - Renault/Nissan (OJ C 178, 23.6.1999, p. 14), paragraphs 
19 and 20. 
202  Applications for consent to the transfer of control and licences and section 214 authorizations by Time 
Warner Inc. and America Online Inc., Transferors, to AOL Time Warner Inc., transferee, CS Docket 
No 00-30, 11.1.2001, point 63. 
203  Integrated systems digital networks. This technology allows download speeds up to 128 kbit/s, 
appreciably lower than ADSL performance. Internet access using this mode is generally charged by 
minute of use, in contrast to high-speed offerings. 
204  OECD report dated 29 October 2001 entitled The Development of Broadband Access in OECD 
Countries, p. 6. 
205  Office of Telecommunications, Direction to Resolve a Dispute between BT, Energis and Thus 
concerning xDSL Interconnection at the ATM Switch, 21.6.2002, paragraph E 12. 
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should be noted that, during the period under review, from January 2001 to October 
2002, all the offerings allowed download speeds of the order of 512 kbit/s, i.e. around 
four times greater than that allowed by ISDN technology on low-speed networks. The 
offerings on the French market are thus well above the speeds used as criteria both by 
the OECD and by the FCC. 
(185) In the case of high-speed Internet access, the offerings available from French operators 
during the period covered by the infringement involved download speeds equal or 
superior to 512 kbit/s. In the case of standard Internet connection, the download speed 
on an analogue line is 56 kbit/s. ISDN technology does, it is true, allow download 
speeds on the telephone line to be boosted to 128 kbit/s. But, in addition to the fact 
that it offers lower potential than that required for the generally-accepted definition of 
high-speed access referred to in paragraph 184, ISDN technology is reported to 
account in France for scarcely 0.3% of domestic Internet access.206 It played a wholly 
marginal role during the relevant period. There are no unlimited Internet access 
offerings available using ISDN. Wanadoo Interactive draws attention to the launching 
of ADSL offerings with download speeds of 128 kbit/s in the autumn of 2002 which, it 
argues, bears witness to the continuity between low-speed and high-speed. These 
offerings became available at the end of 2002, at the end of the period covered by this 
Decision. There is no need for the Commission to decide whether they belong to the 
high-speed or low-speed market. The Commission does not possess the information 
that would enable it to evaluate the degree to which they can be substituted for 
512 kbit/s offerings. At first sight, however, factors militating against their inclusion in 
the high-speed Internet access market are their technical performances and a speed 
which is four times less than that provided by 512 kbit/s offerings, and a range of 
prices which is much closer to unlimited low-speed offerings.207 
(186) In the vast majority of cases, it may be said that during the period covered by this 
Decision, high-speed Internet access offered the possibility of download per second at 
virtually ten times the rate of low-speed Internet access. This was indeed the 
commercial angle which the service providers constantly focused on during the 
relevant period. For the purposes of defining a market, any such performance ratio of 1 
to 10 amounts to a very significant difference. 
(187) The differences in performance between the two categories of products are clearly 
perceived by consumers. According to Wanadoo Interactive's marketing services, 
ADSL is chosen by Internet users primarily on account of […]*.208 […]*.209 In addition, 
according to Wanadoo Interactive's internal documentation, "ADSL is preferred to 
                                                
206  Source: BDRC Ltd, “The Development of Broadband Access Platforms in Europe”, August 2001, p. 79. 
207  It cannot be ruled out that these new low-speed ADSL offerings are examples of disguised unlimited 
low-speed access packages, presented more attractively as new technology, and offering the advantage 
of leaving the telephone line available for use. One of the objectives of these offerings would be to 
develop unlimited offerings not affording high-speed performances, but allowing service providers to 
avoid having to pay contributions towards financing the universal service, which until 2003 were based 
on the amount of low-speed traffic, and imposing a strain on their economic equilibrium. In its 
publication Internet, un bilan du marché of 18 March 2003, the ART uses the term "medium speed" to 
describe this type of offering. 
208  […]* file, p. 3104 […]*   file, p. 3121 […]* pp. 3143 et seq. of the file […]* file, pp. 4074 et seq. […]* 
file, pp. 4136 et seq. 
209  […]* file, p. 3222 
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unlimited access packages because of […]*.210 It cannot therefore, be argued that 
performance differences are regarded as marginal by users. Furthermore, analysis of 
price differences between low-speed and high-speed offerings shows that consumers 
are prepared to pay a premium for extra performance and convenience. 
4. Price differences in respect of services and differences in revenue per subscriber 
(188) In return for the speed and convenience which it provides, high-speed Internet access 
entails a different charge system than that of conventional access. It is difficult to 
establish a strict comparison between the range of charges for conventional Internet 
access and high-speed Internet access, because of the wide range of options provided 
by the different ISPs and the scale of offerings not involving subscription and of 
charges calculated per minute. However, a number of comparison exercises allow 
some idea to be formed of the price differences between high-speed and low-speed 
Internet access during the period covered by this Decision. 
(189) First, comparison between the average monthly revenue procured by Wanadoo 
Interactive from all its subscribers, on the one hand, and the average monthly revenue 
from its ADSL subscribers, on the other, gives an approximation of the difference 
between the average price for low-speed Internet access and the average price for a 
high-speed Internet access subscription. In the first half of 2001, Wanadoo 
Interactive’s revenue per Internet customer (including ADSL subscriptions) averaged 
€[…]*,211 whereas, at that time, it may be estimated that the average annual revenue 
from Wanadoo Interactive's ADSL subscribers, weighting the two services in 
question, was €[…]*  per month and per subscriber, i.e. […]* as much as the overall 
average. 
(190) A second method can be used for comparing prices, based on the suggestion made by 
Wanadoo Interactive in its reply of 4 March 2002 to the statement of objections, that 
the relevant comparison with high-speed Internet access should be packages offering 
unlimited low-speed Internet access. Unlimited flat-rate packages in the strict sense, 
apart from the trial initiated by AOL in 2000 and 2001, developed in France only as 
from August 2002. However, packages offering 20 hours, 30 hours or 40 hours were 
already available in 2001. If one compares, in the case of each provider, the rate for its 
high-speed Internet access offering with the charge for its most expensive low-speed 
Internet access flat-rate or unlimited offering, it may be seen that the ratio is never less 
than 1.8 and that in the great majority of cases it is well above 2.212 It may thus be said 
that, in general, in the period from January 2001 to October 2002, high-speed Internet 
access offerings for residential customers were approximately twice as expensive as 
low-speed access offerings which are closest within the range of low-speed access 
services,213 not to mention cheaper low-speed access offerings. 
                                                
210  […]* file, p. 2083 
211  Wanadoo press release, 26 July 2001. 
212  See Annex 24. 
213  The differences shown in Annex 24 underestimate the average price difference, since they are based on 
calculation of an arithmetical average. Calculation of the price difference on the basis of an average 
weighted to take account of the size of each provider's subscriber base would have produced greater 
differences. 
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(191) Wanadoo Interactive explains in its reply that the present prices for high-speed 
Internet access offerings are too high and harm the spread of this access mode and 
deduces from this that prices should fall in the near future.214 This hypothesis of a 
future reduction in a price differential cannot be taken as a criterion in assessing the 
definition of the relevant market in 2001 and 2002. 
(192) A price and revenue ratio of at least one to two between two services cannot be 
regarded as minor. It can be taken as a basis for defining two separate markets. 
5. Assessment of the degree of substitutability 
(193) Low-speed and high-speed Internet access undoubtedly present some degree of 
substitutability. According to the market analyses carried out by Wanadoo Interactive's 
marketing departments, a change in the charges for the packages referred to as 
"unlimited" or "integral" (20, 30, 40, 50, 60 or 100 hours a month) can result in a 
change in the growth trajectory of high-speed offerings. Several documents found on 
the premises of Wanadoo Interactive show that, for example, a subscription charge for 
the eXtense package of the order of FRF […]* a month would have adversely impacted 
the development of that service, to the benefit of the "integral" packages.215 Wanadoo 
Interactive points to the risk of "cannibalisation" between flat-rate or unlimited access 
offerings on the one hand and ADSL offerings on the other in the acquisition of new 
subscribers. The Commission considers that the effect of the company's argument is 
merely to show that it is highly probable that subscribers will migrate from low-speed 
facilities to high-speed Internet access facilities, a matter which it has never doubted. 
(194) However, this observation on probable migrations from low-speed to high-speed 
Internet access does not in itself allow the conclusion to be drawn that there is 
sufficiently significant substitutability between the services. Although some form of 
substitutability exists, its operation is extremely asymmetrical, given the value 
attached by users to the intrinsic features of high-speed Internet access.216 
(195) In this respect, as will be seen from Table 7, the information obtained from Wanadoo 
Interactive shows that customer migrations from high-speed to low-speed facilities are 
[…]* compared with migrations from "integral" to "high-speed" facilities.217 The rates 
of migration are very dissimilar. If, however, the products were perfectly substitutable 
from the point of view of demand, the rates of migration should be identical or at least 
comparable. 
Table 7: migration of Wanadoo subscribers between unlimited offerings and ADSL 
                                                
214  Reply of 4 March 2002, p. 22, paragraphs 68 to 72 (file, p. 1726). 
215  It should be noted that Wanadoo Interactive's "Intégrale 100 h" offering which, at €9 a month less than 
the eXtense package, is the offering which in terms of unlimited access and price is closest to the high-
speed access offerings in Wanadoo's range, had only […]* subscribers on 31 March 2002 (i.e. […]* 
times less than the ADSL offerings) and was growing at a rate more than […]* less than that of the 
ADSL offerings (file, pp. 2577 to 2579). 
216  In the case of the United Kingdom market, this idea of asymmetric substitutability was put forward by 
the Office of Telecommunications in its Direction to resolve a dispute between BT, Energis and Thus 
concerning xDSL interconnection at the ATM switch, referred to above, paragraph E 16. 
217  Information taken from […]* (file, pp. 4132 et seq. and 4240 et seq.). 
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 December 
2001 
February 
2002 
Rate of migration "integral" to "high-speed" […]* % […]* % 
Rate of migration "high speed" to "integral" […]* % […]*  % 
Ratio between the rates of migration to "high-speed" and 
to "integral" 
[…]* […]* 
(196) These figures tend to show that the propensity of "integral" subscribers to migrate to 
"high-speed" facilities is on average […]* times as great as that of "high-speed" 
subscribers to migrate to "integral" facilities. Clearly, if there were highly symmetric 
substitutability between the services, the differences in rates of migration would not 
have been so disproportionate. 
(197) The low rates of migration of ADSL subscribers towards "integral" facilities is all the 
more revealing as, during the period covered by this Decision, the catalogue price per 
hour for these flat-rate offerings was generally on a downward trend,218 while prices 
for the eXtense and Wanadoo ADSL services remained stable. If Wanadoo subscribers 
had actually considered the products to be interchangeable, any such change in relative 
prices should have resulted in a switch to low-speed packages.219 However, this was 
not the case, Wanadoo's ADSL offerings continued their strong growth with only 
limited migratory movements.220 
(198) In general, Wanadoo subscribers switched to an extremely limited extent from ADSL 
to other Wanadoo offerings; the figure may be estimated at an average of […]* % of 
the customer base per month for the eXtense service between August 2001 and June 
                                                
218  Between September 2001 and March 2003, the price per hour (leaving aside the fidelity option which 
brought a 20% discount) for the "integral" ten-hour package fell from €1.04 to €1 (- 4 %). The price for 
the entry package (three hours at the end of 2001, then five hours at the beginning of 2003 fell from 
€1.93 to €1.6 (- 17%). The prices for the twenty hours a month package remained stable. The thirty-
hour package at €0.75 an hour was replaced by forty-hour and sixty-hour packages at €0.5 and €0.42 an 
hour ( a reduction of 34% and 45% respectively compared with the previous thirty-hour package). 
219  The phenomenon of differing trends in prices for low-speed and high-speed offerings is not confined to 
France. Between 2001 and 2002, ADSL prices in Europe fell by an average of 11.4%, whereas during 
the same period the price for 40 hours of low-speed use fell by more than 33% (Teligen Total Research, 
“Report on Internet Access Costs via a Standard Telephone Line, ADSL and Cable Modem”, July 2002, 
p. 60). However, throughout Europe, high-speed access offerings continued to grow at a much higher 
rate than low-speed offerings. In the United States, econometric analyses show that the incremental 
price for low-speed Internet access is not correlated with the price for high-speed Internet access and 
that low-speed Internet access does not therefore exercise any constraint on high-speed tariffs (see 
Hausman, Sidak and Singer, ‘Cable Modems and DSL: Broadband Internet Access for Residential 
Customers’). 
220  This pattern is not specific to Wanadoo, but is common to all the players on the French market. 
Between January 2001 and January 2002, high-speed Internet access prices remained stable. During the 
same period, the flat-rate prices for 20 hours, 40 hours and 50 hours a month fell by 5.3%, 5% and 9.6% 
respectively (source: ART, "Internet, un bilan du marchè français, mars 2003"). The relative price of 
flat-rate low-speed offerings closest to unlimited-access formulas thus fell between January 2001 and 
January 2002. However, during 2001, the rate of growth of the high-speed market, measured in terms of 
the number of new subscribers per week, continued to accelerate throughout 2001 (+ 74 % between the 
second half of 2000 and the first quarter of 2001, + 19% in the second quarter of 2001, + 4% in the third 
quarter of 2001 and + 91% in the last quarter of 2001). 
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2002 and at […]* % of the customer base per month for the Wanadoo ADSL service 
between January and June 2002.221 However, these rates (in particular for Wanadoo 
ADSL) overestimate switches from ADSL to low-speed, since they include switches 
between the ADSL products themselves that should be disregarded if a proper 
assessment is to be established.222 
(199) On the question of customer transfers from high-speed to low-speed Internet access 
where there was a moderate price change, the Commission had a survey carried out223 
among a representative sample of residential subscribers224 to these high-speed 
Internet access services.225 The survey involved asking the sample for its reactions to a 
general high-speed subscription price increase of 10%. The survey shows that 80% of 
subscribers would keep their high-speed Internet subscription if there were a 10% 
price increase, 7% would cancel all Internet connections and 13% would switch to 
low-speed Internet subscription packages, with half of this latter category opting for 
unlimited access packages. In order to assess whether the increase in prices would be 
profitable to the company and evaluate more fully the degree of competitive constraint 
exercised on high-speed services by low-speed services, the impact of any such 
increase on the margin on recurring variable costs should be examined. On the one 
hand, in the case of 80% of its subscribers, the company would, through a 10% price 
increase, achieve a net gain of some €3.80 for eXtense and €1.72 for Wanadoo ADSL. 
On the other, the company would loose 20% of its subscribers and the relevant 
margins. Given the margin levels on recurring variable costs for eXtense and 
Wanadoo ADSL products from 2001 up to the date of this Decision, the differential 
between additional profits and profit losses is always positive.226 Conversely, for this 
condition not to be met, the level of the margin on recurring costs would, for the two 
products in question, had to have reached 40%, which has never occurred since ADSL 
products first appeared and which seems difficult to achieve in the near future given 
the characteristics of the market. 
(200) It must be noted that, amongst the reasons which the Internet users surveyed gave for 
keeping the subscription, the fact of having entered into a one-year subscription with 
the service provider, though a very widespread practice,227 was seen as a decisive 
                                                
221  The number of customers switching from these services is shown in Annex 16. During the period under 
review, an average of 418 customers per month switched from the eXtense service (out of an average 
customer base of 263 000 during the period). In the case of Wanadoo ADSL, the average number of 
customers migrating was 985 a month (out of a customer base of 120 000). 
222  In practice, the vast majority of these changes involved customers switching from Wanadoo ADSL to 
eXtense. 
223  Survey carried out by Novatris in June 2002 for the Commission (file, pp. 5115 to 5174). 
224  The sample included 789 residential ADSL or cable high-speed Internet access subscribers. 
225  In its reply of 23 October 2002, Wanadoo Interactive challenged the choice of the sample and argued 
that a sample covering the whole of the French population should be used in order to assess more 
accurately the behaviour of intended users who had not yet subscribed to one or other formula. The 
Commission had decided not to use this method, since it considered that, to gain a valid assessment of 
the propensity of high-speed users to switch to low-speed, it was sufficient to examine a sample of 
individuals who had already tried out the functionalities and features of high-speed Internet access 
services. […]* file, p. 3234  
226  See Annex 25 for the detailed calculations. 
227  Two thirds of those surveyed stated that they had taken out a subscription for one year or more. 
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constraint by only a very small minority.228 Nor is there any significant difference in 
reaction between subscribers who have leased and those who have purchased their 
modem. Finally, those surveyed cite the unlimited access aspect of the package and 
speed of connection as the reasons for keeping their subscription despite the price 
increase, rather than objective constraints (for example, the fact of having taken out 
the subscription for one year). It would thus seem that users attach a price and a 
particular value to the specific qualitative features of high-speed Internet access. 
(201) The results of the survey referred to in paragraphs 199 and 200229 do not allow the 
conclusion to be drawn that there is sufficient substitutability between low-speed and 
high-speed offerings for a significant price change to prompt subscribers to switch in 
large numbers from high-speed to low-speed. On the contrary, the results show that 
high-speed subscribers have a distinct preference for the convenience and performance 
offered by high-speed access. The results also invalidate Wanadoo Interactive's 
suggestion in its reply of 4 March 2002 "that a price increase for high-speed access 
would contribute to customers switching to low speed".230 On the contrary, the 
Commission must conclude that there is no significant interchangeability between the 
two categories of service. 
(202) Lastly, it has to be noted that, quite clearly, Wanadoo Interactive's in-house analyses 
prompt its relevant departments to take the view231 that "ADSL is a […]* 232 […]* 
market for unlimited access". 
6. Conclusion on the service market 
(203) In the light of the analysis it has carried out the Commission considers that the 
relevant service market to be used in analysing Wanadoo Interactive's conduct is the 
market for high-speed Internet access for residential customers. 
(204) This market definition is broader than that used by the ART.233 It identifies a high-
speed Internet access market for residential customers,234 but, within that market, 
distinguishes a high-speed Internet access market using ADSL technology,235 notably 
                                                
228  Only 6% of those surveyed who had kept their high-speed Internet access subscription where there was 
a 10% price increase cited their one-year subscription as a motivating factor, and only 2% gave it as 
their main reason. 
229  The results of this survey are corroborated by another survey carried out amongst 955 internet users in 
August 2002, which showed that 0% of high-speed users would be prepared to revert to low-speed 
(article published in Le Figaro on 18 October 2002: ‘Le boom de l'Internet à haut débit’, set out in 
Annex 2 to Wanadoo Interactive's reply of 23 October 2002, (file, p. 6450). 
230  Reply dated 4 March 2002, p. 22, paragraph 72 (file, p.1727). 
231  […]* (p. 3224 of the file). […]* 
232  […]* 
233  The Competition Council has not so far given a ruling on the delineation of the relevant market. But it 
has stated - and this view has been accepted by the Paris Court of Appeal - that "it cannot be excluded 
that the France Télécom group holds a dominant position ... in the provision of high-speed Internet 
access" (decision No 02-MC-03, already referred to). 
234  See in particular ART opinion No 02-35 dated 9 January 2002 to the Competition Council on T-Online 
France's application against France Télécom's practices on the markets for the provision of Internet 
access by ADSL. 
235  See ART opinion No 00-28 dated 7 January 2000 on the Competition Council's request for an opinion 
on the case brought by 9 Télécom against some of France Télécom's practices on the high-speed 
Internet access market using xDSL technologies, section 3.1, competition analysis; ART opinion No 
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because of the difference in its penetration potential compared with Internet access by 
cable. 
2. The geographic market 
(205) The Internet service providers operating on the high-speed Internet access market and 
the telecommunications operators active on the ADSL services market operate on a 
national basis. Even if at present some of their high-speed Internet access offerings are 
limited to specific areas because of technical deployment constraints, it is clear that all 
the providers pursue the same deployment and growth objectives at national level. 
Furthermore, prices are set at national level. Internet service providers provide a 
service aimed at the resident population within the national territory and are subject to 
national rules and regulations. 
(206) The relevant geographic market is accordingly deemed to be the French national 
market. This definition is also that used by Wanadoo Interactive.236 
C. THE DOMINANT POSITION 
(207) In looking at Wanadoo Interactive's position on the relevant market, the Commission 
will examine several factors in turn: the market shares held since the beginning of 
2001, the effects of the link-up with the France Télécom group, and the pre-eminent 
position held in conventional Internet access and in directories. 
1. General 
(208) Wanadoo Interactive points out that the Court of Justice has defined a dominant 
position as "a position of economic strength enjoyed by an undertaking which enables 
it to prevent effective competition being maintained on the relevant market by giving 
it the power to behave to an appreciable extent independently of its competitors, 
customers and ultimately of its consumers".237 According to Wanadoo Interactive, the 
charges it had decided to make were determined by the attitude of its competitors, and 
the company was in reality "under pressure from existing and potential 
competitors".238According to this analysis, the level of prices charged is itself a 
demonstration of the fact of this competitive pressure. 
(209) The Commission considers that Wanadoo Interactive misinterprets the concept of 
behaving independently referred to in the Court's judgment. The power to behave 
independently does not mean that the dominant undertaking is in a position of 
complete invulnerability vis-à-vis existing or potential competitors. Any such 
invulnerability requirement would ultimately render the very concept of abuse of a 
dominant position irrelevant, since, in that case, the dominant undertaking, protected 
                                                                                                                                                   
02-346 dated 30 April 2002 on tariff decision No 2002033 concerning the IP/ADSL routing offering 
and on the tariff proposals concerning IP/ADSL offerings announced by France Télécom, in particular 
section II.2; ART opinion No 01-548 dated 19 June 2001 on tariff decision No 2001482 concerning the 
development of Netissimo 1 and Netissimo 2 services and tariff decision No 2001480 concerning the 
development of the IP/ADSL access provision offering and the IP/ADSL routing offering, section II.1. 
236  Reply dated 4 March 2002, p. 30 (file, p. 1735). 
237  Case C–27/76 United Brands and Others v Commission [1978] ECR 207, paragraph 65. 
238  Reply dated 4 March 2002, p. 32, paragraph 110 (file, p.1737). 
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from any competitive risk, would have no need to engage in practices designed to 
eliminate rival firms. Enjoying a dominant position does not mean that there is no 
competitive pressure. The dominant position simply enables the relevant undertaking 
"if not to determine, at least to have an appreciable influence on the conditions under 
which that competition will develop, and in any case to act largely in disregard of it so 
long as such conduct does not operate to its detriment".239 The Commission considers 
that, in this case, the various elements of dominance described in paragraphs 211 to 
252 gave Wanadoo Interactive the means to engage in a large-scale market penetration 
strategy that was untenable for its competitors, which were unable to follow suit. 
(210) Wanadoo Interactive made a number of points on some of the dominance factors 
identified by the Commission, its view being that none of the factors taken on its own 
was evidence of dominance. The Commission would point out at the outset, before 
looking in detail at the points raised by the company, that it did not itself, in its 
analysis, look at any single factor, but examined a combination of elements which, 
taken together, are such as to give Wanadoo Interactive a dominant position on the 
relevant market. 
2. Market shares 
(211) Table 8 shows the growth of Wanadoo Interactive's market share since the beginning 
of 2001 amongst ADSL and cable modem high-speed Internet service providers.240 
Wanadoo Interactive's market share includes both Wanadoo Interactive's ADSL 
subscribers and Câble Wanadoo's subscribers. In its own market analyses, the 
company includes subscribers to Câble Wanadoo, which carries its brand name, 
although technically the service is provided by France Télécom Câble.241 
Table 8: Wanadoo Interactive's market shares on the high-speed market 
 31/12/2000 31/03/2001 30/06/2001 30/09/2001 31/12/2001 31/03/2002 30/06/2002 30/08/2002 
Total […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* 
Wanadoo [40-50]* % [50-60]* % [50-60]* %  [60-70]* % [60-70]*% [70-80]*% [70-80]*% [70-80]*% 
 
(212) Very large market shares, in excess of 50%, must be regarded as serious, and indeed 
sufficient, evidence of the existence of a dominant position, save in exceptional 
circumstances.242 However, since the market was still at a fairly immature stage at the 
beginning of 2001, two other key considerations must be taken into account in 
addition to absolute market shares. 
                                                
239  Case 85/76 Hoffmann-La Roche v Commission [1979] ECR 461, paragraph 39. 
240  Percentages calculated on the basis of the answers to various requests for information provided by 
Wanadoo Interactive, Noos, NC Numéricâble, UPC France, Est Vidéocommunications, T-Online 
France, Tiscali France, AOL France, 9Télécom, Easynet, Nerim, BD Multimédia, NetUltra, Infonie and 
Oreka. 
241  See, for example, the following in-house documents obtained on Wanadoo Interactive's premises: […]* 
(file, p. 4236 et seq.); […]* (file, p. 4128 et seq.); […]* (file, pp. 4155-4156); […]* (file, p. 4254 et 
seq.); […]* (file, p. 4263); […]* (file, p. 4278 et seq.); […]*  (file, p. 4350 et seq.). 
242  Judgment in Akzo, paragraph 60. 
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(213) Wanadoo Interactive's relative position vis-à-vis its next largest competitors needs to 
be examined first.243 On 1 January 2001, Wanadoo Interactive had […]*times as many 
subscribers as its largest competitor, the cable operator Noos.244 As from the second 
half of 2001, Wanadoo Interactive opened up a considerable gap vis-à-vis its largest 
competitor. In the first quarter of 2001, its growth rate was more than […]*times that of 
Noos. At the end of March, Wanadoo Interactive had […]*times as many subscribers 
and at the end of June […]*times as many. One year later, at the end of June 2002, 
Wanadoo Interactive had about […]*times as many subscribers as Noos. As far as its 
other competitors were concerned, whether cable modem or ADSL service providers, 
none of them ever exceeded a market share of 8% during the period under review. 
Thus, as will be seen from Table 9, not only did Wanadoo Interactive have a clear lead 
over its largest competitor throughout the period, it also widened its lead over it to a 
striking extent. 
Table 9: ratio between Wanadoo Interactive's market shares and those of its main competitor 
31/12/2000 31/03/2001 30/06/2001 30/09/2001 31/12/2001 31/03/2002 30/06/2002 31/08/2002 
[1-5]* [1-5]* [1-5]* [1-5]* [1-5]* [5-10]* [5-10]* [5-10]* 
 
(214) In addition, particular attention needs to be given, within the relevant market, to the 
market segment involving ADSL offerings. The cable modem offerings segment has 
less potential in terms of geographical deployment capacity than the ADSL 
segment.245 If one looks only at the segment involving ADSL Internet access services 
for residential customers, Wanadoo Interactive's market shares were very large: 
consistently close to [90-100]* % from the beginning of 2001 to the end of the 
summer 2002, and still [80-90]* % in August 2002.246 As will be seen from Table 10, 
since the end of 2000 Wanadoo Interactive has had more than […]*times as many 
ADSL subscribers as its largest competitor in this segment. 
Table 10: ratio between Wanadoo Interactive's market shares and those of its main competitor in the 
ADSL segment247 
                                                
243  Wanadoo Interactive's position in relation to all its other competitors is examined in section II.E.1. 
244  See the subscriber bases of Wanadoo Interactive and Noos at the end of 2000 and beginning of 2001 in 
Annex 25. 
245  On 1 January 2001, there were in France 4.9 million cable sockets capable of taking high-speed 
services, as against more than 11 million lines directly connectable to ADSL. The 16 largest cable 
operators had geographically fragmented and technically disparate networks, whereas the telephone 
network which carries ADSL is uniform in technical specifications. The Paris region itself, in which 
cable operators are strongly established, presents a mosaic of areas served by different operators. Lastly, 
cable operators are prohibited by law from serving more than 8 million inhabitants, which imposes a 
severe constraint on the extension of their networks. The weaknesses of the cable networks compared 
with ADSL in the deployment of high-speed Internet access are analysed in a number of decisions and 
public documents issued by the ART (see, in particular, its opinion No 00-28 of 7 January 2000, and the 
report on the situation of the cable operators which can be consulted at its website: http://www.art-
telecom.fr, clicking on "les grands dossiers", "réseaux câblés"). 
246  Percentages calculated on the basis of the raw figures provided by the service providers' replies referred 
to in footnote 240. 
247  The relative improvement in the main ADSL competitor's situation in the first quarter of 2002 is mainly 
due to the slowdown in Wanadoo Interactive's sales as a result of the ban on marketing eXtense 
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 31/12/2000 31/03/2001 30/06/2001 30/09/2001 31/12/2001 31/03/2002 30/06/2002 31/08/2002 
Wanadoo's ADSL 
subscribers/main 
ADSL 
competitor’s 
subscribers 
[10-15]* [10-15]* [10-15]* [15-20]* [20-25]* [10-15]* [5-10]* [5-10]* 
Wanadoo's high-
speed 
subscribers/main 
ADSL 
competitor's 
subscribers 
[20-25]* [15-20]* [15-20]* [15-20]* [20-25]* [10-15]* [5-10]* [5-10]* 
 
(215) Relative market shares, and the relationship between the market shares of the 
undertaking concerned and of its competitors, especially those of the next largest, are 
held by the Court of Justice to be relevant factors in assessing a dominant position.248 
Consequently, the market shares held by Wanadoo Interactive since the beginning of 
2001 are, in view of the above considerations, serious evidence of dominance. 
(216) Wanadoo Interactive considers that market shares do not provide reliable evidence in 
the context of an emerging market characterised by a still limited customer base. 
Wanadoo argues that it is necessary to adopt a forward-looking approach on market 
shares. In addition to this assessment on the validity of market shares, Wanadoo 
Interactive expresses doubts on whether a dominant position can be determined on an 
emerging market249 and argues that the Internet access sector is a part of the new 
economy in which market shares provide only very unreliable evidence.250 These 
remarks call for the following comments. 
(217) Firstly, as a general point, the fact that a sector is a growth sector does not in itself 
mean that it is not covered by the competition rules, and in particular Article 82 of the 
Treaty. Analysis of the market position must of course take account not only of market 
shares, but also of the specifics of a dynamic market. This is precisely what the 
Commission set out to do in this Decision. However, the Commission cannot debar 
itself from examining the position of an undertaking on a growth market pending its 
final consolidation, since this would mean ex post acceptance of any abuses 
committed. 
(218) Secondly, while it cannot be ruled out that the term "emerging market" may properly 
be applied to the high speed Internet access market,251 the Commission takes the view, 
                                                                                                                                                   
packages in France Télécom agencies imposed by the Competition Council in the decision of 27 
February 2002 already referred to. 
248  Hoffmann-La Roche, paragraph 48. 
249  Reply of 4 March 2002, paragraph 154 (file, p. 1749). 
250  Ibid., paragraph 121. 
251  However, it should be noted that Wanadoo Interactive bases its assessment (reply of 4 March 2002, 
footnote 80 - file, p. 1739) on a Commission non-opposition merger Decision adopted in May 2000, in 
which the xDSL equipment market was described as an emerging market (Commission Decision of 19 
May 2000 in Case IV/M.1908 - Alcatel/Newbridge Networks (OJ C 169, 17.6.2000, p. 7), at paragraph 
12). That Decision was adopted more than seven months before the beginning of the period covered by 
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at all events, that it is impossible to regard the relevant market as entirely new or in a 
phase of pure experimentation. At the end of June 2000, the high-speed Internet access 
market for residential customers already had some 100 000 subscribers, and at the end 
of 2000, there were more than 180 000 subscribers in France. As from the first quarter 
of 2001, the market grew by more than 5 000 new subscribers a week. Although the 
term emerging market may be used to describe this key period, it is quite clear that, at 
that date, high-speed Internet access services had gone well beyond the stage of simple 
commercial or technical experimentation. In other countries, high-speed Internet 
access services already had a large number of subscribers at the end of 2000. 
Germany, for example, had nearly 450 000 subscribers to high-speed Internet access 
services at the end of 2000, while the United States had more than 5 million.252 In 
addition, although high-speed does constitute a separate market, Internet access 
services and certain uses linked to high-speed services were not new. The high-speed 
market developed in France as from 1997 and as an extension of an existing market, 
that of low-speed Internet access offerings. At the end of 2000, there were some 5 
million Internet subscribers in France. Even though high-speed Internet access 
displayed some features of an emerging market, it cannot be asserted that Wanadoo 
Interactive's development on the relevant market as from 2001 took place against a 
background of uncertainty and instability associated with an entirely new type of 
product. 
(219) Thirdly, the risk of a fluctuating market share that could, according to the company, be 
a feature of a market in a high growth phase does not seem to apply to Wanadoo 
Interactive in the case in point. The company's market share grew consistently and 
steadily throughout the high-speed market and the company's penetration on the 
ADSL offerings segment is surprisingly stable over the period. There is thus no 
evidence of wide and erratic fluctuations in market shares on the high-speed market in 
France as from the beginning of 2001, a feature which would indicate that there was 
no dominant position. 
(220) Fourthly, Wanadoo Interactive suggests that a forward-looking or dynamic analysis of 
market shares should be used in addition to the observation of the market shares that 
existed in 2001 and at the beginning of 2002. According to Wanadoo Interactive, not 
only current competition, but also potential competition from future competitors 
should be examined. To understand the company's perception of the reality and scale 
of the threat posed by future competitors, reference may be made to the simulations 
carried out by Wanadoo Interactive itself. In March 2001, the company foresaw a 
customer base of [>1.5]* million by the end of 2004, both ADSL and cable access.253 
For the same period, according to internal company documents, the number of 
subscribers for the high-speed access market could be estimated at [>2.5]* million by 
                                                                                                                                                   
this Decision. Furthermore, it applies only to the segment using xDSL technology, which developed 
later than cable modem technology. 
252  BDRC, “The Development of Broadband Access Platforms in Europe”, August 2001, pp. 83 and 126. It 
is known that Wanadoo Interactive was following the situation abroad during the initial stage of 
development of ADSL services. The […]* (file, p. 3146) includes the following paragraph: "In the 
United States (source […]* study, January 2000) demand for high-speed is soaring in the towns in 
which ADSL is deployed (one third of demand). This demand is growing more rapidly on the 
residential market and is driven by customers' need for speed, value-added content and convenience of 
use". 
253  […]* (file, p. 4254). 
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the end of 2004.254 Wanadoo Interactive's forecast was thus equivalent to [50-60]* % 
of the whole of the market at the end of 2004. This market penetration forecast was 
re-assessed by Wanadoo Interactive in June 2001 at […]* million customers by the end 
of 2004, not including cable access. Wanadoo Interactive thus believed at that time 
that it would have […]* of the ADSL segment at the end of 2004, and thus at least [50-
60]* % of the residential high-speed Internet access market.255 At the time when these 
forecasts were made, the company did not foresee any significant erosion at all in its 
share of the high-speed market. On the contrary, the company was forecasting a steady 
increase in its market shares in ADSL.256 Wanadoo Interactive's own forward-looking 
analyses tend to show that the company was confident in its capacity to hold on to its 
very high market shares in the medium term and did not feel any threat to its dominant 
position. At all events, a slight decline in market shares which are still very high 
cannot constitute proof of the absence of a dominant position.257 
(221) Lastly, in its reply of 23 October 2002, Wanadoo Interactive cites the marketing 
campaigns carried out by its competitors at the time of the Internet Festival in March 
2002. However, the company does not prove that these marketing campaigns could 
have had a destabilising effect on the market shares which it held. On the contrary, on 
the basis of the figures set out in Table 8, it may be seen that the company's market 
share remained intact in the first half of 2002, despite the efforts of its competitors. 
Furthermore, the only credible competitor explicitly cited by Wanadoo Interactive is 
T-Online France, which operated Club Internet, whose "declared intention is to take 
15% of this segment [ADSL]".258 Even if T-Online France were at some time in the 
future to win 15% of the ADSL segment on the high-speed market, Wanadoo 
Interactive's position does not seem to be such as to be undermined by this level of 
penetration. In its reply of 23 October 2002, Wanadoo Interactive also describes the 
campaigns and objectives of its competitors, on the basis of their advertising in the 
autumn of 2002. In actual fact, even during this period in which its competitors made 
exceptional efforts, Wanadoo Interactive accounted for more than [50-60]* % of the 
growth of the high-speed market. Although the marketing campaigns of competitors in 
a context of healthy competition are liable to lead to some erosion of the relevant 
company's market shares, its dominance in terms of market shares on the relevant 
market does not seem threatened. 
(222) In view of the above, it cannot be argued that there was any volatility, fragility or 
instability in Wanadoo Interactive's position on an emerging market that would 
invalidate an examination of market shares and their inclusion amongst the factors 
determining dominance. 
3. The link-up with France Télécom 
(223) Amongst Internet service providers in France, Wanadoo Interactive occupies a special 
position because it forms part of the France Télécom group. The fact that Wanadoo 
                                                
254  pp. 7 and 13 of Annex 31 to Wanadoo Interactive's reply of 4 March 2002 to the statement of objections 
(file, pp. 2076 and 2082). 
255  […]* (file, p. 2907). 
256  […]* (file, p. 2907), which indicates a […]* % market share for Wanadoo in ADSL by 2004. 
257  Court of First Instance of the European Communities in Joined Cases T-24/93, T-25/93, T-26/93 and T-
28/93 Compagnie maritime belge v Commission [1996] ECR II–1201, paragraph 77. 
258  Reply of 4 March 2002, paragraph 118 (file, p. 1740). 
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Interactive belongs to the France Télécom group gives it commercial and technical 
deployment facilities and potential financial support which are liable to be of crucial 
importance in gaining massive penetration of a developing market involving a new 
type of activity. 
(224) As a general point, Wanadoo Interactive disputes that it benefits from the support 
provided by France Télécom to its subsidiary, pointing out that other providers of 
high-speed Internet access are backed by powerful global companies.259 More 
specifically, Wanadoo Interactive cites the case of AOL France and T-Online France, 
which form part of the AOL-Time Warner and Deutsche Telekom groups respectively, 
and Tiscali. 
(225) It should be noted in this connection that, according to the Court of Justice, the size, 
financial strength and degree of diversification of competitors at world level do not 
necessarily deprive the dominant undertaking of its privileged position.260 The 
situation of undertakings affected by Wanadoo Interactive must therefore be analysed 
in the light of the circumstances of the present case. 
(226) Tiscali is a group which specialises in Internet access, but does not have the 
diversified resources that would give it some security of revenue, in contrast to the 
France Télécom group. T-Online France is a subsidiary of Deutsche Telekom, but 
Deutsche Telekom does not have a position on the relevant geographic market 
comparable to that of Wanadoo's parent company, with the result that its backing is 
necessarily only financial. AOL France is linked up to a group with a relatively 
diversified portfolio, but one which until the end of 2002 held only a very weak 
position on the high-speed Internet access market in France.261 
(227) Wanadoo Interactive's argument regarding the claimed power of its competitors and 
their strategic support from large international groups is all the less relevant as none of 
them occupies a pre-eminent position on the low-speed market, which constitutes one 
of the possible growth reservoirs of the high-speed market. On the contrary, Wanadoo 
Interactive is by far the leading low-speed Internet access provider in France. 
Wanadoo Interactive's share of the market for low-speed Internet access was estimated 
in 2001 at between [30-40]* %.262 By comparison, the next largest competitor on the 
low-speed market, AOL, held scarcely more than [10-20]% of the market at that date, 
i.e. […]* less than Wanadoo Interactive.263 A survey of a sample of Internet users 
published in November 2001 on the question "Which is your main ISP?" gave 
Wanadoo 39%, AOL 16%, Tiscali 9% and Club Internet 6.5%.264 Thus, the positions 
held on the low-speed market by the relevant competitors were insufficient to act as a 
counterweight to the advantages enjoyed by Wanadoo Interactive on the relevant 
market. 
                                                
259  Reply of 4 March 2002, paragraphs 123 and 149 (file, p. 1748). 
260  Case 322/81 Nederlandsche Banden Industrie Michelin v Commission [1983] ECR 3461, paragraph 59. 
261  Up to the end of 2002, AOL held less than 3% of the high-speed Internet access market in France. 
262  Reply of 4 March 2002, paragraph 114 (file, p. 1738). 
263  Ibid., footnote 76. 
264  Study on Internet access carried out by the Benchmark Group among 6 000 Internet users, reported in 
Le Journal du Net of 15 November 2001. 
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(228) Whatever the willingness of the relevant groups to back the investments and 
commercial initiatives of their French subsidiaries, none of them could pretend to 
provide their subsidiaries with technical backing and backing in terms of commercial 
network in France on such a decisive scale as those provided by France Télécom to 
Wanadoo Interactive, as outlined in paragraphs 229 to 246. 
1. Synergies within a large group 
(229) In its stock exchange listing prospectus issued in July 2000, Wanadoo described the 
general advantages it would acquire from the support of the France Télécom group as 
follows: "The Wanadoo group benefits from strong synergies with France Télécom. At 
distribution level, France Télécom distributes the Wanadoo connection kits in its 700 
France Télécom sales outlets and its strong regional representation ensures that the 
group's name is well known. The group benefits directly from France Télécom's know-
how in marketing to the general public and industry. The group draws on France 
Télécom's infrastructure in the IP area and in France Télécom's investments in 
promoting the new access technologies, such as (...) ADSL. Lastly, the group benefits 
from the formidable reservoir of professional know-how which France Télécom 
represents".265 
(230) In addition to this general statement by the company itself, a more precise description 
should be given of the nature of the benefits which Wanadoo Interactive derives from 
the link-up with France Télécom in the deployment of its ADSL offerings for the mass 
residential market. 
2. Technical support 
(231) In technical terms, Wanadoo Interactive benefits from the support of France Télécom's 
facilities. France Télécom is the incumbent telecommunications operator in France. It 
operates either directly or indirectly, through its subsidiary Transpac, long-distance 
networks in France which are used to carry Internet traffic. Above all, France Télécom 
is the owner of the local telecommunications access network linking all telephone 
subscribers to its network. The use of France Télécom's local access network is 
essential in order to provide an ADSL service. Throughout the period covered by this 
Decision, France Télécom controlled virtually all the ADSL connections in France. 
(232) Specifically, the technical support of France Télécom gave Wanadoo Interactive a 
considerable competitive edge throughout 2000 and the first seven months of 2001. 
Unlike the other Internet service providers using ADSL technology for high-speed 
Internet access offerings, Wanadoo Interactive received preferential treatment from the 
incumbent telecommunications operator throughout that period. France Télécom 
offered Wanadoo Interactive a bespoke national and regional IP routing facility as 
from the end of 1999. During the same period, the other Internet service providers 
were offered only the Turbo IP routing facility, which imposed greater constraints on 
them since it obliged them to have points of presence in each of France Télécom's 41 
geographic areas in order to achieve maximum territorial coverage.266 Consequently, 
the only constraint on Wanadoo Interactive's geographical presence was the rate of 
                                                
265  Wanadoo's stock exchange listing prospectus, July 2000, p. 52. 
266  Up to October 2000, the Turbo IP facility was indeed not only offered to, but imposed on anyone 
wishing to subscribe to one of the IP/ADSL 1 or IP/ADSL 2 offerings. 
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roll-out of ADSL technology by France Télécom, whereas the other ADSL service 
providers had to establish numerous points of presence in order to be present outside 
Paris, which few of them were prepared to do. […]* 267 […]* 268 During the same 
period, Wanadoo Interactive's competitors, and notably Noos, were represented almost 
exclusively in the Paris region, or indeed, in the case of providers using ADSL 
technology, in just a few districts of the capital. 
(233) The bespoke facility finally disappeared in August 2001, with the entry into force269on 
20 July 2001 of tariff decision No 2001480 concerning developments in IP/ADSL and 
Collecte IP/ADSL offerings and the extension to all Internet service providers of the 
facility for national and regional IP/ADSL routing. However, in the spring of 2001 as 
in the summer of 2001, Wanadoo Interactive was confident of France Télécom's 
willingness to grant it a second bespoke facility to reduce its production costs if need 
be.270 
(234) Another technical advantage lies in Wanadoo Interactive's ability to have real-time 
access to information allowing potential customers' addresses to be linked up with 
France Télécom's corresponding distributors, so that Wanadoo Interactive was able to 
inform any interested customers within a very short period of time whether the area 
within which they lived was covered by an ADSL service. Wanadoo Interactive's 
competitors, by contrast, have to send a specific request to France Télécom to 
establish potential customers' eligibility for ADSL. This means a loss of time for them 
which may make it more difficult to clinch the deal with the potential customer.271 
(235) The technical advantages referred to in paragraphs 232 to 234 (bespoke facility and 
access to files on high-speed-convertible lines) reflect the vertical integration between 
Wanadoo Interactive and France Télécom, which is far and away its main supplier. 
The Court of Justice has held that a vertical integration effect could be regarded as one 
of the factors contributing to a dominant position.272 The fact that, in the case in point, 
Wanadoo Interactive is legally a separate entity distinct from France Télécom does not 
detract from the effects of the vertical integration of the group as a whole.  
(236) Wanadoo Interactive has not disputed the fact that the bespoke service provided in 
2001 could have constituted a major advantage in the roll-out of its services. However, 
it did dispute the fact that access to knowledge of France Télécom's ADSL network 
and to the eligibility of phone lines could have constituted an advantage. It considers 
that, as from October 2001, all competitors had the use of a server of equivalent 
eligibility. It acknowledges that the Competition Council in France decided on interim 
measures in February 2000,273 but emphasises that that decision does not affect the 
substance. The Commission for its part considers that the conditions relating to the 
                                                
267  […]* file, p. 255 et seq.). 
268  At the end of January 2001, Wanadoo Interactive's total reserved bandwidth for Netissimo 1 was about 
[…]* Mbit/s for Paris and Île-de-France, as against […]* Mbit/s for the rest of France (Annex to France 
Télécom's reply of 16 May 2001, file, p. 113 et seq.). 
269  Following the approval of this tariff decision by the Minister for Economic Affairs, Finance and 
Industry. 
270  […]* (file, p. 2909), […]* (file, p. 3317). 
271  […]* 
272  United Brands, paragraphs 70 and 71. 
273  Abovementioned decision of the Competition Council adopted on 27 February 2002. 
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eligibility server have no longer been discriminatory since July 2002, when the French 
Competition Council held that the interim measures it had imposed had been complied 
with. The fact remains that Wanadoo's privileged treatment continued for almost a 
year and a half, at an important stage in the development of the market. 
(237) France Télécom's technical support gives Wanadoo Interactive an advantage to which 
its competitors do not have access, which must be regarded as constituting a strategic 
entry barrier and, consequently, as a factor of dominance. 
3. Commercial support 
(238) Wanadoo Interactive benefits from the commercial backing of France Télécom, whose 
network of agencies gives it a comprehensive physical presence throughout the 
national territory. The marketing of the relevant products does of course entail 
remuneration for France Télécom's sales outlets. The fact remains, however, that the 
presence of Wanadoo's name in France Télécom's 700 commercial agencies and the 
exclusivity enjoyed by its ADSL offerings within this network gave it a degree of 
visibility which allowed it easily to reach potential customers throughout France.274 
The density of the network makes it easier to identify sales prospects, on the one hand, 
and to guide customers interested in ADSL services to Wanadoo Interactive's Internet 
access offerings on the other. This aspect is all the more important as, in order to be 
connected to a "dissociated" ADSL service, and regardless of which Internet service 
provider they initially envisage being connected to, consumers are in all cases obliged 
to apply to the France Télécom agency to which they are attached for the provision of 
an ADSL line.275 When they do so, it is quite possible that, in practice, and especially 
since the marketing of the eXtense package combining an ADSL line and Internet 
access provided by Wanadoo, […]* 
(239) In order to gain a clearer idea of the advantage afforded by this commercial presence 
in agencies, one may compare the network of 700 France Télécom agencies in which 
Wanadoo Interactive was represented with the 26 sales outlets belonging to Noos, its 
main competitor at the beginning of 2001.276 The distribution medium did expand 
during the course of 2001, particularly as from September 2001. At the end of 2001, 
Wanadoo Interactive's high-speed services were marketed in […]* sales outlets, both 
France Télécom shops and large-scale retail outlets and specialised retailers.277 
Competitors also gradually developed their sales outlet networks. The fact remains, 
however, that at the beginning of 2002, the leading competitor, Noos, was represented 
                                                
274  Wanadoo Interactive's products are also marketed in […]* general or specialised retail outlets and 
through a network of small independent retailers comprising […]* outlets (France Télécom's letter of 
22 November 2001, file, pp. 689 et seq.). 
275  It will be borne in mind that, for the purposes of high-speed Internet access using ADSL, residential 
consumers can choose between acquiring a package (combining the provision of the high-speed line 
with the provision of Internet access proper), and entering into a separate contract with France Télécom 
for the provision of the Netissimo 1 service (ADSL access line) and with the Internet service provider 
of their choice (Wanadoo Interactive or another ISP) for Internet access proper. 
276  Email sent by Noos to the Commission on 7 October 2002, file, p. 5338. At that time, Club Internet did 
not have any shops or retail network of its own (letter from T-Online France dated 28 February 2002, 
file, p. 1359). 
277  France Télécom's letter to the Commission of 22 November 2001, file, p. 706. 
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in fewer than […]* sales outlets,278 i.e. more than […]* times fewer than Wanadoo 
Interactive.279 
(240) Furthermore, the efficiency of the distribution networks accessible to competitors is 
much lower than that provided by the network of France Télécom's agencies. None of 
Wanadoo Interactive’s competitors enjoys an exclusive relationship with a distributor 
dedicated to telecommunications services and Internet access comparable to the 
exclusive relationship between France Télécom and Wanadoo Interactive. […]*:280 the 
exclusivity enjoyed by Wanadoo Interactive's high-speed services in France Télécom's 
agencies thus represented a very significant means of dominating the market. 
(241) Thus, throughout 2001 France Télécom's agency network provided crucial support for 
the marketing of Wanadoo Interactive's ADSL services, particularly the eXtense 
package. During 2001, several in-house company documents reflect the very strong 
commitment of France Télécom's agencies to the eXtense product.281 At the beginning 
of 2001, the company estimated that, for 2001 as a whole, France Télécom's agencies 
would place between […]* % of the eXtense packages and ADSL subscriptions 
sold,282 i.e. a proportion which is very much higher than the average observed for 
products in the Wanadoo Interactive range as a whole.283 At the end of 2001, Wanadoo 
Interactive still regarded the France Télécom agencies as the main channel for 
distributing ADSL products on the residential market, with […]* % of the sales 
anticipated in 2002.284 
(242) It must also be noted, as far as this commercial support is concerned, that Wanadoo 
Interactive benefits indirectly from France Télécom's advertising relating to high-
speed Internet access. Its advertising tries to persuade potential consumers to apply to 
their France Télécom agency, where they are likely to be channelled towards 
Wanadoo Interactive's services.285 France Télécom is reported to have spent some 
€[…]*  on press and radio advertising of this type in 2001,286 alongside the 
approximately €[…]* spent by Wanadoo Interactive on ADSL advertising campaigns. 
(243) In Michelin, the Court of Justice considered the question of commercial networks 
giving direct access to consumers and the possibilities of commercial synergies with 
other elements in the product range of a company or of the group to which it belongs 
                                                
278  Email sent by Noos to the Commission on 30 August 2002, file, p. 5240. 
279  At the beginning of 2002, the products of T-Online (Club Internet), which was at that time the second 
largest competitor on the market in numerical terms, were stocked by a network of fewer than 500 
general or specialised retailers (T-Online's letter to the Commission of 28 February 2002, file, p. 1359), 
i.e. four times fewer than Wanadoo Interactive. 
280  […]* (file, p. 4180). 
281  […]* (file, p. 3211); […]* (file, p. 3859). […]* 
282  […]* (file, p. 3853). […]* (file, p. 4329). […]* (file, pp. 2434 et seq.). 
283  […]* (file, p. 3954). 
284  […]* (file, p. 3104). 
285  It should be noted here that, even amongst the customers who finally opted for a "dissociated" offering, 
from January to September 2001, the period during which the Netissimo service was almost exclusively 
marketed through agencies, more than […]* opted for the Wanadoo ADSL service, the rest being 
divided amongst all the other providers. While this does not constitute hard proof, it seems to indicate 
that consumers applying to a France Télécom agency were directed towards Wanadoo's service. 
286  Source Sécodip, cited by one of Wanadoo Interactive's competitors in its reply to the Commission's 
request for information of March 2002. 
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as a factor contributing to the establishment of a dominant position.287 In the case 
being examined here, the support which Wanadoo Interactive derives from its 
exclusive presence in France Télécom's agencies is a particularly important factor 
liable to underpin its dominant position, in a situation where products have entered a 
phase of rapid growth. The cost and time required for a company to set up its own 
distribution network or a network involving an exclusive commercial relationship 
comparable to that enjoyed by Wanadoo must be regarded as an obstacle to market 
penetration by competitors and as an important factor in Wanadoo's dominant 
position, particularly at the start of the period under review. 
4. Logistical and financial support 
(244) Lastly, Wanadoo Interactive benefits from logistical and financial support from France 
Télécom. A look at the way in which eXtense starter packs are acquired and marketed 
is revealing. France Télécom buys the modems and puts together the starter packs, 
placing orders with different suppliers. […]* 288 The assumption of these cost items by 
France Télécom during the period between the entry of the starter packs into stock and 
their sale to customers, which is generally several weeks, represents a significant 
advantage for Wanadoo Interactive, since it reduces its working capital requirement, 
an advantage which its competitors did not enjoy. 
(245) More anecdotally, as Wanadoo Interactive's main supplier, France Télécom allowed 
Wanadoo Interactive favourable payment terms […]* 289 whereas the other Internet 
service providers were invoiced by France Télécom at regular dates, or indeed in some 
cases in advance.290 Wanadoo Interactive […]*confined itself to noting that the 
IP/ADSL access service had been invoiced late in 2001 to a number of competitors,291 
which was not relevant to the issue raised by the Commission. 
(246) The Commission considers that the logistical support provided for the procurement of 
eXtense packs, the savings in terms of working capital requirements for marketing 
them and the invoicing periods which France Télécom occasionally applied to its 
subsidiary constitute, in the context of a growth market, very appreciable advantages 
that contribute to Wanadoo Interactive's dominant position. 
4. Wanadoo Interactive's position on the directory publishing markets 
(247) In 2000, France Télécom brought together within Wanadoo its telephone directory 
publishing activities and its activities involving the sale of advertising space in 
business directories, which had previously been divided between its own departments 
and the Office d'Annonces (ODA). These activities bring in very considerable revenue 
and are very profitable activities of the Wanadoo group. In a decision adopted in 
March 1998, the Competition Council took the view that France Télécom and the 
                                                
287  Michelin, paragraphs 55, 56 and 58. 
288  […]*  (file, p. 3637). 
289  […]* (file, p. 251 et seq.), […]* (file, p. 633) . […]* (file, pp. 4727 et seq.) […]* (file, pp. 4765 et 
seq.), […]*  (file, p. 5904), […]* 
290  See France Télécom's reply of 1 August 2001 to the information request of 10 July 2001. In that reply 
(Annex 2a), it is clear that [...]*. France Télécom's replies of 14 March 2002 and 4 November 2002 
show that an equivalent phenomenon occurred in 2002. 
291  Reply of 4 March 2002, paragraph 142. 
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ODA held a dominant position respectively on the business directory publishing 
market and on the market for the sale of advertising space in business directories.292 
(248) Although, for the purposes of this proceeding, it is not necessary to examine whether 
Wanadoo SA and its yellow pages (Pages Jaunes) subsidiary, the successors of France 
Télécom and the ODA in the relevant activities, hold a dominant position, it should be 
noted that the inclusion of these highly profitable activities in the group's portfolio is 
liable to considerably reduce the impact which the Wanadoo Interactive subsidiary's 
policy of selling at a loss on the high-speed Internet access market has on the group's 
worth and stock exchange value. In 2000 and 2001, Wanadoo achieved, in its 
"directories and services for business" segment results before depreciation of 
respectively €225 million and €238 million.293 Quite clearly, Wanadoo Interactive 
would have viewed the very heavy losses recorded on the high-speed Internet access 
market in a very different light if the impact of this severe loss had not been offset, at 
Wanadoo group level, by the very substantial profits earned from the directory 
publishing business, and in particular from the sale of advertising space. The 
composition of the Wanadoo group's business portfolio thus gives it considerable 
financial power that helps to establish its dominant position on the relevant market. 
(249) Wanadoo Interactive disputed the advantage associated with the revenue earned for 
the group from its directory business. On the contrary, it takes the view that the only 
real item that counts is the €[…]*  raised when Wanadoo was introduced on the stock 
exchange in 2000.294 
(250) The Commission […]* considers that the cash raised in 2000 represented a very 
appreciable advantage in providing financial underpinning for the loss-making high-
speed Internet access business. Wanadoo Interactive claims that its competitors are 
"all linked up with financially powerful groups",295 without providing any factual 
evidence for its assertion. The Commission considers, by contrast, that this level of 
cash assets gave rise to substantial financial asymmetry in relation to certain operators 
such as Mangoosta. 
(251) Furthermore, the Commission considers that the level of cash assets at the beginning 
of the period is not the only parameter to be taken into consideration. A company 
cannot manage its cash without taking account of the manner in which the level of its 
cash assets is affected by its current operating conditions. Thus, the room for 
manoeuvre afforded to Wanadoo by its cash assets would have been less if the 
deterioration in its cash created by its loss-making Internet activities had not been 
offset by the net cash contributions generated by a profit-making activity. 
(252) The Commission considers that the benefits deriving from the directory publishing 
business were such as to reinforce the dominant position on the market for high-speed 
                                                
292  Decision No 98-D-16 of 3 March 1998 concerning practices implemented by the Office d'Annonces in 
the marketing of advertising space in telephone directories. 
293  Annex to Wanadoo's consolidated accounts as at 31 December 2001, p. 14 (document transmitted by 
Wanadoo Interactive on 15 March 2002, file, p. 2369). 
294  Point 3 of appendix C to Wanadoo Interactive's reply of 23 October 2002 (file, p. 6366 et seq.). 
295  Point 2 of appendix C to the reply of 23 October 2002. 
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Internet access, particularly during a period of cyclical downturn and the drying-up of 
the financial resources available for the Internet sector.296 
5. Conclusion 
(253) A dominant position may derive from a combination of several factors which, taken 
separately, are not necessarily determinative.297 In the case under examination here, 
the Commission considers that the market shares held by Wanadoo Interactive since 
the beginning of 2001, the multiple affects of the link-up with the France Télécom 
group and the position held by the Wanadoo group on the directories market are, taken 
together, liable to give Wanadoo Interactive a dominant position on the French market 
for high-speed Internet access for residential customers. 
D. ABUSE OF A DOMINANT POSITION 
(254) This section shows how the below-cost pricing practised by Wanadoo Interactive 
formed part of a deliberate strategy of predation aimed at preempting a burgeoning 
market, and hence in what way it constitutes an abuse of a dominant position within 
the meaning of Article 82 of the Treaty. 
(255) The arguments advanced by Wanadoo Interactive concern the applicability of Article 
82 of the Treaty to an emerging sector, the objective justification for below-cost 
pricing, and the question of barriers to entry and the recoupment of initial losses. They 
are discussed in detail in this section. 
1. Nature of the abuse: the non-recovery of costs as part of a plan to preempt the 
market 
(256) Community case-law has given rise to two separate methods of analysis when it comes 
to examining whether an undertaking has practised predatory pricing, one based on 
variable costs, and the other on full costs.298 Thus, the existence of predatory prices is 
established in the following situations: 
– the non-recovery of average variable costs per unit, the establishment of which 
in itself suffices to justify a finding of abuse; 
– the non-recovery of average full costs where this is accompanied by a plan 
indicative of an intention to eliminate competitors. 
                                                
296  In its abovementioned publication "Internet, un bilan du marché français/mars 2003", the ART 
describes the phenomenon as follows: "as from mid-2000, particularly because advertising revenue had 
not reached forecast levels, investors reduced the amounts invested in Internet companies. The raising 
of funds and the introduction of companies onto the stock exchange became more difficult. This 
drying-up of funding led to a change in economic models … Internet companies could not continue 
pursuing a strategy of acquiring customers at any price and were forced to come up with a viable 
economic model". 
297  United Brands, paragraph 66. 
298  Akzo, paragraphs 71 and 72; Case C-333/94 P Tetra Pak v Commission [1996] ECR I-5951, paragraph 
41. 
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1. The recovery of costs 
(257) On the basis of the information set forth in section I.F, broadly speaking a distinction 
can be made between three separate periods since the beginning of 2001: 
– from 1 January to 31 July 2001, Wanadoo Interactive was far from recovering 
the (adjusted) variable costs of the services at issue; 
– from 1 August 2001 to 15 October 2002, Wanadoo Interactive came close to 
satisfying the test applied by the Commission, but without ever actually doing 
so: Wanadoo did not recover its (adjusted) full costs;299 nor - although it did 
recover its (outturned) adjusted variable costs for part of the period - was it 
able before March 2002 to forecast the achievement of such recovery in 
advance; 
– from 15 October 2002 onwards, Wanadoo Interactive clearly satisfied the cost 
recovery test applied by the Commission, both for full costs and for variable 
costs, even though its instantaneous revenue may have been lower than its 
accounting costs. 
(258) There can be no doubt about the lack of any short-term rationality in market 
deployment for the first seven months of 2001. 
(259) For the following period, although the accounting costs were never recovered and until 
October 2002 each additional month saw a further worsening of the cumulative result 
for the activity, the company was hovering close to, but always slightly on the wrong 
side of, the borders of economic rationality as referred to by the Commission in this 
Decision. Its forecasts did not allow it to take a favourable view of the short-term 
financial impact of the commercial development of its ADSL products before France 
Télécom's new routing and access charges came into force in 2002. Only the 
introduction of the new France Télécom charges on 15 October 2002, coupled with a 
decision by the telecoms operator to offer all Internet service providers free access to 
its services, enabled Wanadoo Interactive to satisfy without ambiguity the test used by 
the Commission and to experience short-term financial rationality. 
(260) Wanadoo Interactive has criticised the Commission for having overlooked in its 
analysis the features peculiar to the launching of a new product. 
(261) The criticism is unfounded. In its analysis, the Commission has on the contrary made a 
major adjustment to the application of the Akzo predation test in the sense of greater 
flexibility. 
(262) First, instead of simply examining costs and revenue as entered in the company's 
accounts, as the Akzo judgment suggests it might do, the Commission has spread 
customer acquisition costs over 48 months, treating as it were these costs as a 
commercial investment to be written off over a customer's realistic lifetime. The 
flexibility thus introduced into the application of the Akzo test is significant in that it 
has the effect of greatly softening the impact of customer acquisition costs, which 
                                                
299  It should be pointed out, in addition, that over the same period Wanadoo Interactive likewise did not 
cover the unadjusted variable costs as entered in the accounts. 
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nevertheless accounted for […]* % of the costs incurred by Wanadoo Interactive in 
2001.300 Moreover, in its assessment of the revenue generated by subscriptions, the 
Commission has taken into account a theoretical, nominal subscription revenue, and 
not the average revenue actually observed, which is constantly between […]* % and 
[…]* % below the theoretical revenue. In so doing, it has neutralised the mechanical 
effect linked to the growth in the subscriber base explained in paragraph 29. The 
combined effect of these two corrections is to improve by more than [10-30]*  points 
the cost recovery rates used in this Decision compared with what they would have 
been had they simply been based on the unadjusted accounting data. 
(263) Moreover, the Commission has ignored the cost of capital in its analysis. Lastly, as 
regards the assessment of certain cost components, when in doubt the Commission has 
always worked on the basis of whichever assumptions are most favourable to the 
company concerned. 
(264) The method of assessing the recovery of the adjusted costs has thus proved entirely 
respectful of the growth market context and has made for a much more nuanced 
approach than would have been achieved simply by noting the accounting costs 
recorded during the period. The Commission considers that it has gone as far as it can 
in the present case in adapting the method without distorting the logic behind a 
predation test. 
2. The questioning by the company of the interpretation of its pricing practice 
(265) In the opinion of Wanadoo Interactive, the present case lacks several ingredients 
which alone would enable the strategy it pursued to be characterised as predatory. 
There would above all have to have been a sudden fall in prices, that fall would have 
to have been selective and have favoured a given category of customer, and it would 
have to have been accompanied by signs of predation on the market, that is to say, by 
threats against competitors to dissuade them from operating on the market.301 Lastly, 
the fall would have to have been sufficiently long lasting to have had an impact. 
(266) The Commission considers that the legal precedents do not cover every possible 
predation scenario. Predation can take forms other than the radical elimination and 
wholesale ousting of competitors from the market.302 More generally, predation may 
simply consist in dictating or inhibiting the competitive behaviour of an existing or 
potential rival.303 Here, a predatory price is simply one which leads to a maximisation 
of profits through its exclusionary or other anticompetitive effects. 
                                                
300  The apparent “weight” of customer acquisition costs in the analysis is, depending on the period, reduced 
in the calculation of the recovery rates in section I.F to between [0-10]* % for the eXtense service and 
between [0-10]* % for the Wanadoo ADSL service, i.e. some [10-30]* points or more below their share 
in the actual costs posted. 
301  Paragraphs 205 to 215 of appendix C to Wanadoo Interactive's reply of 23 October 2002 (file, p. 6293 
et seq.). 
302  David E.M. Sappington and J. Gregory Sidak, ‘Are Public Enterprises the Only Credible Predators?’, 
The University of Chicago Law Review, 271, 2000, pp. 274 and 275. 
303  P. Bolton, J. Brodley and M. Riordan, 2000, ‘Predatory Pricing: strategic theory and legal policy’, 88, 
Georgetown Law Journal, pp. 3 and 36: “The disciplining of rivals is itself exclusionary since its object 
is to exclude the growth and expansion of the prey or the prey's entry into new markets.” 
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(267) Wanadoo Interactive evokes the need for a fall in prices before one can talk of 
predation. The Commission considers that the argument as to the need for a fall in 
prices is largely fallacious inasmuch as what is involved here is the market roll-out of 
new products, the focus being therefore more on below-cost pricing.304 From a strictly 
factual point of view, moreover, Wanadoo Interactive’s argument is questionable in 
the present case: the launch of packaged offerings at the end of 2000 meant a further 
fall in costs for the subscriber of the order of 21% compared with the separate ADSL 
offerings that existed previously.305 
(268) Economic doctrine in no way limits predatory behaviour to selective strategies aimed 
at winning back a specific customer. Such a restriction of the analysis would be 
meaningless in the present case. The relevant market is a mass residential market. It is 
therefore by no means a market for the supplying of a limited number of large 
customers each generating a substantial turnover as in the precedents Wanadoo 
Interactive cites in its defence, which contain scenarios where selective pricing may be 
rational. 
(269) Lastly, according to Wanadoo Interactive, the price of its ADSL services never 
constituted an element in its growth strategy, any more than it did an instrument 
wielded with a view to eliminating competitors. Wanadoo Interactive thus points out 
that its 2001 and 2002 marketing plans made no mention of prices, but focused instead 
on other strategic factors. The price of services constituted as it were an exogenous 
market variable and not a component of the company's strategy. In its pricing policy, 
Wanadoo was, so it claimed, guided only by the desire to make its offerings 
profitable.306 
(270) The Commission considers that, on the contrary, several internal company documents 
establish a link between the level of prices and Wanadoo Interactive's growth strategy, 
both at the time of the discussions prior to the setting of the price and during 
subsequent talks on possible price adjustments held throughout 2001. In a letter of July 
2000, […]* 307 […]* 308 A month earlier, […]* 309 […]* The Commission considers, 
however, that what matters in the present case is not so much the level of prices per se 
as the difference between prices and costs. 
                                                
304  Ordover et al., op. cit., p. 9. 
305  With the Wanadoo ADSL formula, the cost at the end of 2000 came to FRF 378 taxes included, not 
counting the cost of installation and commissioning (FRF 768.57 taxes included). The cost of the 
eXtense packaged formula came for its part to FRF 298 taxes included, or 21% less than the former. 
306  To back up its assertion, Wanadoo Interactive refers to two documents, one dated July 2000 and the 
other May 2001 ([…]* (file, p. 3142), and […]* (file, p. 3106), cited in paragraph 89 of Wanadoo 
Interactive's reply of 23 October 2002.) However, these two documents are not really relevant to the 
analysis of this case. The first document dates from summer 2000, when the company preferred to price 
the subscription at FRF […]* taxes included; it therefore predates by several months Wanadoo 
Interactive's decision to set the retail price of the subscription to the eXtense package at FRF 298 taxes 
included. The second document sets out the personal views of two Wanadoo Interactive employees on 
billing the subscriber for the cost of accessing the service (and not on the subscription price). These 
views were, however, not acted upon […]* Thus, while thoughts of improving profitability may have 
been uppermost in the minds of some executives, they had no impact on the company's actual pricing 
choices. 
307  […]* 
308  […]* (file, p. 3109) 
309  […]* (File, p. 3234). 
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3. The intention to drive out competition 
(271) In the Commission's view, proof of the intention to drive out competition may take the 
form of internal documents of the dominant undertaking which reveal the existence of 
a plan to damage competitors.310 In the absence of documents providing direct 
evidence, the intention to eliminate competitors may be deduced from the 
circumstances of the case and from a series of important and convergent factors.311 
(a) The plan to preempt the market 
(272) The internal company documents described in section I.G.1 refer to a deliberate 
strategy of preemption by Wanadoo Interactive of the high-speed market, and in 
particular of the ADSL segment. 
(273) The Commission considers that, in the context of a new market which has entered a 
period of dynamic growth, and in view of the advantages derived by Wanadoo from its 
membership of the France Télécom group, this preemption plan must itself be treated 
as an intention to drive out competition. 
(b) The choice of a prices and volumes strategy not replicable by the competition 
(274) The intention to contain competition is apparent also from the ex ante assessment by 
Wanadoo Interactive of the conditions of profitability of the services in question at a 
time when the company was fixing its market penetration objectives. During the first 
seven months of 2001, Wanadoo Interactive deliberately set its charges for and 
promoted its sales of high-speed Internet access services knowing full well that the 
prices were much lower than the variable costs.312 As can be seen from the provisional 
profit and loss account for 2001 and various exchanges within the company, when, in 
June-July 2001, Wanadoo Interactive revised its quantitative sales targets for the 
second half of 2001 strongly upwards,313 it was likewise not in a position to envisage a 
positive cash flow before the end of the year314 despite […]* Similarly, when it fixed 
the quantitative objectives for 2002, again during summer 2001 - then set at a level 
[10-20]* % higher than originally envisaged315 - Wanadoo Interactive was unable to 
reach a favourable conclusion about the viability of ADSL, at least not for the first few 
months of 2002, on the basis of the information and forecasts then available. 
(275) Clearly, given their degree of knowledge of the cost of the services of IP/ADSL access 
and IP routing of ADSL traffic, Wanadoo Interactive's competitors in the ADSL 
segment were a fortiori not in a position to envisage recovering to any greater extent 
their variable costs throughout the latter part of 2001. It was only from December 
2001 at the earliest316 that it gradually dawned on competitors that, on an outturned 
                                                
310  See Commission Decision No 85/609/EEC of 14 December 1985 in Case IV/30.698 - ECS/Akzo (OJ L 
374, 31.12.1985, p. 1), at paragraph 81. 
311  Court of First Instance in Case T-83/91 Tetra Pak v Commission [1994] ECR II-755, paragraph 151. 
312  See section I.G.2 tracing the history of the internal company thinking on the price and margin levels for 
ADSL services during 2000 and 2001. 
313  […]*  (file, p. 3316). […]* 
314  See section I.G.2. 
315  […]* Wanadoo Interactive mentions a target of […]* (file, p. 2907)). Mention is subsequently made of 
a penetration target of […]*  (file, p. 3074). 
316  […]* (file, p. 2293 et seq.) […]* 
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cost basis, the economics of ADSL were less unfavourable to them than expected 
owing to the rules for measuring traffic consumption finally adopted by France 
Télécom, rules which the terms of the IP/ADSL routing contract did not make it 
possible to foresee. 
(276) Knowledge of the cost of France Télécom's services was so piecemeal at the beginning 
of 2002, even among well-informed observers, that, in its opinion of 30 April 2002, 
the ART still considered service providers' payments to France Télécom for ADSL 
access and the routing of ADSL traffic to be higher than their revenue.317 
(277) In the analysis of Wanadoo Interactive's intentions towards its competitors, the ex ante 
perception by the company itself of the profitability prospects at the time of fixing of 
its quantitative objectives is more important than the outturn, which was not finally 
known in its definitive form until several weeks after the 2001 financial year had 
ended. It was in fact this perception of economic conditions throughout 2001 that 
governed how competitors in the ADSL segment viewed Wanadoo Interactive's 
determination to frustrate their expectations of growth, market share acquisition or 
restoration of their margins.318 
(278) It was clear throughout 2001 that Wanadoo Interactive had deliberately chosen a 
growth strategy in relation to high-speed access which was problematical as far as its 
own results were concerned. The company thus clearly and knowingly made a trade-
off between an objective of minimal profitability which would have made it possible 
to recoup within a reasonable period the cost of acquiring customers, and an objective 
of ambitious market penetration to the detriment of its competitors. 
(279) In the course of 2001, Wanadoo Interactive observed on several occasions that its own 
strategy, which combined unprofitable charges with significant sales volumes, was 
economically unsustainable for its competitors and hence could not be reproduced, at 
least not on a comparable scale. […]* 319 […]* 320 It also knew that the reason why a 
competitor like AOL, a major operator in the low-speed market, was not entering the 
high-speed market was that it was impossible to emulate Wanadoo's retail tariffs 
without incurring losses.321 
(280) […]* its competitors in the ADSL segment were systematically several profitability 
points behind it. This disadvantage for competitors was mainly due to the structure of 
                                                
317  ART opinion No 02-346 of 30 April 2002 and the press kit made available on that occasion. According 
to the Authority’s estimates at that time, “based on an average speed of 23 kbit/s per subscriber, as per 
current operating conditions”, Internet service providers “currently pay France Télécom a monthly fee 
of €39.70 (before tax) per subscriber for IP/ADSL offerings (routing + access), an amount greater than 
their revenue”, which is put at €38 (before tax) on the basis of the price charged by Wanadoo 
Interactive (file, 4956). The ART’s opinion states just as explicitly that ISPs had had to pay France 
Télécom a fee of €39.70 per subscriber per month, forcing them to incur losses in order to gain a 
foothold on the market and compete with Wanadoo. 
318  See Commission Decision in the Akzo case, paragraph 79. 
319  […]* (File, p. 3213). 
320  […]* (file, p. 3158). 
321  […]*[…]* The enclosure contains a statement by Mr Treppoz, CEO of AOL France: “In the days when 
we were owned by Cégétel, we launched an offering with Monaco Telecom and had 500 subscribers. 
We did not launch it in France as France Télécom’s ADSL retail offering is currently not a 
money-maker. Technically, we are ready, but we are not in the business of losing money” (file, 
p. 3065). 
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routing service price scales, which was unfavourable to competitors with fewer than 
20 000-30 000 subscribers, and to the need for service providers serving a small 
number of subscribers to spread connection costs (which are fixed in the short term) 
over a limited customer base. These factors had been diagnosed by Wanadoo 
Interactive, which had carried out detailed estimates of the gross margin gap according 
to traffic throughput volumes, highlighting the advantages it enjoyed as market 
leader.322 The cost disadvantage suffered by competitors also stems from other, less 
readily quantifiable factors. For example, unlike Wanadoo Interactive, not all Internet 
service providers have access to financial facilities limiting the need to finance loss-
making activities externally, and they therefore had to add to their operating costs the 
financial expenses resulting from the losses incurred.323 
(281) For all these reasons, while Wanadoo Interactive itself was unable to recover its 
adjusted full costs, not only did its competitors not recover their adjusted full costs but 
also there was every chance of their not recovering their variable costs either. Even 
when Wanadoo Interactive expected, at the end of 2001, to secure a slightly positive 
margin on its production costs the following year,324 it was clear that its competitors 
would be unable to recover their variable costs and hence give economic meaning to 
the development of their high-speed business. 
(282) It is accordingly considered that throughout 2001 Wanadoo Interactive's strategy was 
aimed at recruiting the largest possible number of subscribers despite the fact that the 
economic conditions were not in place. […]* Wanadoo Interactive's strategy thus had 
the effect of eliminating or marginalising competitors incapable of aligning themselves 
on it. The strategy was continued with in 2002, […]* 325 
(283) Notwithstanding this, Wanadoo Interactive did not alter its commercial policy one 
iota. Prices remained unchanged.326 The quantitative market penetration objectives 
were not modified. […]* 327 Thus, despite Wanadoo Interactive having received the 
                                                
322  The document […]* analyses in detail, in the light of the speed and size of connections, the margin on 
network costs hypotheses resulting from the entry into force of the new contract for national and 
regional IP routing of ADSL traffic (file, p. 2921 et seq.). It is clear from this document that a 
competitor with less traffic than Wanadoo Interactive will enjoy margins on network costs several 
points lower than those of Wanadoo Interactive. Thus, a very small competitor offering connection 
speeds of only [...]* Mbits/s earned a negative margin on network costs […]* points below that of 
Wanadoo; a medium-sized competitor which had a larger subscriber base and offered connection speeds 
of […]* Mbits/s was still […]* margin points below Wanadoo; and a bigger competitor offering 
connection speeds of […]* Mbits/s managed to reduce the gap between it and Wanadoo to […]* margin 
points. 
323  In this connection, it can be estimated that the cost of externally financing the deficit incurred by 
Wanadoo Interactive in 2001 as a result of its ADSL business (losses in the region of €[…]*) would 
have entailed financing costs of about €[…]*  per subscriber per month. 
324  For Wanadoo Interactive, the adjusted full cost of the eXtense service was during the last few months of 
2001 and the first half of 2002 approximately […]* % above the adjusted variable cost. It can be 
considered, moreover, on the basis of the network cost differentials that an average competitor is 
invariably […]* profitability points below Wanadoo Interactive. Thus, while during that period 
Wanadoo recovered […]* % of its full costs (or […]* % of its variable costs), competitors invariably 
achieved a rate of recovery of their variable costs necessarily lower than […]* %. 
325  See paragraph 139. 
326  […]* (file, pp. 3216, 3217 and 3233). 
327  […]* (file, pp. 3534 et seq.) 
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Commission's first statement of objections a few weeks earlier, the idea of going all-
out to win customers was still being considered for subsequent years. 
(284) In this context, the announcement by Wanadoo Interactive in 2001 and at the 
beginning of 2002328 of particularly ambitious commercial objectives, unattainable by 
a non-dominant undertaking under the unfavourable profitability conditions then 
prevailing, had the effect of discouraging rival companies and contributed towards the 
attainment of the company's objective of driving out or containing competition. It is 
impossible to subscribe here to the analysis proposed by Wanadoo Interactive, which 
sees in the expression of its preemption strategy a mere subjective intention.329 On the 
contrary, the expression of the preemption intention is conveyed and corroborated by 
indisputable economic factors and by the translating of the intention into commercial 
policy. It is impossible to hold that a commercial growth strategy which puts 
competitors' capacity for financial resistance to the test has anything to do with 
competition based on merit. Consequently, the Commission must consider that the 
dynamic and scope of the below-cost selling during the relevant period are in 
themselves evidence of the intention to drive out competition.330 
(c) A contextual element: the overall policy of the France Télécom group towards 
competition in the high-speed market 
(285) In order better to assess the scope of Wanadoo Interactive's policy and how it fits into 
an overall plan, the subsidiary's behaviour may usefully be viewed against the 
background of that of the France Télécom group as a whole. What follows in 
paragraphs 286 to 290 is not a list of objections directed against Wanadoo Interactive, 
but the strategy pursued by the subsidiary cannot be completely dissociated from the 
objectives of the parent company. 
(286) First of all, reference may be made to the behaviour of France Télécom on the 
wholesale market. The charges for and commercial terms of the wholesale access 
solutions called, according to the French regulatory terminology, options 1, 2 and 3 are 
not covered by this proceeding.331 With regard to these, the Commission would simply 
point out that the ART considered until summer 2002 that the charges adopted by 
France Télécom did not enable the various potential operators to enter the value 
                                                
328  The commercial objectives and achievements of Wanadoo Interactive are occasionally communicated 
to the press. In an article in Les Echos dated 7 September 2001, Wanadoo's CEO, Nicolas Dufourcq, is 
quoted as mentioning a target of 300 000 ADSL subscribers by the end of the year and the acquisition 
of 1 000 new ADSL subscribers a day. An article in Le Journal du Net dated 4 October 2001 referred to 
the 210 000 ADSL subscribers then registered, 10 000-a-week growth in the number of subscriptions 
and a target of “300 000 by the end of the year”. An article in Les Echos dated 21 February 2002 gave a 
figure of 457 000 ADSL subscribers and mentioned a target of one million subscribers by the end of 
2002. In an article in the same newspaper dated 23 January 2002, mention was made of the recruitment 
of 140 000 subscribers between October and December of the previous year. 
329  See paragraphs 117, 118 and 133-137 of the reply of 23 October 2002 (file, p. 6276 et seq.) 
330  Court of First Instance in Tetra Pak, paragraphs 151 and 190. 
331  Option 1 refers to full unbundled access to the copper pair, option 2 refers to shared access to the 
copper pair, and option 3 covers an offer of indirect access to the copper pair via the incumbent 
operator's ATM network. 
 EN    EN 
creation chain of high-speed Internet access, referring to a situation of “blockage of 
competition” on the ADSL market.332 
(287) France Télécom's pricing strategy concerning option 5, which according to the French 
terminology covers the combination of the services of IP/ADSL access and IP routing 
of ADSL traffic outlined in paragraph 42, is of the utmost importance in this context. 
[…]* Table 11, which sets out the forecast results for (wholesale) IP/ADSL access and 
IP routing services, illustrates this point. 
Table 11: Forecast operating figures for France Télécom's high-speed ADSL 
Internet access services (€ million)333 
 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Turnover […]* […]* […]* […]* 
Full costs total […]* […]* […]* […]* 
Result […]* […]* […]* […]* 
Net margin rate […]* […]* […]* […]* 
Cumulated net margin since 2001 […]* […]* […]* […]* 
 
(288) The cumulated profit earned by France Télécom from its wholesale services, […]* can 
be contrasted with Wanadoo Interactive's cumulated losses from its ADSL services 
between 2000 and 2002 [...]*334 […]*Wanadoo Interactive, marketed the retail product 
by reselling the same wholesale products at a loss under highly unfavourable 
profitability conditions. 
(289) Wanadoo Interactive has not commented on the substance of the evidence in the 
table.335 It simply points out, firstly, that France Télécom's wholesale tariffs are 
approved by the national telecommunications regulator - something which in its view 
limits France Télécom's margin for manoeuvre - and, secondly, that France Télécom 
and Wanadoo Interactive are separate legal entities with their own shareholder 
bases.336 On the first point, the Commission would observe that, while wholesale 
tariffs are indeed approved by the Minister for Telecommunications on the basis of an 
ART opinion, the national regulator has no power of initiative as to their level and 
simply formulates an opinion on proposals from France Télécom without being able to 
amend them in any way.337 At best, the regulator may reject en bloc, as it did in spring 
                                                
332  See paragraph III.1.3 of ART opinion No 02-346, referred to above. See also the press release and 
transparencies published on the ART’s website on 7 May 2002. In its reply of 4 March 2003 (paragraph 
103 - file, p. 6883), Wanadoo Interactive states, moreover, that […]* 
333  Taken from the forecasts drawn up by France Télécom for its wholesale IP/ADSL and IP routing 
services in 2001, paragraph 3 of France Télécom's letter to the Commission dated 9 April 2002 (file, p. 
2573). 
334  […]* 
335  The table was communicated to it under cover of the Commission's letter dated 16 January 2003. 
336  Paragraphs 104-107 of Wanadoo Interactive's letter dated 4 March 2003 (file, p. 6884). 
337  Pursuant to Article L.36-7, paragraph 5, of the French Posts and Telecommunications Code, the ART 
“shall issue a public opinion on (…) tariffs for services for which there are no competitors on the 
market, prior to their approval, where appropriate, by the Minister for Telecommunications and the 
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2002, a tariff proposal deemed unsatisfactory and ask France Télécom to submit a new 
proposal, without, however, being able to dictate its content. It is therefore wrong to 
say that France Télécom does not have sufficient margin for manoeuvre to set its 
tariffs on its own initiative. On the second point, concerning the legal separation of 
France Télécom and Wanadoo Interactive, the Commission would simply stress the 
strength of the shareholder links and the cohesion within the group through its 
executive committee. 
(290) Lastly, the Commission has set out in section I.G.4 various additional elements 
reflected in company documents which constitute evidence of an intention to restrict 
the competitive scope of rivals of its subsidiary Wanadoo Interactive: the policy of 
“closing off” the modems market during the first few months of 2001; the procedure 
for informing Internet service providers as to whether lines are suitable for ADSL, 
which was discriminatory for two and a half years; and the proposed agreement on the 
remuneration of distribution networks and on retail prices for the sale of ADSL 
packages. These facts do not fall within the scope of the objections examined as part 
of this proceeding. Accordingly, the Commission will not comment on their 
compatibility with Community competition law. Nevertheless, these elements do form 
part of an overall strategy aimed at containing for as long as possible competitors' 
growth within narrow limits and hence they are useful in that they give a better grasp 
of the context and of Wanadoo Interactive's intentions. They serve to illustrate a multi-
faceted strategy aimed at containing the growth of competition within very narrow 
bounds.338 
(291) Thus, the intentional strategy of preempting the market in high-speed Internet access 
for residential customers pursued in 2001 and 2002 by Wanadoo Interactive formed 
part of a set of practices employed within the France Télécom group which throw the 
policy pursued by its subsidiary into sharper relief. Wanadoo Interactive's commercial 
policy of below-cost selling, unsustainable by competitors, was part of a deliberate 
plan to divert demand for high-speed services to the benefit of the France Télécom 
group as a whole, at different stages of the value chain, and to corner as it were the 
first few years of market growth. 
4. Objectives pursued by Wanadoo Interactive using the preemption strategy 
(292) The focusing by Wanadoo Interactive on the objective of preempting the high-speed 
market at a time when the economic conditions were not in place found its rationale in 
the medium-term objectives described in paragraphs 293 to 298. Preempting the high-
                                                                                                                                                   
Minister for the Economy.” It is thus clear from the French legislation that the ART has no competence 
to deliver an opinion on Wanadoo Interactive's retail tariffs. With respect to France Télécom’s 
wholesale offerings, in its opinion of 19 June 2001 on the IP/ADSL and routing offerings the ART 
considered, not that the incumbent’s tariff proposal was satisfactory on the whole, but only that it 
should help to “significantly improve the situation on the retail market”, about which it had expressed 
concern in the same opinion. In its opinion of 7 May 2002, the ART did not impose on France Télécom 
any offering price levels, but merely indicated the minimum conditions which new offerings should 
meet. 
338  In its decision No 02-D-38 of 19 June 2002 concerning a referral and an application for interim 
measures from Liberty Surf, the Competition Council, despite not having in its possession the same 
evidence as the Commission, talks of a “strategy common to” both France Télécom and Wanadoo and 
of a “community of interests”, and states that the degree of autonomy of Wanadoo Interactive vis-à-vis 
France Télécom affects “the ascribability of the practices but not their materiality”. 
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speed market by below-cost pricing was designed to maximise revenue and margins 
on ADSL subscriptions, stabilise that same revenue by increasing subscriber loyalty, 
and maximise revenue on neighbouring markets, notably those in advertising and 
electronic commerce. It was also intended as a means of acquiring a position of 
strength on the market in the acquisition of specific high-speed content. 
(293) First of all, the position occupied on the high-speed market was intended to make it 
possible in the long term to rebuild the company's margins on its ADSL products. 
Various company documents give different time horizons, both near and distant, for 
the restoration of positive margins on the products in question. […]* 339 […]* In its 
reply of 23 October 2002, Wanadoo Interactive included a table showing margins of 
€[…]* a month on average for the eXtense package as from November 2002, 
thereafter remaining at this level until […]*.340 The company has also stated that this 
estimated margin of €[…]* was in itself conservative, pointing to a “rising trend in 
terms of margins” which its simplified estimate did not properly reflect, without, 
however, providing any simulations of trends in margins in the years ahead.341 At all 
events, irrespective of the exact level of margins and the precise date on which this 
target was to be met, it is clear that Wanadoo did expect, over a time horizon of 
several years, to earn sizeable margins on this pure access activity. In the light of these 
internal company reflections, it is clear that the rationale of a predation policy for 
Wanadoo Interactive lay less in an unlikely increase in Internet access subscription 
prices than in a recoupment of initial losses through a gradual rebuilding of margins on 
access products. 
(294) Not only was it intended that subscribers to high-speed services should ultimately 
generate a turnover and margins higher than those generated by subscribers to low-
speed services, but it was also intended that they should constitute a more stable 
source of revenue. The market in low-speed Internet access is seen by Wanadoo 
Interactive as a “churn” market, i.e. a market with high customer turnover in which 
customers switch readily from one service provider to another. By contrast, according 
to Wanadoo the churn rate for subscribers to high-speed services is […]*  times lower 
than for low-speed subscribers.342 The acquisition of a more stable customer base is 
clearly a safety factor as far as the company's revenue is concerned343 and it 
contributes towards the attainment of an objective of increased subscriber loyalty and 
of maximisation of the profitability of customers over their lifetime. 
(295) Secondly, the potential for generating turnover from ADSL customers should, 
according to Wanadoo, lie not only in access revenue but also in portal revenue and 
electronic commerce revenue linked to more intensive use of the Internet, and hence 
                                                
339  File, p. 2957. 
340  Annex 9 to Appendix D to Wanadoo Interactive's reply of 23 October 2002 (file, p. 6379). 
341  See paragraphs 327 and 336 of Wanadoo Interactive's reply of 23 October 2002 (file, p. 6315). 
342  In 2000, for all Wanadoo subscribers, all access services combined, the annual average churn rate came 
to […]*% […]*file, p. 3438)). In 2001 and 2002, the annual average churn rate for eXtense was of the 
order of […]*% (paragraph 31 of the reply of 4 March 2003 (file, p. 6867)); the eXtense service thus 
had a churn rate more than […]*times lower than that which low-speed products had in 2000. In 
January 2002, the monthly churn rate was […]*% for dial-up low-speed offerings, […]*% for 
“integral” offerings and […]*% for broadband; in February 2002, the monthly churn rates were […]*%, 
[…]*% and […]*% respectively […]*file, p. 4134)). The churn rate for low-speed offerings is thus 
[…]*times higher than that for high-speed offerings. 
343  […]* (file, p. 3412). 
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should stem from markets neighbouring the relevant market.344 As an internal 
company document explains, […]* 345 A Wanadoo Interactive document, speaking of 
ADSL subscribers, […]* 346 Wanadoo Interactive's […]* marketing plan […]* 347 With 
ADSL, Wanadoo Interactive's intention was […]* 348 […]* 349 The intention with 
ADSL was also to improve advertising revenue prospects. With this in view, the 
acquisition of substantial market shares is strategic inasmuch as, as was pointed out in 
the course of internal company discussions about the 2004 strategic plan, […]* 350 
Moreover, over the period 2001-2004, Wanadoo Interactive foresaw […]* increase in 
revenue from content, electronic commerce and advertising, the total volume of which 
[…]* between 2000 and 2004, and the average level of which per subscriber was […]* 
over that period.351 
(296) Thirdly, an early presence in the high-speed Internet access market has a direct impact 
on content supply. The fact of having gained a considerable head-start in the 
deployment of commercial Internet access offerings confers on the service provider an 
important advantage when it comes to acquiring content.352 
(297) Lastly, preemption of the high-speed market was seen as an important factor in 
consolidating the service provider's image.353 The objective of an early presence in the 
relevant market arose from the need […]* 354 […]* 355 […]* 356 […]* 357 The strategy's 
objective was clear: to create, in the eyes of the consumer, a strong association 
between the Wanadoo trade mark and the high-speed concept, so as to be assured 
subsequently of the lion's share of any market growth. In this respect, 2001 was a 
decisive year: thanks to its positioning in terms of price, […]* 358 
(298) The overall economic reasoning underlying the market preemption strategy is finally 
summed up as follows in […]* memo […]* 359 […]* The Commission considers that 
                                                
344  The economic literature acknowledges that initial losses are recouped not only on the relevant market 
but also on closely related markets. M. Canoy, P. de Bijl, Ron Kemp, “Access to Telecommunications 
Networks”, mimeo, CPB, October 2002, p. 30. 
345  […]* (file, p. 3223). 
346  […]* (file, p. 2655). 
347  […]* (file, p. 3409). 
348  Ibid. 
349  A […]*study […]* states (p. 10) that “[…]*have already made purchases on line.” (file, p. 4145). 
350  […]* (file, p. 4249). 
351  […]* (file, p. 3437 et seq.). 
352  It is not without reason, for example, that in October 2002 Microsoft chose as vehicles for its new 
interactive gaming platform, Xbox Live, the service providers Wanadoo Interactive and Noos, which at 
that time ranked first and second on the French market, and not other service providers such as T-
Online France or Tiscali (Reuters, “Microsoft to pilot Xbox Live in Europe in Nov”, dispatch dated 25 
September 2002, 4.21 hours). 
353  File, p. 3415. 
354  […]* (file, p. 3409). 
355  […]* (file, p. 3415). 
356  The abovementioned [...]* study states that, in the residential market, [...]*% of new subscribers to the 
eXtense product learned about the Wanadoo offering by word of mouth, twice as many as did so 
through the press or online advertising. The same document indicates that [...]*% of subscribers to the 
eXtense package would recommend the product to their friends and acquaintances, compared with 
[...]*% for all Wanadoo Interactive subscribers, all services combined. 
357  […]* (file, p. 3086). 
358  […]* (file, p. 4157). 
359  […]* (file, pp. 2958 and 2959). 
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this analysis sums up perfectly the logic of predation and preemption applied by 
Wanadoo Interactive, a logic which was perfectly rational strategically as far as the 
company was concerned. 
5. Conclusion on the intention to preempt 
(299) The Commission considers that Wanadoo Interactive deliberately embarked upon a 
strategy of expanding its high-speed services, combining below-cost prices and 
substantial sales volumes, which was unsustainable by its competitors. 
2. Applicability of the predation concept to a growth sector 
(300) In its reply of 23 October 2002, Wanadoo Interactive maintains that it is at all events 
impossible to make an allegation of predation in a business sector which does not 
possess a sufficient degree of maturity, and that therefore such an allegation cannot be 
levelled against it.360 It questions the relevance of the application of the traditional 
case-law of the Court of Justice to a sector which it describes as “emerging”.361 In the 
context of a new service, the incurring of significant losses is, in its view, inevitable, 
and instant profitability is “by definition impossible”362 on a market characterised by 
great economic uncertainty.363 
(301) In this connection, it must be pointed out that nothing in Article 82 of the Treaty or in 
the Community case-law on the subject provides for an exception to the application of 
the competition rules to sectors which are not yet fully mature or which are considered 
to be emerging markets. To subordinate the application of the competition rules to a 
complete stabilisation of the market would be to deprive the competition authorities of 
the power to act in time before the abuses established have exerted their full effect and 
the positions unduly acquired have thus been finally consolidated. It follows, on the 
contrary, from the case-law that it must be possible to penalise predatory pricing 
whenever there is a risk that competitors will be eliminated, as the aim pursued by the 
Treaty, which is to maintain undistorted competition,364 rules out waiting until such a 
strategy leads to the actual elimination of competitors.365 
(302) Even if it cannot be ruled out that the high-speed Internet access market must indeed 
be considered an emerging market, it is at all events a specific type of market 
justifying particular vigilance on the part of the Community competition authorities. 
The market has strong links with the market for local access in the 
telecommunications sector, which for its part possesses none of the features of an 
emerging market. The telecommunications sector, and local access in particular, is still 
deeply affected by the preponderance of the former telecommunications monopoly, 
which controls almost all access to the final consumer. Even if high-speed Internet 
access were to be treated as an emerging market, its links with a market in the throes 
                                                
360  See paragraphs 188 and 191 of the reply of 23 October 2002 in which Wanadoo Interactive refers to the 
necessity of “a mature market on which the operator complained of has been in a dominant position for 
a significant length of time” (file, p. 6291). 
361  See paragraphs 193 and 196 of Wanadoo Interactive's reply of 4 March 2002 and paragraph 348 of its 
reply of 23 October 2002 (file, p. 6319). 
362  Paragraph 57 of the reply of 23 October 2002 (file, p. 6262). 
363  Paragraphs 84-87 of the reply of 23 October 2002 (file, p. 6270). 
364  In accordance with the objective set out in Article 3(g) of the Treaty. 
365  Court of Justice in Tetra Pak, paragraph 44. 
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of deregulation and the resulting risks of a leverage effect make it impossible to grant 
it any exemption from the ordinary rules of Community competition law. 
(303) The Commission would point out further that, in the context of the development of 
ADSL products, the objective of rapid profitability was not beyond reach despite the 
newness of the products in question. […]* 366 […]* France Télécom's figures show 
therefore that, contrary to what Wanadoo Interactive maintains, the newness of ADSL 
services in no way precluded the attainment of an objective of fairly rapid profitability. 
The incurring of substantial losses on a new type of product such as ADSL can 
therefore by no means be considered either inevitable or necessary. 
(304) In this context, the Commission considers that Article 82 of the Treaty is applicable 
and that a charge of predation cannot be averted in the present case on the ground that 
the market is an emerging one. 
3. Lack of objective justification for below-cost pricing 
(305) According to Wanadoo Interactive, the rule established by the Akzo predation test is 
not absolute and must be assessed in the light of the economic circumstances of each 
case. The company maintains that below-cost pricing may be perfectly justified by 
aims other than a wish to oust competition. Firstly, it says, it is seeking to achieve 
economies of scale, and secondly its below-cost pricing benefits the market as a 
whole. Below-cost pricing which has the effect of subsidising the customer is, it 
argues, even socially desirable.367 Lastly, even if it were dominant, the company is, it 
maintains, obliged by existing or potential competitive pressure to align itself on the 
prices set by other competitors. These various arguments are examined in 
paragraphs 306 to 331. 
1. Economies of scale and learning effects 
(306) Wanadoo Interactive states that the variable cost of some products diminishes with the 
quantity produced and depends on the volume of demand, while a high production 
volume may help to gather experience and therefore to reduce the costs of future 
production.368 
(307) This argument, instead of legitimising predation objectively, highlights on the contrary 
one of the rational objectives thereof. One of the objectives of below-cost pricing may 
be to reserve for the company engaging in the practice the benefit of economies of 
scale on the market and to delay accordingly for competitors their arrival at the same 
volume threshold allowing the economies of scale. For an argument based on 
efficiency gains to be admissible, it must be possible to prove that such gains could not 
have been achieved by means other than a below-cost selling strategy. In the present 
case, there is no guarantee that such gains could not have been achieved had the 
market developed in a balanced manner. Moreover, a combination of being at a higher 
point on the learning curve than competitors and having higher output thanks to 
                                                
366  See [...]* 
367  Paragraphs 227 and 228 of the reply of 4 March 2002 (file, p. 1766). 
368  Reply of 4 March 2002, paragraphs 161 and 162 (file, p. 1752). 
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below-cost pricing may have exclusion effects capable of consolidating the dominant 
company's hegemony.369 
(308) In the present case, the conquest of market shares at the beginning of 2001 regardless 
of the losses incurred enabled Wanadoo Interactive to achieve economies of scale 
early on. The learning effects are difficult to measure, except perhaps in the reduction 
of certain customer administration costs, which was noticeable from the end of 2001. 
The scale economies are much more apparent in an area such as the routing of ADSL 
traffic. Until October 2002, routing charges were sharply tapered according to traffic 
volume.370 Depending on the traffic volume, the charge per Mbit/s for the regional 
traffic routing service varied on a scale of […]* and the charge for the national routing 
service on a scale of […]*. The charge is a function of the number of subscribers. 
Thus, at the end of 2001 or the beginning of 2002, on the basis of the routing service 
price scales, a new operator serving some 8 000 subscribers divided evenly between 
the Paris region and the rest of metropolitan France bore an average routing cost per 
subscriber […]* higher than that borne by Wanadoo Interactive.371 Wanadoo 
Interactive had for its part already achieved by summer 2001 a customer base that 
attracted the lowest charges. In view of the tapering nature of the price scale, an 
operator did not qualify for the lowest routing charge until it had more than 16 000 or 
so ADSL subscribers in the Paris region and more than 81 000 subscribers in the 
provinces.372 In August 2002, none of Wanadoo Interactive's competitors in the ADSL 
segment had yet attained these thresholds. Wanadoo Interactive, for its part, had 
crossed them as early as April 2001 thanks to its rapid growth and its below-cost 
pricing. 
(309) Thus, while the search for scale economies and learning effects may be included 
among the rational justifications for predatory behaviour, it may not serve to legitimise 
that practice from the point of view of competition law since it has the effect of 
conferring a more favourable cost structure on the dominant undertaking to the 
detriment of its competitors. 
2. Lack of justification in the form of positive externalities 
(310) Wanadoo Interactive suggests that it chose initially to sacrifice its profitability on the 
altar of market growth with a view to helping to increase awareness of high-speed 
Internet, which would in turn have benefited its competitors and the market in specific 
high-speed content, and to reducing network costs. 
(311) This argument cannot be upheld. An undertaking in a dominant position has no need 
to practice predatory pricing in order to attract new customers and draw consumers' 
attention to the product.373 
(312) Above all, Wanadoo Interactive's argument is deficient in one essential respect: there 
is no proof that the strategy pursued by the company would alone have made it 
                                                
369  See, for example, Bolton et al., op. cit., p. 51. 
370  […]* (file, p. 274) […]* 
371  Assuming a bandwidth consumption of the order of 15.8 kbit/s per subscriber. 
372  Making the same assumption as in footnote 371. 
373  P. Areeda and D. Turner, ‘Predatory Pricing and Related Practices under Section 2 of the Sherman Act’, 
Harvard Law Review, vol. 88, p. 714. 
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possible to attain the desired objective of increased broadband use in France. The 
positive effects linked to market growth could have been brought about had the market 
developed under conditions of equilibrium among service providers. If it had really 
been the France Télécom group's intention to develop the high-speed market for the 
benefit of all operators, France Télécom could have priced all its wholesale products - 
from shared or full unbundled access to the local loop to IP/ADSL access and routing 
services - at low levels encouraging the entry of competitors. The France Télécom 
group chose instead to confine the losses associated with developing high-speed 
access to its retailing subsidiary, thereby diverting the market growth to its advantage. 
It cannot therefore cogently be maintained that the France Télécom group, and 
Wanadoo Interactive in particular, were guided by a desire to develop the market for 
the benefit of all stakeholders.374 If such had been the case, France Télécom could 
have applied much sooner the remedy that was finally proposed once proceedings had 
been initiated against Wanadoo Interactive. 
(313) Wanadoo Interactive also maintains that its pricing policy has had a positive spillover 
effect in bringing about a reduction in the cost of modems and ADSL equipment in 
France.375 This argument does not withstand scrutiny. In 2000 and 2001 Alcatel, the 
leading supplier of ADSL equipment in France, produced at its plant in Belgium more 
than six million modems.376 By the end of 2001 there were some 15 million DSL 
connections worldwide.377 The total number of ADSL connections in France in 2001 
was of the order of 392 000, and only some of these were equipped with Alcatel 
modems. The expansion of the French market has therefore not been decisive as 
regards this supplier's production volumes or as regards the level of its manufacturing 
costs and selling prices, since all modems of the same type are technically identical.378 
3. The argument as to alignment on competitors' prices 
(314) On a number of occasions, Wanadoo Interactive has claimed that, as a would-be new 
entrant into the relevant market, it was forced to align itself on the prices charged by 
competitors.379 This claim elicits several series of observations, on the validity of the 
alignment argument from a point of view of principle, on the market position actually 
occupied by the companies concerned, and, lastly, on matters of fact which factually 
refute Wanadoo Interactive's contention. 
(315) First of all, from a point of view of principle, it is true that new entrants or 
undertakings which are not in a dominant position are entitled to charge promotional 
prices for limited periods. Their sole aim is to draw the consumer's attention to the 
very existence of the product, more persuasively than by a mere advertisement,380 and 
such offers do not have any negative impact on the market. On the other hand, 
alignment by the dominant operator on the promotional prices of a non-dominant 
                                                
374  The ART stated, moreover, in a document dated April 2002 entitled “l'accès à Internet, premier bilan”, 
p. 10, that “if alternative ISPs really had the means to compete with Wanadoo's offerings, then the rate 
of penetration [of high-speed access] might well be much higher.” 
375  Submission by Wanadoo Interactive at the hearing on 18 March 2002. 
376  Point 5 of Alcatel's letter to the Commission dated 12 June 2002 (file, pp. 5026 and 5027) 
377  Statement by Easynet's representative at the hearing on 18 March 2002. 
378  Point 6 of Alcatel's abovementioned letter. 
379  Reply of 4 March 2002, paragraphs 185, 186, 199 to 202, section 3.4.6.2. 
380  Areeda et al., op. cit., pp. 715 and 716. 
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operator is not justified. Whilst it is true that the dominant operator is not strictly 
speaking prohibited from aligning its prices on those of competitors,381 this option is 
not open to it where it would result in its not recovering the costs of the service in 
question. Whilst the fact that an undertaking is in a dominant position cannot deprive 
it of its entitlement to protect its own commercial interests when they are attacked, 
such behaviour cannot be countenanced if its actual purpose is to strengthen that 
dominant position and abuse it.382 The dominant undertaking thus has a special 
responsibility not to allow its behaviour to impair genuine undistorted competition on 
the common market.383 
(316) Wanadoo Interactive claims it was obliged to align the price of its eXtense service, set 
in autumn 2000, on those of the offerings of three competitors: the cable operator 
Noos using cable modem technology, and the ADSL Internet service providers Club 
Internet (T-Online France) and Mangoosta. None of these three operators can be 
characterised as dominant or be deemed to have objectively posed a serious threat to 
the interests of the dominant undertaking. Their respective situations at the end of 
2000 and the beginning of 2001 are commented on briefly in paragraphs 317 to 319. 
(317) The cable operator Noos cannot be characterised as the dominant operator on the 
domestic market. It is restricted in its scope to the Paris region, and what is more a 
significant number of communes in that region, especially in the departments 
immediately surrounding Paris, are not covered by it.384 Having almost no distribution 
outlets of its own, its marketing network is small. It enjoys none of the advantages that 
Wanadoo Interactive derives from its many links with France Télécom. It had no 
experience with low-speed Internet access and hence it had not only to enter a market 
that was new to it but also to learn the rudiments of a trade that it had never practised. 
[…]* starting in 2000 and the first quarter of 2001 Wanadoo Interactive enjoyed a 
growth rate invariably […]* times faster than Noos's in this market.385 It was clear as 
soon as ADSL technology was launched in France at the end of 1999 that Noos would 
quickly be outdistanced and that it would not occupy a dominant position on a national 
scale on the market in high-speed Internet access. 
(318) T-Online France, for its part, displayed at the relevant time none of the features of a 
dominant undertaking on the relevant geographic market. Its entry into the high-speed 
market in France was no more than symbolic. In June 2000 the company had 24 times 
fewer high-speed Internet subscribers than Wanadoo Interactive. Both in September 
2000 and at the end of 2000, the ratio between the total number of T-Online France 
subscribers and of Wanadoo Interactive subscribers was […]*, and at the end of the 
                                                
381  Judgment in Akzo, paragraph 135. 
382  See Court of First Instance in Case T-65/89 BPB Industries and British Gypsum v Commission [1993] 
ECR II-389, paragraph 117; United Brands, paragraph 189; Compagnie maritime belge, paragraphs 146 
and 147. 
383  Court of Justice in Michelin, paragraph 57; Court of First Instance in Case T-228/97 Irish Sugar v 
Commission [1999] ECR II-2969, paragraph 112. 
384  Wanadoo Interactive points out in its reply of 4 March 2003 (paragraph 37 - file, p. 6868) that Noos had 
been granted an exclusive concession in Paris. The exclusive nature of this concession is immaterial 
here since the concession related to the cable TV network infrastructure and not to the provision of 
high-speed services. Noos therefore enjoyed no territorial exclusivity with regard to broadband, the 
telephone network being at least as extensive as Noos's cable network. 
385  A detailed comparison between Noos's subscriber bases at the end of 1999 and during the first quarter 
of 2001 is to be found in Annex 23 to this Decision. 
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first quarter of 2001 […]*.386 During the second half of 2000, the total number of 
subscribers to Wanadoo Interactive's high-speed Internet access services grew […]* 
times faster than that of T-Online France, and in the first quarter of 2001 […]*  times 
faster.387 
(319) Mangoosta, the third competitor, likewise did not occupy a dominant position on the 
relevant market. Unlike Wanadoo Interactive, which had been an established player on 
the market in low-speed Internet access for more than five years, Mangoosta was an 
entirely new company without any track record or logistical resources to match those 
of Wanadoo Interactive. Its ADSL subscriber base never grew beyond the 5 000 mark. 
(320) Secondly, it should be pointed out for the sake of completeness that Wanadoo 
Interactive's statements are factually inaccurate. The cases of the two Wanadoo 
Interactive products to which this Decision relates and the chronology of the price 
decisions of the various market operators are examined in paragraphs 321 to 331. 
(321) The case of the Wanadoo ADSL service is easily dealt with. As indicated in 
paragraph 127, the price of this service was set before April 1999. At that time, the 
question of alignment did not arise. Club Internet for its part did not announce its 
selling price until 22 October 1999 and, as pointed out in paragraph 127, had to align 
itself on the price set by Wanadoo Interactive. It is therefore not possible to claim any 
alignment on the prices of a competitor for this product, which, in mid-2002, 
accounted for over a third of the company's high-speed residential subscribers. 
(322) The case of the eXtense service merits more detailed examination. The price of this 
service will be scrutinised in the light of the prices charged by Noos, Club Internet (T-
Online France) and Mangoosta, in that order. 
(323) From May 2000,388 Noos offered a subscription to the Noosnet high-speed access 
service for a total of FRF 378 (or €58), taxes included, per month.389 This was 27% 
more per month than Wanadoo Interactive was to charge several months later for a 
subscription to the eXtense service. In addition, Noos demanded FRF 1 200 (or €183) 
up-front from the subscriber, which was 21% more than it cost to buy an eXtense 
starter pack from Wanadoo Interactive.390 Noos's offering was thus appreciably more 
expensive than the one which Wanadoo Interactive was to propose several months 
later. 
                                                
386  See Annex 23 to this Decision. 
387  Ibid. 
388  Historically, Noos's offering, then known as Cybercâble, was launched in 1998. During the second half 
of 1999 and for the first two months of 2000, Noos's offering was suspended for technical reasons. It 
was resumed in March 2000 with a dual pricing structure depending on whether or not the Internet 
subscriber was also a cable TV subscriber: in the former event, the price was FRF 299 taxes included, 
and in the latter, FRF 389 taxes included. In May 2000, a unified pricing system was introduced, 
including a new price. 
389  This amount can be broken down into FRF 299 (or €45.58), taxes included, for Internet access and FRF 
79 (or €12.04), taxes included, for modem rental. 
390  This up-front payment consisted of a FRF 700 installation charge and a FRF 500 modem deposit. The 
deposit is repayable at the end of the contract period, but the FRF 700 installation charge is not. By 
contrast, the purchaser of the eXtense package is not out of pocket as Wanadoo Interactive does not 
charge for installation and the customer owns the modem, which constitutes a saleable asset. 
 EN    EN 
(324) In reality, Wanadoo Interactive pitched the price of its eXtense service slightly below 
a temporary promotional offer by Noos. Noos offered a subscription at FRF 299 taxes 
included for a period of one year391 to customers newly recruited between 28 August 
2000 and 21 January 2001, and to those customers only.392 This promotional offer was 
subsequently extended until 1 March 2001. However, it was clearly a short-lived offer, 
presented to the public as such, and the advantage it conferred was limited in time. 
Moreover, it covered only the subscription, and not the up-front payment referred to in 
paragraph 323, with the result that it was always far less advantageous than Wanadoo 
Interactive's offer. Furthermore, in February-March 2001, just a few weeks after 
eXtense was launched, all of Noos's prices were increased, with the result that they 
were now much higher than Wanadoo's, both because of the promotion period coming 
to an end and because of the billing for any exceeding of the upload limit,393 coupled 
with the marketing of the “Noosnet forfait 1 Go” offering aimed at large customers, 
henceforth the only Noos offering that can properly be compared to eXtense.394 
(325) The monthly subscription fee for Noos's offering has therefore never been lower than 
that of Wanadoo Interactive. Even during Noos's promotional period, which 
overlapped only with the first seven weeks of the marketing of the eXtense service, the 
up-front payment required of the customer by the cable operator was invariably 20% 
higher than the price payable for the eXtense starter pack. 
(326) T-Online France, for its part, announced the launch of its offering several weeks 
before Wanadoo Interactive, on 22 November 2000, with a view to commencing sales 
on 1 December 2000.395 Wanadoo Interactive's internal documents reveal that, after 
some hesitation, the price was in reality set internally at FRF […]* taxes included 
(before being […]*  FRF 298 taxes included) during the first half of October 2000, i.e. 
more than six weeks before T-Online made public its packaged service offering and 
more than two weeks before T-Online set its price internally. The price mentioned 
momentarily during the summer of FRF […]* taxes included no longer appears in any 
budget documents after 5 October 2000. It would appear therefore that Wanadoo 
Interactive's argument is factually incorrect. 
(327) Wanadoo Interactive claims that the budget presentations obtained by the Commission 
from its finance department are not formal decisions in the way that a price decision 
is.396 In its reply of 23 October 2002, the company maintained that it had planned up to 
the last minute to charge FRF […]* a month for its eXtense service.397 The 
subscription fee was, it said, set once and for all on 22 November 2000, the day on 
which Club Internet made the details of its offering public. To back up this assertion, it 
produced an email drafted by […]* on 22 November 2000 […]*, in which it is stated: 
“I confirm the subscription fee of FRF 298 taxes included (instead of FRF […]* taxes 
included) from 1 January.” 
                                                
391  Noos provided the modem to the customer free of charge for one year from the date on which he signed 
up. 
392  Customers recruited before 28 August 2000 paid the old subscription fee of FRF 378 taxes included. 
393  This upload limit billing lasted from February to November 2001. 
394  From March 2001, large customers were offered a special version of the Noosnet offering known as 
“Noosnet forfait 1 Go” for FRF 499 plus a FRF 79 modem rental fee. […]* (file, p. 3266)). 
395  Article in Le Journal du Net, 23.11.2000, entitled “Pack ADSL: Club Internet tire le premier”. 
396  Footnote 86 to the reply of 23 October 2002 (file, p. 6268). 
397  Paragraph 77 et seq. of the reply of 23 October 2002 (file, p. 6268). 
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(328) The Commission would point out first of all that, in a company the size of the one at 
issue here, a budget presentation is an extremely serious exercise. The price 
assumptions made during the first half of October 2000 were by no means exploratory 
scenarios, but instead quasi-definitive assumptions. At all events, the extremely 
succinct email produced by Wanadoo Interactive cannot be considered to be a 
document of greater evidential value than the budget presentations referred to in 
paragraph 326 or to attest to the fact that Wanadoo Interactive was still seriously 
thinking about setting the price at FRF […]* taxes included. It does not prove at all 
that the company had decided on a firm launch price at that level. It indicates at most 
that there had been some hesitation about the definitive price level up to that point, and 
that it was only then that that hesitation was finally swept away. The company has, 
moreover, not produced any other evidence of the FRF […]* price hypothesis 
surviving, other than residually, during the period from […]*. 
(329) Lastly, as regards Mangoosta, on 23 October 2000 this competitor launched its 
packaged service at a price of FRF 330, taxes included, per month, modem rental 
included. The launch was announced in the press on 6 October 2000.398 Wanadoo 
Interactive claims that it aligned itself on this competitor also. 
(330) The argument employed by Wanadoo Interactive elicits a number of responses. First 
of all, the nominal price proposed by Mangoosta was 11% higher than the price at 
which Wanadoo Interactive's offering was to be pitched several weeks later. 
Moreover, except in the case of the first 1 000 subscribers recruited during a 19-day 
promotion period,399 Mangoosta, unlike Wanadoo Interactive, billed to the consumer 
installation costs of FRF 500 taxes included. Wanadoo Interactive points out that 
Mangoosta's subscription fee included the modem rental and the installation kit. A 
simple calculation400 shows, however, that it was cheaper to subscribe to Wanadoo 
Interactive's offering for any period of at least 15 months.401 Lastly, in February 2001, 
barely weeks after Wanadoo Interactive launched its eXtense product, Mangoosta 
increased its monthly subscription fee by 20%, making it highly uncompetitive 
compared with that of Wanadoo Interactive. If Wanadoo Interactive had in fact set its 
prices out of fear of being ousted by Mangoosta, there was nothing to prevent it from 
revising its prices upwards. 
(331) The documents cited by Wanadoo Interactive concerning the in-house perception of 
the potential pressure exerted by competitors402 lead at most to the conclusion that 
during the second half of 2000 the company may have overestimated the reality of the 
potential competitive threat and have defined a strategy of preventive occupation of 
the ground by way of riposte. […]* Such a mistaken perception cannot, however, 
serve to justify below-cost pricing. It would be tantamount to acknowledging that a 
                                                
398  Article in Le Journal du Net, 6.10.2000, entitled “Yahoo France se lance dans l'ADSL avec 
Mangoosta”.  
399  To subscribers recruited between 6 and 23 October Mangoosta offered the first month's subscription 
plus the installation costs. 
400  The calculation consists in finding the value for the variable X in the following equation: 500 + 330X = 
995 + 298X. 
401  In addition, by acquiring the starter pack, the Wanadoo subscriber became owner of a saleable good, 
unlike the Mangoosta subscriber, to whom the up-front payment represented a net loss. 
402  See paragraphs 61 and 62, 71 to 75 and 166 of the reply of 23 October 2002 (file, pp. 6203, 6267 and 
6287). 
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dominant undertaking is entitled to determine its commercial policy in such a way as 
to stymie the ambitions of purely virtual competitors. […]* In such a context, while 
the argument based on alignment on competitors' prices would have been admissible 
in principle, it lost all factual foundation as from […]*. This Decision therefore finds 
fault with the company not so much for setting prices at the end of 2000 at a below-
cost level as for subsequently maintaining those prices at that level as part of a wide-
ranging strategy of market preemption deployed at national level as from the 
beginning of March 2001. 
4. Probability of a recoupment of losses 
(332) Wanadoo Interactive maintains that a strategy of predation may be considered viable 
and realistic only if the structure of the market and the presence of sufficient barriers 
to entry enable the dominant undertaking subsequently to enjoy high, stable margins 
on the relevant market and thus to recoup any losses initially incurred.403 
(333) It should be pointed out that neither the case-law of the Court of Justice404 nor the 
decision-making practice of the Commission405 requires proof that initial losses were 
actually recouped before a finding can be made of abuse through predatory pricing. 
Action by the competition authorities is justified as soon as there is a risk that 
competition may be distorted, regardless of any prospect of loss recoupment. 
(334) However, while the recoupment of losses initially incurred may constitute a rational 
objective associated with predation, other scenarios are perfectly conceivable. In 
certain specific cases, the undertaking may embark upon a strategy of predation with 
aims other than the achievement of operating margins higher than those which would 
prevail in a competitive context. For example, in certain highly specific share 
ownership scenarios, the undertaking may attach only secondary importance to 
recoupment of its losses.406 It may also abandon the idea of recouping all its initial 
losses and concentrate instead on balancing its future costs and revenues.407 Lastly, it 
may aim at recoupment in the long term by means other than its operating results.408 
                                                
403  Cf., for example, paragraphs 253 to 300 of the reply of 4 March 2002; paragraphs 197 to 200 and pp. 14 
to 18 of Annex 1 to the reply of 23 October 2002. 
404  Court of Justice in Tetra Pak, paragraph 44. 
405  Commission Decision 2001/354/EC of 20 March 2001 in Case COMP/34.141 - Deutsche Post AG (OJ 
L 125, 5.5.2001, p. 27). 
406  Some economists take the view, for example, that in the case of a public enterprise a strategy of 
predation without recoupment of initial losses is perfectly conceivable, as the need for ultimate 
recoupment of the losses is less strong owing to the ultimate guarantee of viability provided by the state 
shareholder (see in this connection David E.M. Sappington and J. Gregory Sidak, Competition Law for 
State-Owned Enterprises, December 2002). In the present case, Wanadoo Interactive, which is owned 
more than 70% by France Télécom, which is itself state-owned, is a public enterprise. Loss recoupment 
is even less likely to be an objective where the public enterprise has in its portfolio of activities other, 
highly profitable products reducing the need to offset the losses induced by the predation, as is the case 
here. 
407  P. Bolton, J. Brodley and M. Riordan, “Predatory Pricing: response to critique and further elaboration”, 
The Georgetown Law Journal, vol. 89, 2001, pp. 2512 and 2513. 
408  It is also possible to envisage a predation strategy the purpose of which is not to maximise revenue and 
operating profit through supracompetitive prices or margins, but simply to increase the company's value 
by enlarging its customer base and hence the potential future value of its goodwill. This increase in 
value has financial implications for the company's shareholders when the business is sold or whenever 
its market value increases (e.g. as a result of an exchange of shares). 
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(335) The Commission accordingly considers that proof of recoupment of losses is not a 
precondition for a finding of abuse through predatory pricing. 
(336) Subsidiarily, it must be pointed out that the recoupment of losses is rendered plausible 
in the present case by the structure of the market and the associated revenue prospects. 
(337) The more the market's functioning is characterised by the existence of significant entry 
barriers capable of facilitating loss recoupment, the more a predation strategy will pay 
dividends. The probability of loss recoupment will be less strong in a market where 
entrants have access to the same technology as the incumbent operator, where there 
are fewer irreversible costs and where firms can enter and exit the market without 
difficulty and without extra cost.409 Conversely, it is not necessary for purposes of loss 
recoupment that the entry barriers should be absolutely insurmountable,410 as in that 
case the entry of competitors is altogether improbable and recourse to a predation 
strategy with a view to dissuasion is no longer warranted. For loss recoupment to 
become a likely prospect, it is sufficient that the obstacles to entry guarantee the 
dominant undertaking the maintenance in the long term of a large degree of market 
concentration in its favour. The barriers may take many forms. They may be absolute, 
insurmountable barriers, such as regulatory, legal or technical obstacles. Or they may 
be barriers which, without necessarily being insurmountable, nevertheless constitute 
obstacles to entry slowing down new entrants' progress. These obstacles exist where 
the new entrant into the relevant market is placed at a disadvantage compared with the 
incumbent solely by reason of the latter's already being in business.411 Lower unit 
production costs thanks to economies of scale, brand image, privileged access to 
information on costs and cost trends, and the dominant undertaking's entry-
discouraging behaviour itself412 are capable of constituting obstacles to entry. The 
higher the non-recoupable entry costs, the more the market is characterised by strong 
obstacles to entry, as the risks associated with unsuccessful entry are high. 
(338) Although proof of the possibility of actually recouping the initial losses is not required 
by Community law, the Commission intends, accessorially, to examine the entry 
barriers and entry costs which characterise the relevant market and which render 
plausible a recoupment of the losses by the dominant firm in the long run. It is 
necessary to identify, firstly, the factors forming an obstacle to the redistribution of 
subscribers existing at the time when the abuse comes to an end and, secondly, the 
factors making it difficult for competing companies to secure a significant share in the 
market growth resulting from the ending of the abuse. 
(339) The strategic barriers related to the effects of the link-up with the France Télécom 
group, together with the many synergies resulting therefrom, were set out in section 
II.C.3. A number of other obstacles to the entry and growth of competitors, which are 
likely to assume particular importance when the abuse comes to an end, must be 
discussed, namely: the disincentives to mobility on the part of existing subscribers; the 
cost of acquiring sufficient notoriety in a mass market; and the cost of rolling out 
                                                
409  See Baumol, ‘Contestable Markets: an uprising in the theory of industry structure’, American Economic 
Review, vol. 72, p. 1 et seq. (March 1982). 
410  Because of the potential risks of an over-restrictive approach to entry barriers, some economists prefer 
the terms “obstacle to entry” or “conditions of entry” (See Joskow et al., op. cit., p. 227). 
411  Ordover et al., op. cit., p. 11. 
412  See Scherer and Ross, Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance, pp. 360 and 361. 
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alternatives to France Télécom's wholesale offering. In addition, the level of the 
margins recorded by Wanadoo Interactive since October 2002 is a sign of the 
company's capacity to recoup its losses in the medium term. 
1. Disincentives to mobility on the part of existing subscribers 
(340) It will first of all be examined whether existing subscribers to Wanadoo Interactive's 
ADSL services can switch easily to another provider. 
(341) As pointed out in paragraph 294, the market in high-speed Internet access differs from 
that in low-speed access in that it is not a market with a high customer turnover, 
having a churn rate three times lower than the average for all Internet users. 
(342) Besides brand loyalty and customer satisfaction with the quality of the service 
provided, a number of objective factors may help to explain the low mobility of 
subscribers. 
(343) First, practically all market offerings, and the subscription to the eXtense service in 
particular, involve commitment periods of either one year or two years and provide for 
financial penalties in case of termination of the contract before its expiry. 
(344) Secondly, assuming that this first obstacle has been overcome and the subscriber has 
been released from his commitment, two situations may arise. In the first, the 
subscriber wants to switch from an ADSL provider to a broadband cable service 
provider, or vice versa: he then has to change modems and incur a potentially 
dissuasive cost. In the second, the subscriber wants to switch from one ADSL service 
provider to another ADSL service provider. It is then not necessary to change modems 
if the equipment is compatible with the technical specifications of the telecoms 
operator administering the service. Two scenarios must, however, in turn be 
considered. In the first scenario, the Internet service provider to which the consumer 
has chosen to migrate is a telecoms operator and controls the value chain: there is then 
a risk of several days' interruption of service as there is as yet no procedure for 
migrating from a France Télécom ADSL offering to an ADSL offering of another 
telecoms operator. In the second scenario, the consumer turns to an ADSL provider 
who is in reality just a reseller of the service proposed by France Télécom: the access 
provider then has to pay France Télécom €53.40 by way of commissioning costs. All 
this helps to explain why the temptation for Wanadoo Interactive's existing subscribers 
to migrate to competing service providers, and in particular to service providers 
proposing cheaper offerings, is in reality not very strong.413 
                                                
413  The cases of the competing ADSL service providers Free and Oreka are significant in this regard. From 
August 2002, Oreka's offering was priced at €39.95 taxes included, or almost 12% less than what most 
providers of comparable products were charging. The price of Free's offering launched in September 
2002 came to €29.9 taxes included, or approximately 34% below the prices of its competitors. Oreka, 
whose pricing policy Wanadoo Interactive describes as “aggressive” (paragraph 105 of the reply of 23 
October 2002 (file, p. 6274)), gained in all only 1 500 ADSL subscribers during the four months 
following the launch of its offering (letter from Oreka to the Commission dated 2 January 2003 (file, p. 
6112)). Free, for its part, recruited more than 100 000 customers during the same period, but only a 
small proportion of them came from competing ADSL providers and hence, a fortiori, from Wanadoo 
Interactive. The number of Free subscribers originally with competitors has been divulged to the 
Commission but is a business secret (file, p. 5386); it is less than 10% (file, p. 6838). Between 
September and December 2002, fewer than […]* subscribers to Wanadoo's ADSL or eXtense services, 
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(345) Owing to the disincentives to mobility on the part of existing subscribers, the bulk of 
the effort involved in the conquest of market shares by competitors must therefore be 
concentrated on new customers. 
2. The costs of entering and acquiring a critical size in a mass market 
(346) It is common practice to consider that early entry into a market confers a major 
advantage on a firm where it has been able to establish a significant preference for its 
brand in the eyes of the consumer, not by providing an objectively better service than 
its competitors, but simply because it was first on the market or because it has spent 
heavily on its image.414 In such a context, a new entrant must not only invest the 
technical resources needed to produce and market the good, but it must also incur 
substantial promotional expenditure if it is to make its offering well enough known. 
(347) Contrary to what Wanadoo Interactive has claimed, Internet access markets are 
characterised by significant barriers to entry. In support of its position, Wanadoo 
Interactive has cited the July 2000 stock exchange listing prospectus, in which the 
market is described as having low barriers to entry. This brief comment in a public 
document must be supplemented both by an observation of developments on the 
relevant markets since that position was taken and by internal company documents, 
likewise dating from after that time. Any validity Wanadoo's analysis as set out in the 
abovementioned prospectus may have had in the first half of 2000 may have 
diminished with time in view of the behaviour of the operators present in this sector. 
(348) It would be wrong, moreover, to consider the structure of a market to be an entirely 
exogenous, immutable given. On the contrary, the behaviour of firms on a market, and 
in particular the behaviour of the firm first present thereon or enjoying other historical 
advantages, is likely to modify the conditions governing entry or growth by competing 
companies on that same market. A company's early commitment to a market appearing 
at first sight to be relatively open may be intended not only to derive benefit from 
more favourable production conditions, but also to increase the costs of entry for 
potential competitors.415 
(349) […]*, Wanadoo Interactive […]*mentions .416 It is thus difficult for a new, unknown 
operator to become established quickly as a recognised service provider. Even service 
providers with recognised brands have to spend very substantial sums on promotion, 
as can be seen from Table 12, which is based on an internal Wanadoo Interactive 
                                                                                                                                                   
or less than […]*% of Wanadoo Interactive's average subscriber base during that period, migrated to 
Oreka and Free. It should be pointed out in this connection that, at that time, more than […]* Wanadoo 
subscribers, be they customers of the Wanadoo ADSL service or customers of the eXtense offering for 
more than a year, were free to migrate to a different service provider. Therefore fewer than […]*% of 
Wanadoo Interactive's subscribers who were free to migrate left this service provider for a cheaper 
competitor. 
414  See, for example, Paul Joskow and Alvin Klerovick, ‘A Framework for Analyzing Predatory Pricing 
Policy’, Yale Law Journal, vol. 89, Nb 2, December 1979, pp. 228 and 229. 
415  Elie Appelbaum and Chin Lim, ‘Contestable Markets under Uncertainty’, Rand Journal of Economics, 
vol. 16, No. 1, spring 1985, p. 28. 
416  […]* (file, p. 4249). 
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document,417 setting out the promotional expenditure of the leading French service 
providers in 2001. 
Table 12: promotional expenditure of Internet service providers in 2001 (low-speed and 
high-speed combined) 
 € million Proportion of 2001 
Internet turnover 
Wanadoo Interactive […]* […]*% 
AOL418 
 
[…]* Not known 
Liberty Surf419 
 
[…]* […]*% 
Club Internet420 
 
[…]* Not known 
Free […]* […]*% 
(350) Advertising expenditure of such orders of magnitude, both in absolute terms and as a 
proportion of turnover, especially on the part of companies already well known as 
service providers, bears witness to the scale of the cost of acquiring sufficient 
notoriety and visibility on a mass residential market. For a new operator on the high-
speed Internet access market with no previous experience of low-speed Internet 
access, like Mangoosta, it is not technically impossible to enter the market, but it is 
extremely doubtful whether a new entrant of this type will be able to make up for its 
lack of image through a wide-ranging promotion campaign and arouse the interest of a 
sufficient number of consumers to threaten the position of a dominant operator. A 
fortiori, a new, unknown entrant which does not embark upon a massive promotion 
campaign can hope to acquire only a small or negligible share of the market. Such was 
the case on the French market with two operators which started up in 2002.421 Thus, 
wholly new, unknown entrants, without being prevented from penetrating the market 
altogether, are forced to employ niche strategies if they are not to incur promotional 
expenditure out of all proportion to their commercial investment capabilities. This 
                                                
417  […]* (file, p. 4068). 
418  AOL France has not published its 2001 turnover. 
419  Turnover of Internet business only, excluding telecoms products. 
420  T-Online France has not published its 2001 turnover. 
421  In its reply of 4 March 2002 and at the hearing on 18 March 2002, Wanadoo Interactive claimed that it 
was easy even for a wholly new entrant to penetrate the market. It gave the example of Dixinet (replies 
dated 4 March 2002, paragraph 299, and 23 October 2002, enclosure 1, p. 16), which had been offering 
an ADSL service since the beginning of 2002. However, apart from the fact that this service was priced 
at €46 taxes included, i.e. more than that of Wanadoo Interactive, Dixinet was in reality merely 
experimenting with a subscriber base which as yet had no statistical significance on the French market 
at the end of 2002. At the end of August 2002, Dixinet had only 10 subscribers to its ADSL and 
telephone services (letter from BD Multimédia to the Commission dated 26 September 2002 (file, 
p. 5327)). The case of Net pratique, which was also highlighted by Wanadoo Interactive, is equally 
revealing. The company launched its service in summer 2002 and at the end of 2002 it had only 1 400 
or so subscribers (letter from Net Ultra to the Commission dated 12 December 2002 (file, p. 5393)). 
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advantage in terms of notoriety for the incumbent constitutes a high entry barrier for 
potential new entrants into the Internet access market. 
(351) With regard to the high-speed Internet access market in particular, […]*.422 Service 
providers must, during this high-speed market development phase, build an image as 
the default supplier of a product viewed by the consumer as technically sophisticated 
and become large enough to benefit from economies of scale. 
(352) In this process, the chronological sequence of entry into the market is far from neutral. 
Clearly, a service provider that has a considerable head start over its competitors 
during the initial phase of market growth is able to capitalise on the momentum thus 
gained. By contrast, laggards must make a much bigger effort to acquire customers if 
they wish to make up for lost time and bridge the resulting image gap and confer on 
their high-speed service the same notoriety as that of the dominant undertaking's 
flagship offering. In these circumstances, new competitors are confronted with the 
need not only to carry out the expenditure technically necessary in order to provide the 
service but also to undertake substantial advertising and promotional expenditure both 
to raise their product's profile and to undermine loyalty to the dominant undertaking's 
brand. 
(353) An industry in which advertising expenditure is highly significant, especially where 
the amounts spent on advertising are of the same order of magnitude as the revenue 
earned from the associated sales, must be considered an industry characterised by 
substantial entry costs.423 The advertising expenditure already incurred confers an 
advantage on the incumbent and creates a same-sized handicap for new entrants, 
whose advertising and promotion costs are generally higher and less effective than the 
incumbent's.424 Although the advantages derived by the incumbent from its already 
being present on the market may gradually be eroded with time, new market entrants 
are obliged to bear higher advertising costs for a longer period than the incumbent if 
they are to be able to challenge its market position.425 The present case provides an 
illustration of this type of situation. 
(354) Wanadoo Interactive sees the upsurge in promotional offers from October 2002 as 
proof of the strength of competition and of the return to healthy market conditions. 
The Commission interprets it differently. These large-scale promotional campaigns by 
competitors are, at this stage in the market's development and in view of the head start 
gained by Wanadoo Interactive, the only means of avoiding outright eviction and of 
achieving a certain visibility with a view to acquiring a critical size. The analysis of 
competitors' promotional expenditure426 attests to the fact that this expenditure 
represents a highly significant entry cost. Three salient points in particular emerge 
from it. 
                                                
422  File, p. 3414. 
423  Scherer and Ross, Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance, pp. 436-438. 
424  Cf., for example, William S. Comanor and Thomas A. Wilson, ‘Advertising Market Structure and 
Performance’, Review of Economics and Statistics, volume XLIX, November 1967. 
425  William S. Comanor and Thomas A. Wilson, ‘The Effect of Advertising on Competition: a survey’, 
Journal of Economic Literature, vol. XVII (June 1979), especially at pp. 453 and 454. 
426  See Annex 22. 
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(355) Firstly, during the period 2001-2002, Wanadoo Interactive spent nearly €[…]*  on 
advertising, promotion and various marketing activities related to its eXtense and 
Wanadoo ADSL services, of which […]*427 and more than […]* of the total 
promotion budgets of Tiscali-Liberty Surf and T-Online France - Club Internet for 
their entire range of services.428 Leaving aside cases of new entrants without any 
experience or notoriety in the low-speed Internet access market, even firms well 
ensconced in that market will probably hesitate before committing themselves in the 
high-speed market to advertising and promotion campaigns on the same scale as those 
which Wanadoo Interactive undertook in 2001 and above all in 2002. Although 
advertising expenditure focused on acquiring new customers is in the nature of a 
variable cost, and although it ceases if the company decides to stop recruiting new 
subscribers, it none the less represents a high entry cost which is liable to prove 
dissuasive should the company set its sights on a non-negligible market share. In order 
to benefit from scale economies in the activity in question, including qualifying for the 
lowest IP routing charges, and in order to gain separate growth momentum through 
having a critical size,429 it is necessary to acquire several tens of thousands of 
customers,430 which in itself calls for a very substantial advertising and promotion 
outlay on top of the other customer acquisition costs. 
(356) Secondly, the advertising and promotion expenditure incurred is very substantial 
compared with revenue. It can be roughly estimated that in 2002 the advertising and 
promotion outlay of Wanadoo Interactive's competitors was equivalent to 
approximately 38% of their total high-speed turnover and to 102% of the additional 
turnover generated by the growth in their high-speed subscriber base in 2002. For 
Wanadoo Interactive, the corresponding ratios were […]*% and […]*%. These ratios 
are very high, especially for Wanadoo Interactive's competitors, and they attest to the 
fact that large-scale market entry is particularly costly. 
(357) Thirdly, not only is the advertising and promotion expenditure competitors must incur 
if they are to acquire a certain visibility substantial, but it is less effective than that of 
Wanadoo Interactive owing to the advantages in terms of notoriety on the relevant 
market already enjoyed by that company. In 2001, Wanadoo Interactive spent on 
advertising, promotion and various marketing activities related to its ADSL services 
approximately €[…]* per new subscriber. During the first half of 2002, the company 
devoted under the same heads approximately €[…]* per new subscriber. During the 
last quarter of 2001 and the first half of 2002, to acquire each additional customer 
competitors for their part devoted […]* to […]* times more resources to advertising, 
direct marketing, promotion and publicity than the amounts indicated for Wanadoo 
Interactive in 2001 and spring/summer 2002. In the second half of 2002, the average 
amounts per subscriber acquired converged as between Wanadoo Interactive and its 
competitors. However, if one subtracts from the sample the service provider Free, 
whose product, which is appreciably cheaper than that of the competition, requires less 
                                                
427  Only Wanadoo Interactive's ADSL and eXtense services offering download speeds of 512 kbps are 
referred to here, to the exclusion of its other ADSL products. 
428  […]* (file, p. 4068). 
429  The network effects linked to a broad subscriber base play a part in the recruitment of new subscribers 
through “word of mouth”. 
430  As explained in section II.B.3.1, in order to qualify for the lowest IP routing charges, it was necessary 
before October 2002 to build up a subscriber base in excess of 95 000. 
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in the way of advertising to set it apart,431 competitors' advertising and promotion 
expenditure is still […]* times greater than that of Wanadoo Interactive. 
Consequently, while it is not impossible for operators with a high profile in the low-
speed market to win market share in the high-speed market, they will have to put in a 
much greater effort than Wanadoo Interactive did back in 2001. 
(358) Thus, the structure of the market in the wake of Wanadoo Interactive's predation 
strategy is not such that it acts as an absolute bar to entry into and growth on the high-
speed market for service providers which already enjoy notoriety in the low-speed 
market. It does, however, affect very strongly the scale and volume of their entry into 
the market and their capacity to attain a critical size. It is, therefore, not so much the 
nature and unitary amount per new subscriber of the advertising and promotion 
expenditure as the overall volume of the commitments needed to acquire a critical 
subscriber base that turns advertising and promotion expenditure into a potentially 
dissuasive entry cost. Even companies with a firm foothold in the low-speed Internet 
access market may hesitate to embark upon advertising and promotion campaigns on 
the same scale as Wanadoo Interactive.432 In this context, the effort required of 
competitors in order to become more than mere “background noise” has to be seen as 
a barrier to entry and to re-entry for new entrants of the Mangoosta type, or as a 
significant entry cost for operators already present on the low-speed market, both of 
which promote a high degree of market concentration.433 The foreseeable difficulty for 
competitors to acquire a critical size on a mass market enabled Wanadoo to envisage 
as perfectly plausible a market sufficiently concentrated to allow a recoupment of 
losses. 
3. Cost of alternatives to the retail offering proposed to service providers by France 
Télécom 
(359) Instead of having recourse to France Télécom's wholesale offering, which combines 
both IP/ADSL access and IP/ADSL routing services, competitors in the ADSL 
segment may choose to build their own telecommunications network with a view to 
freeing themselves from the economic constraints associated with that retail offering 
                                                
431  The economic model of Free's offering cannot be reproduced by just any operator, as will be shown in 
paragraphs 361 and 362. 
432  An analyst commented on the situation at the end of 2002 as follows: “In France, Tiscali no longer has 
the financial resources to cut its prices aggressively and to launch vast marketing campaigns” (article in 
Les Echos dated 9 September 2002 entitled “Wanadoo et T-Online se ruinent à l'extérieur”). 
433  In its Barilla-BPL-Kamps Decision, already referred to, at paragraph 21, the Commission had occasion 
to acknowledge that advertising may constitute a significant barrier to entry, as Wanadoo Interactive 
admits in its reply of 23 October 2002, paragraph 201 (file, p. 6293). Likewise, in its Decision in the 
Procter and Gamble/VO Schickedanz case, paragraph 145, the Commission described a process similar 
to that observed in this case as follows: “In terms of barriers to entry, the marked increase in the level of 
on-going promotional support has significantly raised the level of expenditure necessary for a new 
entrant wishing to stand out above the 'background noise' of this on-going brand support, so that the 
absolute amount of money required to overcome the promotional barrier to entry has been significantly 
increased. Furthermore, the effect of this increase in the underlying level of advertising expenditure is 
also to increase the minimum viable market share on entry since the potential entrant knows that in 
order to fund competitive levels of advertising, it must achieve sufficient sales … Retaliation by 
incumbents with significant market shares against new entrants is thus cheap and easy, and until the 
new entrant achieves a similar market share, incumbents have a cost advantage on one of the key 
competitive parameters.”  
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and, possibly, proposing to the final consumer a product characterised by a better 
quality/price ratio. 
(360) Such a choice of strategy exposes a company, however, to obstacles which do not arise 
in the case of the mere retailing of the wholesale access and routing services provided 
by France Télécom. 
(361) First of all, the service provider's national and regional telecommunications network 
must attain a sufficient degree of capillarity to serve the whole country. The operator 
Free, which has held a telecommunications operating licence since early 1999, has for 
example spent more than three years setting up a several thousand kilometre long optic 
fibre network costing between €15 and 30 million,434 only to finish up covering just 
the country's main population centres. Investment on such a scale cannot be carried out 
quickly and without a very substantial initial capital outlay. 
(362) Moreover, in order to master the various parts of the telecommunications service, a 
service provider making this investment choice must resort, in order to reach the final 
customer, to the local loop unbundling solution, which involves high fixed costs. The 
leasing by France Télécom of the copper pairs to other companies entails for the latter 
not only recurring charges but also very substantial, non-recoupable fixed costs related 
inter alia to the transfer of the lines and to the service of providing space for the 
companies' equipment in France Télécom's premises. The initial capital outlay is 
substantial, and at all events out of reach for an entrant which does not have very 
considerable financial resources. In Free's case, it is put at €10 million initially for 
unbundling alone435 and at €70 million for all the investment linked to ADSL in 2003, 
on top of the transport network infrastructure costs already referred to.436 In addition, 
the actual local loop unbundling process is particularly long and technically difficult. 
(363) Wanadoo Interactive has pointed out that, even if they are not network operators along 
the lines of Free, Internet service providers can use the infrastructure of the alternative 
telecommunications operator LDCom.437 This is factually accurate inasmuch as 
LDCom offers network services to service providers using the solutions known 
according to the French regulatory terminology as option 1 and option 3, but two 
points have to be made. First, recourse to the services of a wholesaler introduces an 
intermediary into the value chain, creating an extra cost compared with direct 
administration of the network by the service provider itself, whose freedom it limits 
technically and financially. Moreover, LDCom is itself faced with the difficulties and 
financial needs outlined in paragraph 362, with the result that the technical solutions it 
proposes are at present partial and geographically highly circumscribed.438 
(364) The construction of an alternative telecommunications network and recourse to the 
local loop unbundling solution result in considerable delay and the initial tying-up of 
large sums of money. In these circumstances, this model, which alone makes it 
possible to break free from the technical and financial constraints, is being 
                                                
434  Online article dated 13 June 2002 (http://qualitysteam.fr/actualités/juin02/13-06-2002-1.html). 
435  Article in Les Echos entitled “Free propose un accès ADSL à 30 euros”, 23 September 2002. 
436  Article in La Tribune entitled “Le fournisseur d’accès Free tire la croissance d’Iliad”, 5 March 2003. 
437  Reply of 4 March 2003, paragraph 103 (file, p. 6883). 
438  At the end of 2002, LDCom offered more than […]* times fewer ADSL lines than France Télécom. 
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implemented only very gradually and, at the time of this Decision, very marginally.439 
The cost and time needed to set up an ADSL network comparable to that of France 
Télécom are such that they limit considerably the scope for competing service 
providers to propose an economic model that is more attractive to the consumer. They 
must therefore also be interpreted as barriers to entry. 
4. The rebuilding and increasing of Wanadoo Interactive's margins, evidence of the 
likely recoupment in the long run of the initial losses 
(365) Wanadoo Interactive confirmed in its October 2002 reply that as from 2003 its gross 
production margin on the eXtense package service will be more than €[…]* per month 
(giving a margin rate of […]*%), and that this margin shows an upward trend over 
time.440 Such a margin level would thus make it possible to recover customer 
acquisition costs for each new subscriber to the eXtense product in about a year. 
Overall, assuming - on the basis of the information supplied by Wanadoo - that the 
margin levels for the eXtense and Wanadoo ADSL services are maintained throughout 
2003 at €[…]* and €[…]* respectively, subscribers recruited up to 31 March 2003 
would alone generate a margin on recurring costs in excess of €[…]*,441 more than 
enough to cover the non-recurring costs linked to the acquisition of new customers,442 
and making a significant contribution towards recouping the losses of previous 
financial years. Although it is difficult to predict when the initial losses will have been 
recouped, it is likely that recoupment will occur within the space of a few financial 
years. 
(366) The level of the margins upon termination of the abuse as indicated by Wanadoo 
Interactive, and their maintenance or progression over time, are firm evidence of the 
company's probable ability to recoup its initial losses over a reasonable time horizon 
through rebuilt margins. 
5. Conclusion on the likelihood of loss recoupment 
(367) The Commission considers that there are indeed significant entry barriers and high 
entry costs to be paid for the acquisition of a critical size, even if these obstacles are 
not absolute in nature. Contrary to what Wanadoo Interactive maintains, entry (or re-
entry) into and the acquisition of a critical size on the relevant market are costly and 
time-consuming. These features create an environment conducive to the maintenance 
by Wanadoo Interactive of a position of very strong dominance and prevent the 
growth of competitors representing a danger to Wanadoo Interactive. The recoupment 
by Wanadoo Interactive of its initial losses is therefore a likely scenario. The predatory 
strategy introduced in 2000 appears pertinent in this context. 
                                                
439  As at 30 June 2002, there were estimated to be in France between 500 and 750 unbundled lines out of a 
total of more than 33 million telephone lines (See European Commission, “Eighth Report on the 
Implementation of the Telecommunications Regulatory Package”, Annex 3, p. 72). As at 1 February 
2003, there were approximately 10 400 unbundled lines in France (http://www.art-telecom.fr, heading 
entitled “actualité du dégroupage”). Even assuming that all of these lines carry ADSL, this figure is 
negligible (less than 1%) compared with the total ADSL subscriber base at that time. 
440  Paragraphs 327 and 338 of Wanadoo Interactive's reply of 23 October 2002 (file, pp. 6312 and 6313). 
441  This figure is little more than a guesstimate of the total margin generated during the year as there should 
be added to it that produced by customers recruited between now and the end of the financial year.  
442  It will be recalled that in 2002 Wanadoo Interactive spent some €[…]* on advertising, marketing and 
promotional activities related to its ADSL services. 
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5. Conclusion on the abuse 
(368) In view of the above, the Commission considers that the pricing of the eXtense and 
Wanadoo ADSL services at levels which did not make it possible to recover the 
variable costs from March to August 2001 or to recover the full costs from August 
2001 to October 2002, as part of a plan to preempt the high-speed Internet access 
market at an important stage in its development, constitutes an infringement of Article 
82 of the Treaty. 
E. REPERCUSSIONS OF THE ABUSE ON COMPETITION 
1. Effects on the market in 2001 and 2002 of the strategy followed by Wanadoo 
Interactive 
 (a) Evolution of market shares and growth rates 
(369) The first effect of Wanadoo Interactive's predatory strategy was to drive out of the 
market and cause the definitive disappearance in the first half of 2001 of the company 
which was at the time its most determined rival and most advanced competitor in 
rolling out ADSL services, Mangoosta. 
(370) More generally, the comparative growth in sales by the different players on the market 
in high-speed Internet access during 2001 and until the autumn of 2002, shown in 
Table 13, is a revealing indicator of the effect of Wanadoo Interactive's predatory 
pricing in containing and eliminating competition. 
Table 13: Weekly growth of Wanadoo Interactive and its competitors in terms of numbers of 
subscribers 
  S 1 2000 S 2 2000 Q 1 2001 Q 2 2001 Q 3 2001 Q 4 2001 Q 1 2002 Q 2 2002 Q 3 2002 
Wanadoo […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* 
Competing cable 
operators 
771 1 315 1 415 888 280 238 -68 838 375 
Competing ADSL 
providers 
63 131 470 591 299 666 2 847 2 296 1 240 
 
(371) Between January and December 2001, Wanadoo Interactive recruited over […]* new 
subscribers per week to its Wanadoo ADSL and eXtense services. The residential 
ADSL customer base of all its competitors put together grew at the rate of some […]* 
subscribers per week in the same year, while its competitors on the cable modem high-
speed segment for their part recruited fewer than […]* new subscribers per week 
during that period. Above all, the growth rate of the cable operators fell off markedly 
from the first quarter of 2001 onwards, just when Wanadoo Interactive's sales were 
speeding up. Wanadoo Interactive thus grew in 2001 at a weekly rate that was […]* 
times higher than all its competitors put together. The gap in sales growth rates 
widened in the third and fourth quarters of 2001, with Wanadoo Interactive expanding 
on the relevant market respectively […]* times faster than all its competitors put 
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together.443 Overall, Wanadoo Interactive absorbed [80-90]*% of the growth in the 
high-speed market during the whole of 2001. 
(372) During the first eight months of 2002, Wanadoo Interactive recruited more than […]* 
new subscribers per week, […]* times more than all its competitors put together. 
During that period, the cable operators continued to grow slowly; the competitors on 
the ADSL segment, while growing […]* times more slowly than Wanadoo 
Interactive, nevertheless managed to narrow the growth gap somewhat with the 
dominant provider, thanks to the very considerable commercial efforts they made 
during the Internet festival (February-March 2002) and above all the Competition 
Council's decision banning France Télécom from continuing to sell its subsidiary's 
eXtense packages through its sales outlets until July 2002. Overall, during this period 
Wanadoo continued to absorb more than [70-80]* % of market growth. 
(373) As will be seen from Table 14, the result of the distortions in growth rates brought 
about by Wanadoo Interactive's pricing policy was a very steep decline in the market 
shares of competing cable operators during the period covered by this Decision, and 
the maintenance of competitors in the ADSL segment at very low levels of market 
penetration. 
Table 14: High-speed subscriber bases and market shares of Wanadoo and competitors 
 31/12/2000 31/03/2001 30/06/2001 30/09/2001 31/12/2001 31/03/2002 30/06/2002 31/08/2002 
Wanadoo […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* 
 […]*% […]*% […]*% […]*% […]*% […]*% […]*% […]*% 
Competing cable 
operators 
92 602 110 997 122 536 126 173 129 263 128 381 139 275 144 155 
(together) […]*% […]*% […]*% […]*% […]*% […]*% […]*% […]*% 
Competing ADSL 
providers 
5 064 11 172 18 852 22 740 31 393 68 408 98 250 114 367 
(together) […]*% […]*% […]*% […]*% […]*% […]*% […]*% […]*% 
Total […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* 
 
(374) In September 2001 competitors' market shares in the ADSL segment were so small 
that Wanadoo Interactive at the time regarded the cable operators as its only genuine 
rivals on the market in high-speed Internet access.444 In the ADSL segment, it saw the 
“market at the end of 2001 [as] dominated by Wanadoo but not very active overall”.445 
                                                
443  The rate of growth of sales rose to more than […]* new subscribers per week in September and to more 
than […]* in October and November 2001 (see Annex 3). 
444  In the document drawn up by Wanadoo Interactive […]* (file, p. 4005). 
445  […]* (file, p. 3073). 
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(375) At the end of 2001, of a market in high-speed Internet access estimated by the 
Commission at 568 000 residential subscribers, Wanadoo Interactive held a [70-80]*% 
share, with its ADSL access alone serving [60-70]*% of the market. Wanadoo 
Interactive's share of the ADSL segment was [90-100]*%. The situation changed little 
during the first eight months of 2002: Wanadoo Interactive's share of the ADSL 
segment fell to [80-90]*%; overall, Wanadoo Interactive's ADSL products increased 
their share of the high-speed market from [60-70]*%, and if Câble Wanadoo is 
included the market share of the company as a whole remained stable at [70-80]*%. 
(376) Not only did Wanadoo Interactive's market share rise very sharply in 2001 and 
thereafter remain high, the competition also became more fragmented. Wanadoo 
Interactive considerably increased its lead over its first rival, from […]* to […]*. 
While at the end of 2001 the leading competitor still had a market share of over 15%, 
by August 2002 no competitor had more than 10% of the market. Except for T-Online 
France, with a market share of nearly 8% at that time, none of the competing ADSL 
providers then had more than a 2.5% share of the market. Two trends can therefore be 
observed on the market between the beginning of 2001 and the autumn of 2002: a 
steep rise in Wanadoo Interactive's market share and increasing fragmentation of the 
surviving competitors. 
(b) Interpretation of market trends 
(377) ADSL customer preference for Wanadoo Interactive's services cannot be ascribed to 
any intrinsic superiority of the latter. The ADSL access part of the services offered by 
competitors was strictly equivalent to that provided by Wanadoo Interactive (in the 
case of the eXtense package) or France Télécom (in the case of the Wanadoo ADSL 
service), since in fact it corresponded in all cases to the Netissimo 1 service until the 
autumn of 2002. Furthermore, for the Internet access part proper, Wanadoo 
Interactive's competitors were infinitely less well placed on the high-speed market 
than on the dial-up Internet access market, although the service provided is not 
technically different. 
(378) Wanadoo Interactive has ascribed the slow growth of its competitors up until autumn 
2002 to a passive, wait-and-see attitude, pointing in support of this argument to their 
advertising expenditure for low-speed services in 2001.446 The Commission considers, 
on the contrary, that the competitors' delay in rolling out their services in no way 
resulted from a failure to recognise the strategic importance of high-speed Internet 
access: they were simply waiting until France Télécom's wholesale prices and 
Wanadoo Interactive's retail prices were set at levels enabling competitors to draw up 
coherent business plans that would be acceptable to investors. AOL had as early as 
1999 begun testing the water with a view to providing an ADSL service but 
abandoned the plan on grounds of insufficient profitability. Liberty Surf, which 
subsequently became Tiscali France, had also begun in 2000 to put together an 
offering based on an indirect access service called ADSL Connect ATM447 but 
withdrew on account of the unsatisfactory level of wholesale prices, which it claimed 
created a margin squeeze. Easynet was for its part the first operator to sign up to the 
                                                
446  Reply dated 4 March 2003, paragraph 102 (file, p. 6883). 
447  Article in Le Journal du Net, 13.4.2000, entitled “Liberty Surf s'essaye à l'ADSL”. 
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IP/ADSL service.448 Nerim launched its offering at the beginning of autumn 1999,449 
at the same time as Club Internet.450 It therefore cannot be argued that Wanadoo 
Interactive's competitors did not recognise what was at stake in high-speed services 
from the outset. 
(379) Wanadoo Interactive's competitors in the ADSL high-speed Internet access segment 
confirmed that they were unable to align their prices on those charged by Wanadoo 
Interactive, given the costs involved, without incurring heavy losses. The price 
decisions taken by France Télécom in August 2001 led to an improvement in the 
situation. But the evidence collected by the Commission and the cost and price 
simulations submitted by the Internet service providers concerned demonstrate that, 
even after that date, aligning prices on those charged by Wanadoo Interactive was 
liable to generate losses.451 
(380) The gradual emergence of different offerings from spring 2001, and above all autumn 
2001, onwards reflects in most cases a strategy of mere passive presence on the 
market, the aim for the service providers concerned being to respond to spontaneous 
demand and upgrade their existing customers who were already subscribing to low-
speed services, without canvassing for and recruiting new customers. During the 
hearing held on 18 March 2002, the service providers AOL France and Tiscali France 
agreed that their strategy fitted that description. […]*, Wanadoo Interactive referred 
[…]*.452 […]*,453 […]*. 
(381) Wanadoo Interactive's pricing practices in fact forced its actual or potential 
competitors in the ADSL segment to choose between the following options: 
– to align their prices on those of the dominant provider (or charge slightly less) 
and incur losses; 
                                                
448  Statement made by the representative of Easynet France at the hearing held on 18 March 2002. 
449  Article in Le Journal du Net, 5.10.1999, entitled “Nerim.net mise tout sur l'ADSL”. 
450  Article in Le Journal du Net, 22.10.1999, entitled “Une offre ADSL à 440 F tout compris pour Club 
Internet”. 
451  In a letter to the Commission dated 26 October 2001, Easynet states: “Before the IP/ADSL charges … 
and the IP/ADSL routing fees and technical conditions changed … it was totally impossible for us to 
offer an ADSL package at the market price (reference: Wanadoo's eXtense package at FRF 298 taxes 
included) under viable economic conditions. We sold only the IP service at FRF 120 per month taxes 
included. The new price conditions … enabled us in late September to offer the ADSL Easyconnect 
package at near to market conditions (although for more than Wanadoo's package)” [emphasis added]. 
The Easyconnect subscription fee was FRF 327.98 per month taxes included (i.e. 10% more than the 
eXtense subscription), the starter pack being sold for FRF 1 402.54 taxes included, “much more than 
the eXtense starter pack, selling at FRF 999 taxes included since January 2001”. In another letter dated 
5 November 2001, Easynet states that it had to charge FRF 327.98 per month in order to break even. 
Furthermore, in the tables of figures transmitted to the Commission on 7 September 2001 (the precise 
content of which is a business secret), Liberty Surf tried to demonstrate that an Internet service provider 
could not break even when charging the same retail price as Wanadoo Interactive, even after the entry 
into force of the summer 2001 price decisions. The Commission has received other evidence predating 
the pricing decisions taken by France Télécom in July 2001 which stress the still more unfavourable 
conditions prevailing at that time. 
452  […]* (file, pp. 4165 and 4167). 
453  Ibid. 
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– or to continue to charge higher prices and risk being driven completely out of 
the market;454 
– or to refrain from penetrating the market or a particular market segment, or 
enter it passively, minimising certain strategic items of expenditure such as the 
costs of customer acquisition, in particular advertising,455 and adopting 
minimal quantitative sales targets.456 
(382) The objective of the Internet service providers who took the first option was to gain or 
retain some visibility on an emerging market, without actively marketing the products 
concerned,457 so as to avoid incurring excessive losses, since those service providers 
often did not have the scope for cross-subsidisation between business areas that the 
Wanadoo group had. Their aim was to respond to spontaneous demand from their 
existing customers, not genuinely to stimulate demand. 
(383) The competitors that took the second or third options gave preference to financial 
security at the expense of their market presence.458 
(384) Certain operators combined different options or switched between them over time. The 
example of Mangoosta is instructive here. Mangoosta was an independent service 
provider seeking considerable expansion nationwide on the residential high-speed 
Internet market. Initially, in late 2000, it launched its products on a slightly higher 
price base than Wanadoo Interactive,459 with some commercial success. To stem the 
resulting losses, Mangoosta finally raised its prices by nearly 20% in late winter 
2000-2001,460 but this did not prevent it being placed under administration on 2 
August 2001. Mangoosta's insolvency is a typical example of how a new entrant is 
driven out of the market by predatory pricing, where the new entrant, after having for 
a time set its prices at below costs, then adopts a more restrictive commercial policy 
and ends up being completely marginalised.461 
(385) The growth strategy pursued by Wanadoo Interactive in 2001 and 2002, far from being 
based on competition on merit, involved on the contrary putting the financial strength 
of its competitors to the test. The effect of Wanadoo Interactive's pricing policy was 
thus to bring about a steep decline in its leading competitor's market share and prevent 
all its other competitors expanding, or even bar them completely from the market in 
                                                
454  Price is an important criterion in the choice made by residential customers. According to a survey […]*. 
455  According to the […]* survey […]* and cited in footnote 454, […]*. 
456  Service providers are able to gear their advertising and promotion efforts to their quantitative targets in 
terms of the recruitment of new customers. 
457  For example, by concentrating efforts on the Île-de-France region and making only limited advertising 
investments. 
458  The need for financial security and minimum profitability is a key concern for Internet service providers 
that do not have the backing of a group capable of absorbing losses. In a letter to the Commission dated 
29 June 2001, an independent ADSL service provider thus stressed that the low retail prices imposed by 
Wanadoo Interactive caused “absolutely enormous … harm … in terms of the ability to mobilise 
investors in this business”. 
459  Charging a monthly subscription fee of FRF 330 taxes included for a bundled offering combining 
ADSL access and the Yahoo service. 
460  Mangoosta's monthly subscription fee was raised from FRF 330 to FRF 390 taxes included on 19 
March 2001. 
461  Bolton et al., “Predatory Pricing: strategic theory and legal policy”. 
 EN    EN 
high-speed Internet access for residential customers until October 2002.462 The fact 
that, during the period while the abuse lasted, some of the surviving competitors 
increased their market share slightly does not mean that no abuse within the meaning 
of Article 82 of the Treaty existed or that it had no effects since, in the absence of the 
behaviour imputed to Wanadoo Interactive, the market shares of those competitors 
could have grown more significantly.463 
2. Effects at the end of the abuse and in the medium term 
(386) In its arguments, Wanadoo Interactive stressed the great vitality of the market in high-
speed Internet access from September 2002 onwards. The Commission in no way 
disputes the fact that competitive conditions were restored after the entry into force on 
15 October 2002 of the new charges for France Télécom's access464 and routing465 
services, which had been presented as a remedy at the meeting of 19 March 2002.466 
On the contrary, the different pricing decisions taken by France Télécom both in the 
wake of these proceedings and in response to the opinion of 16 April 2002 issued by 
the ART Authority have had the effect not only of evening out the prices for the 
different technical solutions for implementing ADSL, including via local loop 
unbundling,467 but also of very significantly reducing the cost of retail supply. 
Consequently, combining the IP/ADSL access and routing services that go to make up 
option 5 enables ISPs to provide a service based on an economically viable model, and 
there is also a wider range of access solutions which offer a realistic alternative to 
option 5. On peut donc estimer que la prise d’effet de ces différentes mesures tarifaires 
le 15 octobre 2002 a conduit à un déverrouillage du segment de l’accès à haut débit 
par la technologie ADSL. 
(387) In the last four months of 2002, when its competitors were making unprecedented 
promotional and commercial efforts, Wanadoo Interactive continued to absorb [50-
60]*% of growth in the high-speed market, the balance being shared between ten or so 
competitors. During that period, Wanadoo Interactive in no way slackened its 
marketing efforts, stepping up the rate of sales and deciding, following the example of 
several competitors, to distribute modems free of charge from October 2002 onwards. 
Club Internet/T-Online France did not at the end of this period represent the major 
threat claimed by Wanadoo Interactive.468 By the end of 2002, Wanadoo Interactive's 
                                                
462  It should also be pointed out that, according to the survey […]*, […]*% of eXtense customers were 
former subscribers to low-speed Internet services operated by other providers (as against […]*% who 
were former subscribers to Wanadoo's low-speed services). It thus appears that the eXtense package 
also affects the market in low-speed Internet access and can shift the balances on that market. 
463  Judgment in Compagnie maritime belge, paragraph 149. 
464  The new IP/ADSL access charges are […]* % lower than those applied previously. 
465  The new routing charges have since 15 October 2002 been on average 45% lower than before. They 
also decrease much less with traffic volume, so that small providers now suffer only a small cost 
handicap. 
466  See section I.H.1. 
467  France Télécom nevertheless brought an appeal before the French supreme administrative court in June 
2002 (application No 247.866) against all aspects of the ART's decision of 16 April 2002 relating to the 
charges for partial and total unbundling and submitted its complete certified statement to the Council of 
State on 16 December 2002. The current charges for local loop unbundling are therefore pending on the 
decision of the administrative court, which creates a climate of uncertainty. 
468  In its reply dated 23 October 2002, paragraph 16, Wanadoo Interactive claimed that T-Online France's 
penetration target was to gain a […]*% share of the high-speed market in 2003. But the press article 
from which Wanadoo Interactive selectively quoted (file, p. 6246) merely stated that T-Online France 
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market share had declined to [60-70]*% but, despite very great commercial efforts, 
none of its competitors had managed to acquire more than a 9% market share. In the 
first quarter of 2003, competitors stepped up their commercial efforts on the occasion 
of the Internet festival. At 31 March 2003 Wanadoo Interactive's market share stood at 
some [60-70]*%. A single competitor had succeeded in gaining a market share slightly 
exceeding 10%. Despite the breakthrough achieved by this player, whose subscriber 
base was still more than four times smaller than that of Wanadoo Interactive, 
competition was fragmented. Over the period between August 2002 and March 2003, 
Wanadoo Interactive still absorbed [40-50]*% of market growth, placing it well ahead 
of its leading rival. 
(388) It is difficult to speculate on how market shares will evolve in the medium term on the 
basis of the trends observed during the months immediately following the abuse. 
However, even adopting extremely conservative growth assumptions for Wanadoo 
Interactive and optimistic assumptions for its immediate rivals, the chances of 
competitors catching up with Wanadoo Interactive appear to be practically nil, since 
no other company is recruiting new subscribers at a faster rate than the dominant 
company.469 
(389) The most likely scenario is that Wanadoo Interactive will retain a market share 
persistently close to [50-60]*%. Consequently, although in the medium term the 
growth of competitors may lead to some erosion in Wanadoo Interactive's market 
shares in high-speed Internet access, it is quite possible that competitors will never be 
able to catch up and that Wanadoo Interactive's market power has been sustainably 
established thanks to the head start it gained during the existence of the abuse. 
Nevertheless, given the growth potential of this market in the years ahead, it is likely 
that the effects of the strategy pursued by Wanadoo until the end of 2002 will not be 
irreversible. On the one hand, the majority of the subscribers recruited by Wanadoo 
during the period at issue will probably remain loyal to that provider in the long term; 
on the other hand, it is likely that new subscribers will be distributed more evenly 
between the different providers, on condition that Wanadoo Interactive does not repeat 
its previous behaviour of below-cost selling. 
(390) Wanadoo Interactive also argued that it ultimately mattered little whether its 
competitors would one day grow sufficiently to draw level with it, but what was 
important was to determine whether they were able to exercise competitive constraint 
on its behaviour. 
(391) In terms of the principles at stake, Wanadoo Interactive's argument cannot be endorsed 
as it would run counter to the objective of undistorted competition enshrined in Article 
3(g) of the Treaty. Furthermore, irrespective of any consideration to do with protecting 
the interests of undertakings established in the common market, the Commission takes 
                                                                                                                                                   
expected that by the end of 2003 high-speed Internet access would account for 35% of Internet access 
as a whole, without making any reference to its own penetration targets. The quotation used by 
Wanadoo Interactive is therefore invalid. 
469  If the growth trends (both overall and for each provider) observed over the period between September 
2002 and March 2003 were to continue until the end of 2004, and ruling out the eventuality of any 
amalgamation of competitors, Wanadoo Interactive would then have a market share of around [40-
50]*%, more than […]* that of its leading competitor, with none of the other players having a market 
share of more than 9%. 
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the view that it is by no means neutral from the standpoint of collective welfare 
whether competitors are ever able to catch up with Wanadoo Interactive's market 
share, all the more so because the effects of the latter's position on the relevant market 
spill over onto related markets and revenues, such as on-line advertising, the sale of 
pay content and electronic commerce. 
F. EFFECTS ON TRADE BETWEEN MEMBER STATES 
(392) The effect of Wanadoo Interactive's predatory pricing policy was to make it difficult, 
if not impossible, to penetrate the market in high-speed Internet service provision for 
residential customers. Under these circumstances, it was difficult for Internet service 
providers established in other Member States to carry on high-speed Internet business 
in France without incurring heavy losses. In addition, the conditions in which this 
market had developed favoured Wanadoo Interactive on related markets linked to 
advertising and electronic commerce. Wanadoo Interactive's behaviour had 
repercussions on the structure of competition in the common market.470 Trade between 
Member States may thus have been affected.471 
G. ARTICLE 3 OF REGULATION NO 17 
(393) Under Article 3 of Regulation No 17, where the Commission finds, upon application 
or on its own initiative, that there is an infringement of Article 82 of the Treaty, it may 
by decision require the undertakings concerned to bring such infringement to an end. 
(394) Although some evidence suggests that the relevant products have been sold at above 
costs since October 2002, it is the Commission's duty to take every step to ensure that 
Wanadoo Interactive has genuinely and permanently put an end to its predatory policy 
on the market in high-speed Internet access and that it will in future refrain from 
repeating such behaviour.472 
(395) It should be borne in mind here that in late March 2002, when Wanadoo Interactive 
was aware that it was the subject of proceedings initiated by the Commission in the 
previous December on account of predatory pricing practices, a scenario based on a 
return to below-cost pricing was being considered within its […]* department.473 This 
scenario involved […]*,474 […]*475 […]*.476 A resumption of such below-cost selling 
behaviour by Wanadoo Interactive would have the effect of seriously jeopardising the 
                                                
470  United Brands, paragraph 201; Case 22/79 Greenwich Film Production v SACEM [1979] ECR 3275, 
paragraph 11. 
471  See Court of Justice in Case 56/65 Société Technique Minière v Maschinenbau Ulm [1966] ECR 281, in 
particular at p. 303; Joined Cases C-215/96 and C-216/96 Carlo Bagnasco and Others [1999] ECR I-
135, paragraph 47; Case C-35/99 Arduino [2002] ECR I-1529, paragraph 33; Case C-309/99 Wouters 
[2002] ECR I-1577, paragraph 95 with other references. See also Court of First Instance in Case T-
143/89 Ferriere Nord SpA v Commission [1995] ECR II-917, paragraph 20. 
472  Court of Justice in Case 7/82 GVL v Commission [1983] ECR 502, paragraph 24 et seq.; Court of First 
Instance in Case T-62/98 Volkswagen v Commission [2000] ECR II-2707, paragraph 199. 
473  […]* (file, p. 3534 et seq.). 
474  […]*. 
475  […]*. 
476  […]*. 
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improvement in the competitive situation observed in the autumn of 2002, when the 
abuse stopped. Under these circumstances, the Commission considers it appropriate to 
adopt a decision.477 
G. ARTICLE 15 OF REGULATION NO 17 
(396) Under Article 15(2) of Regulation No 17, the Commission may by decision impose 
fines not exceeding 10% of turnover in the preceding business year where an 
undertaking has either intentionally or negligently infringed Article 82 of the Treaty. 
(397) The extent to which Wanadoo Interactive was aware of the costs incurred, as shown 
among other things by the business plans for the services in question, is sufficient 
proof that it was fully conscious of the effects its prices would have on its short-term 
profitability, in view of the scale of its capture strategy. The company's internal 
documents also show that it was not unaware of the legal risks involved in below-cost 
selling. The company consequently knew that its behaviour could have the effect of 
distorting competition in the common market. The infringement was therefore 
committed intentionally.478 In determining the amount of the fine, the Commission 
must take account of the gravity and duration of the infringement, in accordance with 
Article 15(2) of Regulation No 17, and of any aggravating or mitigating 
circumstances, as provided in the guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed 
pursuant to Article 15(2) of Regulation No 17 and Article 65(5) of the ECSC Treaty 
(“the guidelines”).479 
1. Gravity of the infringement 
(398) The assessment of the gravity of the infringement must take into account the nature of 
the abuse, its actual impact and the extent of the relevant geographic market. 
1. Nature f the infringement 
(399) In determining the gravity of the infringement, the Commission will take into 
consideration the fact that the infringement was deliberately aimed at preempting a 
booming market which is playing a key role in the advent of the information society. 
Both the Court of Justice and the Commission have repeatedly found against predatory 
pricing, i.e. below-cost selling by a dominant company. 
2. Impact on the market 
(400) Wanadoo Interactive's share of the market in high-speed Internet access for residential 
customers grew from [40-50]*% to [70-80]*% during the period in question. One 
competitor was eliminated, the market shares of several competitors fell very steeply, 
and those of the other surviving competitors grew very slowly or stagnated at an 
insignificant level.480 Although it is not proven that the developments observed on the 
                                                
477  See the Commission’s Deutsche Post Decision, paragraph 48. 
478  Court of Justice in Case C-279/87 Tipp-Ex v Commission [1990] ECR I-261; BPB Industries and 
British Gypsum Ltd v Commission, paragraph 165. 
479  OJ C 9, 14.1.1998, p. 3. 
480  See section I.E. 
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market can be ascribed exclusively to Wanadoo Interactive's behaviour, the latter's 
predatory pricing policy has undoubtedly had adverse repercussions on competition. 
(401) The impact of the infringement is reinforced by its timing, coinciding with a period of 
strong market demand for high-speed Internet access. The first high-speed access 
services by cable modem became available in France in the course of 1997, but 
conditions on the retail market were radically affected by the commercial introduction 
in late 1999 of ADSL high-speed access solutions. The infringement coincided with 
the boom in ADSL in France and a period in which alternative telecom operators were 
endeavouring, by means of local loop unbundling, to implement technical solutions 
that were substitutable for France Télécom's access network.481 The infringement has 
radically reshaped the market structure. 
3. Extent of the relevant geographic market 
(402) The anticompetitive effects of the behaviour under examination extended over the 
entire territory of one Member State, France. 
4. Conclusion on the gravity of the infringement 
(403) The behaviour under examination constitutes an infringement with a distinct 
anticompetitive dimension in a sector that is regarded as playing a strategic role in the 
development of the information society. It is the reflection of a plan to preempt a new 
market with strong potential, occurring at a key stage in its development. By its very 
nature and by the impact it has had on the market of an entire Member State, the 
conduct in question constitutes a serious infringement. 
(404) In view of the foregoing, the basic amount of the fine, determined according to the 
gravity of the infringement, should be set at €9 million. 
2. Duration of the infringement 
(405) Wanadoo Interactive takes the view that the infringement, in so far as there was any 
infringement, began in late March 2001, when mass marketing of eXtense was 
launched, and ended in August 2001, after which the company only just covered its 
variable costs adjusted according to the Commission method. Wanadoo thus argues 
that the period of below-cost selling did not exceed four months and was consequently 
too short to have had appreciable effects on the market structure. 
(406) The Commission would begin by pointing out that 2001 was preceded by a period of 
over a year in which Wanadoo Interactive sold its Wanadoo ADSL service at a loss. 
Moreover, from January and February 2001, Wanadoo Interactive embarked on a 
growth path for its high-speed subscriber base which was around twice as fast as its 
growth rate in 2000. The mere announcement of the roll-out of the eXtense package 
had immediate effects on the market, in particular on orders received by Mangoosta.482 
                                                
481  Parliament and Council Regulation (EC) No 2887/2000 of 18 December 2000 on unbundled access to 
the local loop (OJ L 336, 30.12.2000, p. 4) entered into force on 1 January 2001 in France as in the 
other Member States. 
482  See the presentation by the representative of Mangoosta's official receiver at the hearing of 18 March 
2002 tracking the impact of roll-out of the eXtense service on the customer contact and order 
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Although such sales, particularly after January 2001, displayed some features of 
abusive behaviour, the Commission does not consider it appropriate to find that they 
constituted an infringement, in view of the characteristics of the market during the 
period in question.483 The infringement is therefore found to have begun on 1 March 
2001. 
(407) Given the intention to preempt the market, which took the form of a strategy for 
driving out competitors, the Commission considers itself bound to apply a variable 
cost recovery test prior to August 2001 and a full cost recovery test after August 2001, 
in line with the relevant case-law. Under such tests the abuse came to an end on 15 
October 2002, when the remedy presented by France Télécom in March 2002 came 
into effect. 
(408) The Commission therefore finds that the infringement lasted nineteen and a half 
months. It is therefore an infringement of medium duration. In accordance with the 
guidelines, the Commission considers it appropriate to increase the fine by 15% for the 
period between March and October 2002. 
(409) It follows that the basic amount of the fine should be €10.35 million. 
3. Aggravating or mitigating circumstances 
(410) Wanadoo Interactive called for no fine to be imposed on the ground that the cost 
standard applied departed from the precedents established by Community case-law. 
The Commission cannot accept this argument. The method used by the Commission is 
not new: it is based on the rule established by the judgment in Akzo. In applying the 
Akzo tests the Commission has simply spread the costs of customer acquisition over a 
period similar to the average customer lifetime. This is an adaptation to the 
circumstances of the case which is in fact favourable to Wanadoo Interactive, in 
comparison with the conclusions that would have been reached by means of a pure 
accountancy-based analysis, more in line with the approach taken in previous 
decisions.484 
(411) Neither can the extent of the wholesale price adjustments made by France Télécom in 
summer 2002 be regarded as a mitigating circumstance. The scale of the effort made 
by France Télécom in respect of its wholesale charges is attributable to the combined 
action of the regulatory and competition authorities at national and Community level, 
not to any spontaneous change of policy on its part. France Télécom has furthermore 
challenged before the national courts the new unbundling charges, which make a 
significant contribution to restoring healthy competitive conditions. 
                                                                                                                                                   
withdrawal rates registered by Mangoosta between week 44 of 2000 and week 11 of 2001 (file, pp. 
1493 and 1494). Mangoosta's representative described the impact which the mere announcement of the 
eXtense package launch had on its expansion plan. Over and above its commercial effects, reflected in 
an immediate drop in orders received by Mangoosta, the implementation of Wanadoo Interactive's 
commercial strategy was claimed to have caused negotiations between the company and its creditors to 
be broken off, thereby seriously undermining its viability. 
483  In 2000 the market consisted of less than 200 000 subscribers and was growing relatively slowly. 
Furthermore, it was only after March 2001 that Wanadoo Interactive left Noos well behind by launching 
its national marketing campaign for the eXtense package. 
484  See section I.F.1. 
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(412) Wanadoo Interactive lastly sought to rely on its openness and full cooperation in the 
course of these proceedings as mitigating circumstances. The Commission notes, 
however, that the company merely complied in a normal manner with its obligations 
under Regulation No 17 with regard to the provision of information to the 
Commission. 
(413) The Commission therefore considers that there are no aggravating or mitigating 
circumstances in this case. 
(414) In conclusion, the amount of the fine to be imposed in accordance with Article 
15(2)(a) of Regulation No 17 should be set at €10.35 million, 
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION: 
Article 1 
From March 2001 to October 2002, Wanadoo Interactive infringed Article 82 of the EC 
Treaty by charging for its eXtense and Wanadoo ADSL services predatory prices that did not 
enable it to cover its variable costs until August 2001 or to cover its full costs from August 
2001 onwards, as part of a plan to preempt the market in high-speed Internet access during a 
key phase in its development. 
Article 2 
Wanadoo Interactive shall immediately bring to an end the infringement referred to in Article 
1, in so far as it has not already done so. It shall, in the context of the ADSL services referred 
to in Article 1, refrain from any behaviour having an object or effect identical or similar to 
that of the infringement. 
Article 3 
Wanadoo Interactive shall forward to the Commission, at the end of each year up to and 
including 2006, the revenue account for its different ADSL services, showing its accrued 
income, operating costs and customer acquisition costs. 
Article 4 
A fine of €10.35 million is hereby imposed on Wanadoo Interactive for the infringement 
referred to in Article 1. 
The fine shall be paid in euros, within three months of the date of receipt of notification of 
this Decision, to the following bank account: Account No 001-3953713-69 (IBAN Code: BE 
71 0013 9537 1369; SWIFT Code: GEBABEBB) of the European Commission at Fortis 
Banque/Fortis Bank, Rue Montagne du Parc/Warandeberg 3, 1000 Brussels. 
After expiry of that period, interest shall become automatically payable at the rate applied by 
the European Central Bank to its main refinancing operations on the first day of the month in 
which this Decision was adopted, plus 3.5 percentage points, namely 5.6%. 
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Article 5 
This Decision is addressed to Wanadoo Interactive, 48 rue Camille Desmoulins, F-92791 Issy 
les Moulineaux Cedex. 
 
This Decision shall be enforceable pursuant to Article 256 of the EC Treaty. 
 
Done at Brussels, […] 
 For the Commission 
 […] 
 Member of the Commission 
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ANNEX 1 - Adjusted variable costs of the eXtense service: recovery from 8 January to 31 July 2001 
(actual) 
Cost items Amount (FRF)
Routing of national and regional traffic […]* This figure includes the € […]*
Cost of IP ADSL 1 […]*
Refunds […]* […]* […]*
Cost of international connectivity […]*
Cost of customer management […]*
Total monthly recurrent variable costs […]*
Remuneration of sales outlets […]* Based on the assumption of  […]* % of new subscribers and […]* % of migrants
Setting-up costs […]*
Cost of eXtense package […]* Average weighted cost for January-June and for July
Advertising […]*
Direct customer-acquisition costs […]*
Monthly revenue
Retail price of eXtense package before tax 249
Audience and advertising revenue […]*
Total monthly revenue […]*
Assumed amortisation of non-recurrent costs over four years
Total monthly recurrent variable costs […]*
Margin on recurrent variable costs […]*
Total monthly variable costs […]*
Margin on total variable costs […]*
Recovery of recurrent variable costs from monthly 
revenue
[…]*
Recovery of variable costs from monthly revenue […]*
ANNEX 2 - Adjusted variable costs of Wanadoo ADSL : recovery from 1 January 31 July 2001 (actual)
Cost items Amount (FRF)
Routing of national and regional traffic […]* This figure includes […]*
Cost of international connectivity […]*
Refunds […]* […]* Figure indicated by Wanadoo Interactive on 4 April 2002
Cost of customer management […]* Reply of 4 March 2002, annex 1, p. 8
Total recurrent variable costs […]*
Remuneration of sales outlets […]*
Cost of kits […]*
Advertising […]*
Direct customer-acquisition costs […]*
Average monthly revenue
Retail price of Wanadoo ADSL 113
Audience and advertising revenue […]*
Total monthly revenue […]*
Assumed amortisation of non-recurrent costs over four years
Total monthly recurrent variable costs […]*
Margin on recurrent variable costs […]*
Total monthly variable costs […]*
Margin on total variable costs […]*
Recovery of recurrent variable costs from monthly 
revenue
[…]*
Recovery of variable costs from monthly revenue […]*
ANNEX 3 - Adjusted variable costs of the eXtense service: recovery from 1 August to 15 October 2001 
(actual)
3.1. ALL SUBSCRIBERS
Cost items Amount (€) Amount (FRF)
Routing of national and regional traffic […]* […]* See calculation in Annex 17
Cost of IP/ADSL 1 […]* […]*
Cost of international connectivity […]* […]* Assumed consumption of  […]* flow invoiced for routing
Refunds […]* […]* […]* Use of Wanadoo's assumption
Cost of customer management […]* […]*
Total recurrent variable costs […]* […]*
Remuneration of sales outlets […]* […]* The proportion of migrants over the period is […]*%
Setting-up costs […]* […]*
Cost of the eXtense package […]* […]* Weighted average
Advertising […]* […]*
Direct customer-acquisition costs […]* […]*
Monthly revenue
Monthly unit revenue from eXtense before tax […]* […]* Taking account of turnover losses (cf. Annex 16)
Audience and advertising revenue […]* […]*
Total monthly revenue […]* […]*
Assumed amortisation of non-recurrent costs over four years
Total monthly recurrent variable costs […]* […]*
Margin on recurrent variable costs […]* […]*
Total monthly variable costs […]* […]*
Margin on total variable costs […]* […]*
Recovery of recurrent variable costs from 
monthly revenue
[…]* […]*
Recovery of variable costs from monthly 
revenue
[…]* […]*
3.2. ONLY SUBSCRIBERS ACQUIRED SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE PERIOD
Cost items Amount (€) Amount (FRF)
Routing of national or regional traffic […]* […]*
Cost of IP/ADSL 1 […]* […]*
Cost of international connectivity […]* […]*
Refunds […]* […]* […]*
Cost of customer management […]* […]*
Total recurrent variable costs […]* […]*
Remuneration of sales outlets […]* […]*
Setting-up costs […]* […]*
Cost of the eXtense package […]* […]* Reply of 23 October 2002
Promotions […]* […]*
Advertising […]* […]*
Direct customer-acquisition costs […]* […]*
Monthly revenue
Monthly unit revenue from eXtense before tax […]* […]* Taking account of turnover losses (cf. Annex 16)
Audience and advertising revenue […]* […]*
Total monthly revenue […]* […]*
Assumed amortisation of non-recurrent costs over four years
Total monthly variable costs […]* […]*
Margin on total variable costs […]* […]*
Recovery of recurrent variable costs from 
monthly revenue
[…]* […]*
Recovery of variable costs from monthly 
revenue
[…]* […]*
Figure supplied by Wanadoo at the meeting of 4 April 2002
ANNEX 4 - Adjusted variable costs of Wanadoo ADSL : recovery from 1 August to 15 October 2001 (actual)
4.1. ALL SUBSCRIBERS
Cost items Amount (€) Amount (FRF)
Routing of national and regional traffic […]* […]* See calculation in Annex 17
Cost of international connectivity […]* […]* Assumed consumption of  […]* flow invoiced for routing
Refunds […]* […]* […]*
Cost of customer management […]* […]*
Total recurrent variable costs […]* […]*
Remuneration of sales outlets […]* […]* Wanadoo presentation to the Commission of 4 April 2002
Costs of kits and packages […]* […]* Weighted average since the beginning of 2001
Advertising […]* […]*
Direct customer-acquisition costs […]* […]*
Average monthly revenue
Monthly unit revenue Wanadoo ADSL […]* […]* Taking account of turnover losses (cf. Annex 16)
Audience and advertising revenue […]* […]*
Total monthly revenue […]* […]*
Recovery of recurrent costs from recurrent 
receipts […]* […]*
Assumed amortisation of non-recurrent costs over four years
Total monthly recurrent variable costs […]* […]*
Margin on total recurrent variable costs […]* […]*
Total monthly variable costs […]* […]*
Margin on total variable costs […]* […]*
Recovery of recurrent variable costs from 
monthly revenue
[…]* […]*
Recovery of  variable costs from monthly 
revenue
[…]* […]*
4.2 ONLY SUBSCRIBERS ACQUIRED SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE PERIOD
Cost items Amount (€) Amount (FRF)
Total recurrent variable costs […]* […]*
Remuneration of sales outlets […]* […]*
Costs of kits and packages […]* […]*
Advertising […]* […]*
Direct customer-acquisition costs […]* […]*
Average monthly revenue
Monthly unit revenue Wanadoo ADSL […]* […]*
Audience and advertising revenue […]* […]*
Total monthly revenue […]* […]*
Assumed amortisation of non-recurrent costs over four years
Total monthly recurrent variable costs […]* […]*
Margin on total recurrent variable costs […]* […]*
Total monthly variable costs […]* […]*
Margin on total variable costs […]* […]*
Recovery of recurrent variable costs from 
monthly revenue
[…]* […]*
Recovery of  variable costs from monthly 
revenue
[…]* […]*
ANNEX 5 - Adjusted variable costs of the eXtense service : recovery from 15 October 2001 to 15 February 
2002 (actual)
5.1. ALL SUBSCRIBERS
Cost items € FRF
Routing of national and regional traffic […]* […]* See Annex 17
Cost of IP/ADSL 1 […]* […]*
Cost of international connectivity […]* […]* International bandwidth of  […]* kbit/s
Refunds […]* […]* […]*
Cost of customer management […]* […]*
Total recurrent variable costs […]* […]*
Remuneration of sales outlets […]* […]*
Setting-up costs […]* […]* Weighted average taking account of the fact that the service was
free of charge from 15/10
Refund and gift voucher […]* […]* Promotions allocated across all subscribers at 15/2/02 
Cost of the eXtense package […]* […]* Weighted average cost of the package since the beginning of 2001
Advertising […]* […]* Amount indicated in Wanadoo's reply of 18/4/2002
Direct customer-acquisition costs […]* […]*
Monthly revenue
Monthly unit revenue from eXtense before tax […]* […]* Taking account of turnover losses (cf. Annex 16)
Audience and advertising revenue […]* […]*
Total monthly revenue […]* […]*
Recovery of recurrent costs from recurrent 
receipts […]* […]*
Assumed amortisation of non-recurrent costs over four years
Total monthly recurrent variable costs […]* […]*
Margin on total recurrent variable costs […]* […]*
Total monthly variable costs […]* […]*
Margin on total variable costs […]* […]*
Recovery of recurrent variable costs from 
monthly revenue […]* […]*
Recovery of  variable costs from monthly 
revenue […]* […]*
5.2. ONLY SUBSCRIBERS ACQUIRED SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE PERIOD
Cost items Amount (€) Amount (FRF)
Total recurrent variable costs […]* […]*
Remuneration of sales outlets […]* […]*
Setting-up costs […]* […]* Access to service free of charge between 15/10 and 15/2
Refund and gift voucher […]* […]* Cost for new subscribers
Cost of the eXtense package […]* […]* Weighting October-December 01/January-February 02
Advertising […]* […]*
Direct customer-acquisition costs […]* […]*
Monthly revenue
Monthly unit revenue from eXtense before tax […]* […]* Taking account of turnover losses (cf. Annex 16)
Audience and advertising revenue […]* […]*
Total monthly revenue […]* […]*
Assumed amortisation of non-recurrent costs over four years
Total monthly variable costs […]* […]*
Margin on total variable costs […]* […]*
Recovery of recurrent variable costs from 
monthly revenue
[…]* […]*
Recovery of  variable costs from monthly 
revenue
[…]* […]*
ANNEX 6 - Adjusted variable costs of Wanadoo ADSL : recovery from 15 October 2001 to 15 February 
2002 (actual)
6.1. ALL SUBSCRIBERS 
Cost items Amount (€) Amount (FRF)
Routing of national and regional traffic […]* […]* See Annex 17
Cost of international connectivity […]* […]* Assumed international bandwidth of  […]* kbit/s
Refunds […]* […]* […]*
Cost of customer management […]* […]*
Total recurrent variable costs […]* […]*
Remuneration of sales outlets […]* […]*
Cost of kits and packages […]* […]* Weighted average since the beginning of 2001
Advertising […]* […]*
Direct customer-acquisition costs […]* […]*
Average monthly revenue
Monthly unit revenue from Wanadoo ADSL […]* […]*
Audience and advertising revenue […]* […]*
Total monthly revenue […]* […]*
Recovery of recurrent costs from recurrent 
receipts […]* […]*
Assumed amortisation of non-recurrent costs over four years
Total monthly recurrent variable costs […]* […]*
Margin on recurrent variable costs […]* […]*
Total monthly variable costs […]* […]*
Margin on total variable costs […]* […]*
Recovery of recurrent variable costs from 
monthly revenue
[…]* […]*
Recovery of variable costs from monthly 
revenue
[…]* […]*
6.2. ONLY SUBSCRIBERS ACQUIRED SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE PERIOD
Cost items Amount (€) Amount (FRF)
Routing of national or regional traffic […]* […]*
Cost of international collectivity […]* […]*
Refunds […]* […]* […]*
Cost of customer management […]* […]*
Total recurrent variable costs […]* […]*
Remuneration of sales outlets […]* […]*
Cost of kits and packages […]* […]* Weighted average since October 2001
Advertising […]* […]*
Direct customer-acquisition costs […]* […]*
Average monthly revenue
Monthly unit revenue from Wanadoo ADSL […]* […]* Taking account of turnover losses (cf. Annex 16)
Audience and advertising revenue […]* […]*
Total monthly revenue […]* […]*
Recovery of recurrent costs from recurrent 
receipts […]* […]*
Assumed amortisation of non-recurrent costs over four years
Total monthly recurrent variable costs […]* […]*
Margin on recurrent variable costs […]* […]*
Total monthly variable costs […]* […]*
Margin on  variable costs […]* […]*
Recovery of recurrent variable costs from 
monthly revenue
[…]* […]*
Recovery of variable costs from monthly 
revenue
[…]* […]*
ANNEX 7 - Adjusted variable costs of the eXtense service : recovery from 15 February to 30 September 
2002 (actual)
7.1. ALL SUBSCRIBERS
Cost items Amount (€)
Routing of national and regional traffic […]* See Annex 17
Cost of IP/ADSL 1 […]*
Cost of international connectivity […]* See Annex 17
Refunds […]* […]*
Cost of customer management […]*
Total recurrent variable costs […]*
Remuneration of sales outlets […]*
Setting-up costs […]* Weighting of costs in 2001 and for subscribers acquired in 2002
 eXtense promotions, end 2001 and March-Sept. 2002 […]* Allocation of costs in 2001 and 2002 across all subscribers
Cost of eXtense package […]* Average weighted cost for all subscribers
Advertising […]* Weighting of actual expenditure in 2001 and up to 30/9/2002
Direct customer-acquisition costs […]*
Monthly revenue
Monthly unit revenue from eXtense before tax […]* Taking account of turnover losses (cf. Annex 16)
Revenue from portals […]*
Total monthly revenue […]*
Assumed amortisation of non-recurrent costs over four years
Total monthly recurrent variable costs […]*
Margin on recurrent variable costs […]*
Total monthly variable costs […]*
Margin on total variable costs […]*
Recovery of recurrent variable costs from monthly 
revenue […]*
Recovery of  variable costs from monthly 
revenue
[…]*
7.2. ONLY SUBSCRIBERS ACQUIRED SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE PERIOD
Cost items Amount (€)
Routing of national or regional traffic […]* See Annex 17
Cost of IP/ADSL 1 […]*
Cost of international connectivity […]* See Annex 18
Cost of customer management […]*
Total recurrent variable costs […]*
Remuneration of sales outlets […]*
Setting-up costs […]* Restoration of fees for access to the service from 15/2/2002
€45 refund […]*
€75 and €150 refunds […]*
Advertising […]*
Direct customer-acquisition costs […]*[ ]*
Monthly revenue
Monthly unit revenue from eXtense before tax […]* Taking account of turnover losses (cf. Annex 16)
Revenue from portals […]*
Total monthly revenue […]*
Assumed amortisation of non-recurrent costs over four years
Total monthly variable costs […]*
Margin on total variable costs […]*
Recovery of recurrent variable costs from monthly 
revenue […]*
Recovery of variable costs from monthly 
revenue
[…]*
ANNEX 8 - Adjusted variable costs of Wanadoo ADSL : recovery from 15 February to 30 September 2002 
(actual)
8.1. ALL SUBSCRIBERS
Cost items Amount (€)
Routing of national and regional traffic […]*
Cost of international connectivity […]*
Refunds […]* […]*
Cost of customer management […]*
Total recurrent variable costs […]*
Remuneration of sales outlets […]*
Promotions […]* Promotions of spring 2002 allocated across total subscribers at 30/9/2002
Cost of kits and packages […]* Weighted average since the beginning of 2001
Advertising […]* Weighting of actual expenditure in 2001 with forecast for 2002
Direct customer-acquisition costs […]*
Average monthly revenue
Monthly unit revenue from Wanadoo ADSL […]* Taking account of turnover losses (cf. Annex 16)
Audience and advertising revenue […]*
Total monthly revenue […]*
Assumed amortisation of non-recurrent costs over four years
Total monthly recurrent variable costs […]*
Margin on recurrent variable costs […]*
Total monthly variable costs […]*
Margin on total variable costs […]*
Recovery of recurrent variable costs from monthly 
revenue […]*
Recovery of variable costs from monthly revenue
[…]*
8.2. ONLY SUBSCRIBERS ACQUIRED SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE PERIOD
Cost items Amount (€)
Total recurrent variable costs […]*
Remuneration of sales outlets […]*
Two months free […]*
€45 refund […]*
Cost of kits and packages […]* Reply of 24/1/2002, weighted average
Advertising […]* Presentation of Wanadoo of 4/4/2002
Direct customer-acquisition costs […]*
Average monthly revenue
Monthly unit revenue from Wanadoo ADSL […]* Taking account of turnover losses (cf. Annex 16)
Audience and advertising revenue […]*
Total monthly revenue […]*
Recovery of recurrent costs from recurrent receipts […]*
Assumed amortisation of non-recurrent costs over four years
Total monthly variable costs […]*
Margin on total variable costs […]*
Recovery of recurrent variable costs from monthly 
revenue 
[…]*
Recovery of variable costs from monthly revenue […]*
ANNEX 9 - Adjusted variable costs of the eXtense service : forecast recovery for the second half of 2001, 
only new subscribers
Cost items Amount (€)
Routing of national and regional traffic […]*
Cost of IP/ADSL 1 […]*
Cost of international connectivity […]*
Cost of customer management […]*
Total recurrent variable costs […]*
Remuneration of sales outlets […]* The proportion of migrants over the period is […]*%
Setting-up costs […]*
Cost of the eXtense package […]* Forecast cost in the second half of 2001
Advertising […]* Ditto
Direct customer-acquisition costs 0,00
Monthly revenue
Retail price of eXtense package before tax 37,98
Revenue from portals […]* Assumption in 2001 budget
Total monthly revenue […]*
Assumed amortisation of non-recurrent costs over four years
Total monthly recurrent variable costs […]*
Margin on recurrent variable costs […]*
Total monthly variable costs […]*
Margin on total variable costs […]*
Recovery of recurrent variable costs from 
monthly revenue […]*
Recovery of variable costs from monthly 
revenue […]*
ANNEX 10 - Adjusted variable costs of  Wanadoo ADSL : forecast recovery for the second half of 2001, 
only new subscribers
Cost items Amount (€)
Routing of national and regional traffic […]*
Cost of international connectivity […]*
Cost of customer management […]*
Total recurrent variable costs […]*
Remuneration of sales outlets […]* Amount indicated in the presentation to the Commission on 4/4/2002
Cost of kits and packages […]* Amount indicated in the presentation to the Commission on 4/4/2002
Advertising […]*
Direct customer-acquisition costs […]*
Average monthly revenue
Retail price for Wanadoo ADSL 17,2
Revenue from portals […]* Assumption in 2001 budget
Total monthly revenue […]*
Assumed amortisation of non-recurrent costs over four years
Total monthly recurrent variable costs […]*
Margin on recurrent variable costs […]*
Total monthly variable costs […]*
Margin on total variable costs […]*
Recovery of recurrent variable costs from 
monthly revenue
[…]*
Recovery of variable costs from monthly 
revenue
[…]*
ANNEX 11 - Adjusted variable costs of the eXtense service : forecast recovery from January to March 2002
Cost items Amount (€)
Routing of national or regional traffic […]* Assumption of €[…]/Mbit/s (Wanadoo presentation of 4/4/2002)
Cost of IP/ADSL 1 […]*
Cost of international connectivity […]*
Cost of customer management […]*
Total recurrent variable costs […]*
Remuneration of sales outlets […]*
Setting-up costs […]*
Cost of eXtense package […]*
Advertising […]*
Direct customer-acquisition costs […]*
Monthly revenue
Retail price of eXtense package before tax 37,98
Revenue from portals […]*
Total monthly revenue […]*
Assumed amortisation of non-recurrent costs over four years
Total monthly recurrent variable costs […]*
Margin on recurrent variable costs […]*
Total monthly variable costs […]*
Margin on total variable costs […]*
Recovery of recurrent variable costs from 
monthly revenue
[…]*
Recovery of  variable costs from monthly 
revenue
[…]*
ANNEX 12 - Adjusted variable costs of Wanadoo ADSL : forecast recovery from January to March 2002
Cost items Amount (€)
Routing of national or regional traffic […]*
Cost of international connectivity […]*
Cost of customer management […]*
Total recurrent variable costs […]*
Remuneration of sales outlets […]*
Cost of kits and packages […]*
Advertising […]*
Direct customer-acquisition costs […]*
Average monthly revenue
Retail price of Wanadoo ADSL 17,2
Revenue from portals […]*
Total monthly revenue […]*
Assumed amortisation of non-recurrent costs over four years
Total monthly recurrent variable costs […]*
Margin on recurrent variable costs […]*
Total monthly variable costs […]*
Margin on total variable costs […]*
Recovery of recurrent variable costs from monthly 
revenue
[…]*
Recovery of variable costs from monthly revenue […]*
ANNEX 13 - Complete costs: actual for 2001 
13.1. Budgetary balance sheet as at autumn 2001
(Source: Wanadoo Interactive, […]*)
eXtense Wanadoo 
ADSL
Average ARPU […]* […]*
Network cost […]* […]*
Margin/network costs […]* […]*
Other production costs […]* […]*
Gross margin on production costs […]* […]*
Acquisition cost spread over 48 months […]* […]*
Adjusted monthly net margin […]* […]*
Recovery of complete costs […]* […]*
Note: the heading "Wanadoo ADSL" comprises Wanadoo ADSL 1 and Wanadoo Pro.
This is why the indicated subscription figure is higher than the theoretical subscription figure for Wanadoo ADSL. 
13.2. Financial balance sheet of offerings, 2001: real August-December 2001 (adjusted)
(according to the documents supplied to the Commission by Wanadoo Interactive on 4 April 2002)
eXtense Wanadoo 
ADSL
Nominal subscription revenue […]* […]*
Network costs […]* […]*
Margin on network costs […]* […]*
Other production costs […]* […]*
Gross margin on production costs […]* […]*
Acquisition costs spread over 48 months […]* […]*
Adjusted monthly net margin […]* […]*
Recovery of complete costs […]* […]*
This presentation includes structural and undivided costs among complete costs.
Turnover losses for eXtense (see Annex 16) have been incorporated, assuming for Wanadoo ADSL
that they are twice as low as for eXtense.
2001
ANNEX 14 - Complete costs: estimates for 2002
14. 1 Budgetary forecast of autumn 2001 for 2002
(Source: Wanadoo Interactive, […]*)
eXtense Wanadoo 
ADSL
Average ARPU […]* […]*
Network cost […]* […]*
Margin/network costs […]* […]*
Other production costs […]* […]*
Gross margin on production costs […]* […]*
Acquisition cost spread over 48 months […]* […]*
Adjusted monthly net margin […]* […]*
Recovery of complete costs […]* […]*
Budgetary assumptions used
1) reduction in the cost of IP routing to […]* in 2002
2) stability in the cost of  Netissimo 1 access
3) costs of access to the service charged to the end customer and not to Wanadoo Interactive
14.2. Target business plans 2002 (after the entry into force of France Télécom's new charges)
(according to a document supplied to the Commission by Wanadoo Interactive on 4 April 2002)
eXtense Wanadoo 
ADSL
Nominal subscription revenue […]* […]*
Network costs […]* […]*
Margin on network costs […]* […]*
Other production costs […]* […]*
Gross margin on production costs […]* […]*
Acquisition costs spread over 48 months […]* […]*
Adjusted monthly net margin […]* […]*
Recovery […]* […]*
This presentation includes structural costs among complete costs
It probably underestimates the real margin since it does not take account of turnover losses as compared to the nominal
subscription charge
Assumptions 2002 : 1) […]* % reduction in the charge for IP routing/ADSL
2) […]* % reduction in the charge for international connectivity
3) Maintenance of the cost of access network at €[…]*
4) Service-access costs to be met by Wanadoo Interactive
2002
ANNEX 14 - Complete costs: estimates for 2002
14.3. Recovery of complete costs over the period February to June 2002: all subscribers
 (according to target document supplied to the Commission by Wanadoo Interactive on 4 April 2002)
eXtense Wanadoo 
ADSL
Real subscription revenue […]* […]*
Network costs […]* […]*
Margin on network costs […]* […]*
Other production costs […]* […]*
Gross margin on production costs […]* […]*
Acquisition costs spread over 48 months […]* […]*
Adjusted monthly net margin […]* […]*
Recovery […]* […]*
In this assessment, the assumptions of Table 3 are corrected taking account of a routing cost of €[…]* per subscriber per month instead of €[…]*.
The acquisition cost is obtained by weighting the cost of acquiring customers in 2001 and 2002 by their respective share of total
 subscribers at 30/6/2002. 
Acquisition costs in 2002 are determined on the basis of forecasts presented by the firm on 4 April 2002 and information on the costs of advertising campaigns 
and promotions in the first half of 2002 provided by the firm.
Losses unexplained by the increase in the number of subscribers have been deducted from the theoretical turnover (cf. Annex 16)
14.4.  Recovery of complete costs over the period February to June 2002: only new subscribers from 15 February
 (according to target document supplied to the Commission by Wanadoo Interactive on 4 April 2002)
eXtense Wanadoo 
ADSL
Real subscription revenue […]* […]*
Network costs […]* […]*
Margin on network costs […]* […]*
Other production costs […]* […]*
Gross margin on production costs […]* […]*
Acquisition costs spread over 48 months […]* […]*
Adjusted monthly net margin […]* […]*
Recovery […]* […]*
This assessment does not differ from that of Table 14.4 for acquisition costs, which no longer incorporate a
weighting for new subscribers in 2001
Losses unexplained by the increase in the number of subscribers have been deducted from the theoretical turnover (cf. Annex 16) 
ANNEX 15 - Summary of cost-recovery indicators
15.1 ALL SUBSCRIBERS
eXtense Wanadoo ADSL Weighted average
Recovery of adjusted 
variable costs 
Turnover Recovery Turnover Recovery
Aug.-15 Oct. 2001 […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
15 Oct. 2001- 15 Feb. 
2002
[…]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
15 Feb. 2002- 30 Sept. 
2002
[…]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
eXtense Wanadoo ADSL Weighted average
Recovery of adjusted 
complete costs
Turnover Recovery Turnover Recovery
Aug.-Dec. 2001 […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
Jan.-June 2002 […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
Note
For the period from August to December 2001, Wanadoo Interactive's accounting system
did not allow revenues from Wanadoo ADSL 1 to be specifically identified.
Figures for those months are therefore based on the theoretical revenue which would have been obtained 
if the average amount received per subscriber had been equal to the theoretical subscription revenue.
The theoretical revenue from subscribers thus breaks down as follows:
No subscr. end Av. No subscr. Theoretical revenue
July […]*
August […]* […]* […]*
September […]* […]* […]*
October […]* […]* […]*
November […]* […]* […]*
December […]* […]* […]*
15.2. ONLY NEW SUBSCRIBERS FOR EACH PERIOD
Weighting according to the weight of products in the growth of turnover over the period
eXtense Wanadoo ADSL Weighted average
Recovery of adjusted 
variable costs
Delta 
turnover
Recovery Delta 
turnover
Recovery
Aug.-Oct. 2001 […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
Oct. 2001-Feb. 2002 […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
Feb. 2002-Sept. 2002 […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
15.3.FORECAST EX ANTE, ONLY NEW SUBSCRIBERS
eXtense Wanadoo ADSL Weighted average
Recovery of adjusted 
variable costs
Delta 
turnover
Recovery Delta 
turnover
Recovery
Aug.-Dec. 2001 […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
First half of 2002 […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
* Before the entry into force of France Télécom's new wholesale charges
It is assumed that, for the beginning of the first half of 2002, Wanadoo Interactive could not foresee
the ban on marketing eXtense packages (27 February 2002) and was thus anticipating an increase
in revenues from the two services similar to those in the previous period.
ANNEX 16 - Reconstitution of the turnover on eXtense and Wanadoo ADSL from August 2001 to June 
2002
16.1. eXtense
Aug-01 Sep.-00 October 2001
Subscr.s Coef Turnover Subscr.s Coef Turnover Subscr.s Coef Turnover
Subscribers at beginning of month […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
New subscribers […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
Incoming migrants […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
Outgoing migrants […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
Cancellations […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
Total […]* […]* […]*
Average for month […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
Accrued turnover (€ thousand) […]* […]* […]*
Average accrued turnover […]* […]* […]*
Average reconstituted difference - 
accrued […]* […]* […]*
nov-01 déc-01 janv-02
Subscr.s Coef Turnover Subscr.s Coef Turnover Subscr.s Coef Turnover
Subscribers at beginning of month […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
New subscribers […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
Incoming migrants […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
Outgoing migrants […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
Cancellations […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
Total […]* […]* […]*
Average for month […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
Accrued turnover (€ thousand) […]* […]* […]*
Average accrued turnover […]* […]* […]*
Average reconstitute difference - 
accrued […]* […]* […]*
févr-02 mars-02 avr-02
Subscr.s Coef Turnover Subscr.s Coef Turnover Subscr.s Coef Turnover
Subscribers at beginning of month […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
New subscribers […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
Incoming migrants […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
Outgoing migrants […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
Cancellations […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
Total […]* […]* […]*
Average for month […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
Accrued turnover (€ thousand) […]* […]* […]*
Average accrued turnover […]* […]* […]*
Average reconstituted difference - 
accrued […]* […]* […]*
mai-02 juin-02
Subscr.s Coef Turnover Subscr.s Coef Turnover
Subscribers at beginning of month […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
New subscribers […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
Incoming migrants […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
Outgoing migrants […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
Cancellations […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
Total […]* […]*
Average for month […]* […]* […]* […]*
Accrued turnover (€ thousand) […]* […]*
Average accrued turnover […]* […]*
Average reconstituted difference - 
accrued […]* […]*
Average difference Aug.-Oct. 2001 […]* €
Average difference Oct. 2001- Jan. 
2002
[…]* €
Average difference Aug.-Dec.2001 […]* €
Average difference Feb.-June 2002 […]* €
ANNEX 16 - Reconstitution of the turnover on eXtense and Wanadoo ADSL from August 2001 to June 
2002
16.2. WANADOO ADSL 
janv-02 févr-02 mars-02
Subscr.s Coef Turnover Subscr.s Coef Turnover Subscr.s Coef Turnover
Subscribers at beginning of month […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
New subscribers […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
Incoming migrants […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
Outgoing migrants […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
Cancellations […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
Total […]* […]* […]*
Average for the month […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
Accrued turnover (€ thousand) […]* […]* […]*
Average accrued turnover […]* […]* […]*
Average reconstituted difference - 
accrued […]* […]* […]*
avr-02 mai-02 juin-02
Subscr.s Coef Turnover Subscr.s Coef Turnover Subscr.s Coef Turnover
Subscribers at beginning of month […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
New subscribers […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
Incoming migrants […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
Outgoing migrants […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
Cancellations […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
Total […]* […]* […]*
Average for the month […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
Accrued turnover (€ thousand) […]* […]* […]*
Average accrued turnover […]* […]* […]*
Average reconstituted difference - 
accrued […]* […]* […]*
Average difference Feb.-June 2002 […]* €
Average difference Jan.-June 2001 […]* €
Note : The figures for turnover in March-June incorporate […]*
ANNEX 17 - Cost of the bandwidth for IP traffic invoiced by France Télécom from September 2001 to June 
2002
Sources
Data for traffic supplied by France Télécom (e-mails from […]* and attachments of
3 May 2002 and 21 November 2002).
Data for average number of subscribers extracted from information supplied by Wanadoo Interactive.
Users of 
Netissimo 
1 Paris
Users of 
Netissimo 1 
provinces
Cost of 
subscribers 
Paris
Cost of 
subscribers 
provinces
Total cost Average 
total 
number of 
subscriber
s
Average 
cost per 
subscriber
Average 
speed per 
subscriber
Rate of 
connection
sept-01 […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
oct-01 […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
nov-01 […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
déc-01 […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
janv-02 […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
févr-02 […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
mars-02 […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
avr-02 […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
mai-02 […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
juin-02 […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
Average cost Weighted average Sept.-Oct 2001 […]*
per subscriber Weighted average Oct 2001-Feb. 2002 […]*
Weighted average Feb. 2002-June 2002 […]*
Average speed Weighted average Sept.-Oct. 2001 […]*
per subscriber Weighted average Oct. 2001-Feb.2002 […]*
Weighted average Feb.2002-June 2002 […]*
ANNEX 18 - Evaluation of the cost of international connectivity from February 2002 to June 2002
France Télécom carried out an accurate measurement of ADSL traffic flows from April 2002 but only on the
basis of Netissimo 1-type flows
For the period 15 February to 31 March 2002, international-connectivity traffic is assumed to be
[…]* of ADSL routing traffic invoiced by France Télécom.  […]*
This traffic is shown in Annex 17.
For the period 31 March to 30 June, the data supplied by France Télécom in its reply of 20 December 2002
is used.
The average is calculated on the basis of a weighting of traffic by the total average number of
ADSL subscribers
Average number
 of subscribers
Feb-02 […]* […]*
March-02 […]* […]*
Apr-02 […]* […]*
May-02 […]* […]*
Jun-02 […]* […]*
Weighted average […]*
Average cost […]*
Traffic
ANNEX 19 - Business plans for 2001
ASSUMPTION FOR SUMMER 2000: the various scenarios studied for charging for the eXtense package
Combination of subscription and package price scenarios envisaged at the end of summer 2000
(Source : Wanadoo Interactive)
Subscription price […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
Package price […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
Discount rate […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
Net present value 2000-2003 […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
Balance based on operating costs […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
Balance based on all costs […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
Simulation based on a subscription costing […]*, not explicitly envisaged in July 2000
according to the cost assumptions applicable at the start of summer 2000
2000 2001 2002 2003 Total
Total revenue […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
Production costs […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
Acquisition costs […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
Net margin […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
Net discounted margin […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
In compiling this table, the Commission has corrected the figures resulting from the Wanadoo simulation
with a subscription at FRF […]* and a package at FRF […]* by applying a subscription revenue variation to the average number of
subscribers of only FRF […]* per month and applying to delta subscribers a FRF […]* reduction per new client in acquisition 
costs.  It is assumed that the subscription remains stable at FRF […]*, including tax, over the entire period
FINANCIAL BALANCE SHEET OF OFFERINGS, 2001 BUDGET
 (source : Wanadoo Interactive, budget dossier 2001, […]*)
Unit ADSL figures, in FRF per subscriber Total ADSL figures, in FRF million
ARPU / month […]* Turnover […]*
Production cost […]* Production cost […]*
Monthly unit gross margin […]* Annual gross margin […]*
Acquisition cost over 48 months […]* Acquisition cost […]*
Adjusted monthly net margin […]* Annual net margin […]*
Assumed subscription price […]*
Assumed costs […]*
[…]*
FINANCIAL BALANCE SHEET OF OFFERINGS, 2001 BUDGET
(Source : Wanadoo Interactive, budget dossier 2001, final version, […]*)
Unit ADSL figures, in FRF per subscriber Total ADSL figures, in FRF million
ARPU/month […]* Turnover […]*
Production cost […]* Production cost […]*
Monthly unit gross margin […]* Annual gross margin […]*
Acquisition cost over 48 months […]* Acquisition cost […]*
Adjusted monthly net margin […]* Annual net margin […]*
Assumed subscription price […]*
Assumed costs […]*
[…]*
[…]*
ANNEX 20 - Estimate of the margin trend on the combined direct costs of the eXtense and Wanadoo ADSL 
services from January 2001 to December 2002
Wanadoo 
eXTense
Cumulated 
number of 
subscribers
Monthly 
growth
Margin on 
recurrent 
variable 
costs
Unit 
acquisition 
cost
Estimated 
margin on 
direct costs 
Cumulated 
margin on direct 
costs
January-01 […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
Febuary-01 […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
March-01 […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
April-01 […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
May-01 […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
June-01 […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
July-01 […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
August-01 […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
September-01 […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
October-01 […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
November-01 […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
December-01 […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
January-02 […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
February-02 […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
March-02 […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
April-02 […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
May-02 […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
June-02 […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
July-02 […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
August-02 […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
September-02 […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
October-02 […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
November-02 […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
December-02 […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
Wanadoo 
ADSL
Cumulated 
number of 
subscribers
Monthly 
growth
Margin on 
recurrent 
variable 
costs
Unit 
acquisition 
cost
Estimated 
margin on 
direct costs 
Cumulated 
margin on direct 
costs
January-01 […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
February-01 […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
March-01 […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
April-01 […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
May-01 […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
June-01 […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
July-01 […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
August-01 […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
September-01 […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
October-01 […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
November-01 […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
December-01 […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
January-02 […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
February-02 […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
March-02 […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
April-02 […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
May-02 […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
June-02 […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
July-02 […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
August-02 […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
September-02 […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
October-02 […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
November-02 […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
December-02 […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
ANNEX 21 - Advertising expenditure and growth in total number of subscribers
Advertising 
(€ '00)
Increase in  
number of ADSL 
subscribers 
(units/month)
January-01 […]* […]*
February-01 […]* […]*
March-01 […]* […]*
April-01 […]* […]*
May-01 […]* […]*
June-01 […]* […]*
July-01 […]* […]*
August-01 […]* […]*
September-01 […]* […]*
October-01 […]* […]*
November-01 […]* […]*
December-01 […]* […]*
January-02 […]* […]*
February-02 […]* […]*
March-02 […]* […]*
April-02 […]* […]*
May-02 […]* […]*
June-02 […]* […]*
July-02 […]* […]*
August-02 […]* […]*
September-02 […]* […]*
October-02 […]* […]*
November-02 […]* […]*
December-02 […]* […]*
[chart]*
Monthly expenditure on advertising and publicity and sales campaigns has been assessed
on the basis of the replies from Wanadoo Interactive of 13 November and 5 December 2001
and 15 March, 18 April and 6 December 2002.
Advertising 
(€ '00)
Increase in 
number of 
ADSL 
subscribers 
(units/month
xi-X yi-Y (xi-X)(yi-Y) (xi-X)² (yi-Y)²
janv-01 […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
févr-01 […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
mars-01 […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
avr-01 […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
mai-01 […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
juin-01 […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
juil-01 […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
août-01 […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
sept-01 […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
oct-01 […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
nov-01 […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
déc-01 […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
janv-02 […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
févr-02 […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
ANNEX 21 - Advertising expenditure and growth in total number of subscribers
mars-02 […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
avr-02 […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
mai-02 […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
juin-02 […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
juil-02 […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
août-02 […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
sept-02 […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
oct-02 […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
nov-02 […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
déc-02 […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
Average […]* […]*
Total […]* […]* […]*
X and Y are the average values for xi and yi
xi and yi are values assumed successively for x and y over the period 
January 2001 to December 2002.
Measurement of linear correlation
Linear correlation coefficient [chart and explanations]*
ANNEX 22 - Advertising and promotional expenditure for Wanadoo Interactive and its high-speed 
competitors (512 kbit/s)
22.1. ADVERTISING AND PROMOTIONAL EXPENDITURE OF COMPETITORS
(€ '000, unless otherwise indicated)
Aggregate data taken from the replies from Club Internet, AOL, Tiscali, Easynet, 9Online, Free,
Net Pratique, NC Numéricâble, UPC France, Noos, Nerim
Free access to the services offered by some providers has not been regarded as a promotion
Point-of-
sale 
advertising
Advertising Promotions Total Increase in subscribers
In € per 
subscriber
Last quarter of 2001 185 2.225 829 4.257 20.253 210
First half of 2002 1.935 7.095 5.435 14.465 71.342 203
Second half of 2002 1.275 10.337 16.105 27.717 196.837 141
For information : second half 
of 2002 without Free Not communicable* > 240
Total for 2002 3.210 17.432 21.540 42.182 268.179 157
* Communication of these data would reveal specific figures for Free
22.2. WANADOO'S ADVERTISING AND PROMOTIONAL EXPENDITURE
(€ '000, unless otherwise indicated)
Advertising/promotional expenditure by Wanadoo Interactive in 2001
Advertising exp. January-Oct. 2001 […]* Replies of 13/11/2001 and 06/12/2002
Promotions and offers January-Oct. 2001 […]* Reply of 5/12/2001,point 9, and 7/12/2002
Advertising November 2001 […]* Reply of 05/12/2001, point 8
Advertising expenditure December 2001 […]* Reply of 15/03/2002
Advertising activities December 2001 […]* Ditto
Promotions end of 2001 […]* Reply of 18/04/2002
Total 2001 […]*
Average per subscriber acquired in 2001 […]*
Advertising/promotion expenditure by Wanadoo Interactive in the first half of 2002
Advertising January 2002 […]* Reply of 15/03/2002
Advertising activities January 2002 […]* Ditto
Advertising campaigns February […]* Reply of 18/04/2002
Advertising activities February 2002 […]* Ditto
Advertising campaigns March 2002 […]* Ditto
Advertising campaigns April to June 2002 […]* Replies of 01/08/2002 and 06/12/2002
Advertising activities April to June 2002 […]* Replies of 01/08/2002 and 06/12/2002
Refund of €45 February-June 2002 […]* Reply of 06/12/2002
Free months of access to Wanadoo ADSL 1 […]* Reply of 06/12/2002
Advertising activities March […]* Reply of 18/04/2002
Total for the first half of 2002 […]*
Average per subscriber acquired in the first half of 2002, in € […]*
Advertising/promotion expenditure by Wanadoo Interactive in the second half of 2002
Communication […]* Reply of 06/12/2002
Advertising and marketing activities […]* Ditto
Refund of €75 […]* Ditto
Refund of €150.92 to students […]* Ditto
Total for the second half of 2002 […]*
Average per subscriber acquired in the second half of 2002, in € […]*
Average for Wanadoo in 2002 as a whole, in € […]*
ANNEX 22 - Advertising and promotional expenditure for Wanadoo Interactive and its high-speed 
competitors (512 kbit/s)
22.3. ASSESSMENT OF ADVERTISING AND PROMOTIONAL EFFORT IN RELATION TO TURNOVER
2002 Competitors Wanadoo
Subscribers at 31/12/2001 […]* […]*
Growth in the first half of year […]* […]*
Growth in July/August 2002 […]* […]*
Growth in September-December 2002 […]* […]*
Simulation new sales, taxes excluded, in 2002 […]* […]* Wanadoo's advertising and promotion effort
Simulation turnover, taxes excluded, in 2002 […]* […]*  as a proportion of turnover in 2001:
Total advertising/promotions 2002 […]* […]* […]*
Advert. + promos/delta sales 2002 […]* […]*
Advert. + promos/total turnover 2002 […]* […]*
Simplified assumptions  . Subscribers in the first half of the year are counted for nine months on average
. New subscribers in July-August are counted for five months on average
. New subscribers in September-December 2002 are counted for two months on average
. Subscription at €45, all taxes included, for competitors of Wanadoo Interactive**
. Wanadoo : real turnover used for the first half of 2002; reconstituted turnover 
  used for the second half of 2002
For competitors of Wanadoo the turnover is over-estimated, partly because of cheaper non-packaged
offers and partly because Free was offered at €30.  However, it is not possible to supply non-aggregate data without
revealing competitors' business secrets.
ANNEX 23 - Comparison of total number of high-speed subscribers of Noos, Club Internet and 
Wanadoo Interactive from December 1999 to March 2001
31-Dec-99 30-Jun-00 30-sept-00 31-Dec-00 31-mars-01
Wanadoo ADSL subscribers (A) […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
Interactive Cable subscribers (B) […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
All subscribers (C) […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
Weekly growth (D) […]* […]* […]* […]*
T-Online France All subscribers (E) […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
(Club Internet) Weekly growth (F) […]* […]* […]* […]*
Noos All subscribers (G) […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
Weekly growth (H) […]* […]* […]* […]*
Comparison Wanadoo/T-Online ADSL (A)/(E) […]* […]* […]* […]*
All subscribers (C)/(E) […]* […]* […]* […]*
Growth (D)/(F) […]* […]* […]* […]*
Comparison Wanadoo / Noos All subscribers (C)/(G) […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
Growth (D)/(H) […]* […]* […]* […]*
ANNEX 24 - Comparison of high-speed and low-speed offerings
Subscriptions 
June 2001 in €
Residential 
high-speed 
512
Low-speed 
flat-rate 20 
hours
Low-speed 
flat-rate 30 
hours
Low-speed 
flat-rate 40 
hours
High-speed 
subscription/highest 
low-speed flat-rate
Club Internet 44,9 14,8 3,0
AOL 23,6
Infonie 45,6 15,0 29,0 1,6
Liberty Surf 44,9 14,5 3,1
Mangoosta 59,5
Netup 10,5 19,7
Netclic 13,7
Nerim 65,2
Noos 57,5
Oreka 12,0
UPC 44,0
9Telecom 12,0
Worldonline 66,5 22,7 2,9
Wanadoo 45,4 14,9 22,6 2,0
Average 52,6 13,4 23,0 24,3 2,2
Subscriptions 
mid-October 
2002 in €
Residential 
high-speed 
512
Low-speed 
flat-rate 20 
hours
Low-speed 
flat-rate 30 
hours
Low-speed 
flat-rate 40 
hours
Low-speed flat-
rate 50 hours
Low-speed 
unlimited
High-speed 
subscription/highest 
low-speed flat-rate
Club Internet 45,00 14,00 19,00 2,4
AOL 44,99 16,90 24,99 1,8
Cario 18,50
Dixinet 46,00
Easynet 50,00
Free 30,00 14,94
Freesurf 45,00
Tiscali 44,90 14,48 22,50 24,95 1,8
Nerim 42,46
Noos 39,00
Oreka 39,95 12,00 3,3
UPC 43,99
9Online 45,00 12,00 24,00 1,9
Worldonline 66,53 22,71 2,9
Wanadoo 45,43 15,00 20,00 25,00 1,8
Average 44,9 14,1 20,7 22,0 2,0
For AOL and Cario, 15 and 25-hour flat-rates have been included in 20 and 30-hour flat-rates
ANNEX 25 - High-speed/low-speed interchangeability
Assumptions concerning user reactions to price variations: Novatris survey.
Assumptions concerning margins: margins on recurrent cost of Wanadoo Interactive
eXtense
Periods since January 2001 January-
July 2001
August-
October 
2001
November 
2001-
February 
2002
February-
September 
2002
After 
October 
2002
Retail price, taxes excluded […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
10 % increase […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
Unit margin on variable costs […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
Additional gain […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
Profit shortfall […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
Variation in profit after 10% increase […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
Wanadoo ADSL
Periods since January 2001 January-
July 2001
August-
October 
2001
November 
2001-
February 
2002
February-
September 
2002
After 
October 
2002
Retail price, taxes excluded […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
10 % increase […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
Unit margin on variable costs […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
Additional gain […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
Profit shortfall […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
Variation in profit after 10 % increase […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
Conclusion : over the entire period, the 10% price increase is profitable and the test is satisfied. 
ANNEX 26 - Growth-rate trend for Wanadoo and its competitors
S 1 2000 S 2 2000 Q 1 2001 Q 2 2001 Q 3 2001Q 4 2001 Q 1 2002 Q 2 2002 Q 3 2002 Q 4 2002
Wanadoo […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
All cable modem 
suppliers (except 
Wanadoo)
771 1.315 1.415 888 280 238 -68 838 375 -329
All ADSL suppliers 
(except Wanadoo) 63 131 470 591 299 666 2.847 2.296 1.240 10.270
Overall total […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
Wanadoo's share of 
growth […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*
[chart]*
The graph illustrates the  weekly growth trend in the number of subscribers of Wanadoo
and all its competitors (via cable modem and ADSL)
The sales of cable operators crumbled in the first quarter of 2001.  Sales of competing ADSL providers
only took off from October 2002 (end of the abuse). The drop in Wanadoo's sales in the spring of 2002 was
due to the effects of the prohibition on marketing eXtense in FT's sales outlets following the French competition
council's decision in February 2002.
